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 Abstract 
Access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising of their 
utilisation (short: ABS) is a central issue in the Convention on Biological Diversity. ABS is 
intended as mechanism to create economic incentives for biodiversity conservation. However, 
its implementation is not satisfyingly achieved yet. Transaction costs for creating agreements 
between users and providers of genetic resources are often referred to as impediment. During 
the consultations for an international regime for ABS contract standardisation in the form of 
voluntary “menus of model contract clauses” has been suggested as counter measure. To map 
the potential and design options of such an instrument research was demanded by the 
international community. 
The focus of analysis in this work is on users of genetic resources, since they form the 
demand side in the market. In a first step problems occurring in the creation of ABS 
agreements are identified and analysed with a new institutional economics theory framework. 
Based thereupon, chances and limitations of the suggested instrument are assessed. Then, a 
governance-theory concept with transaction cost economics and strategic management is 
developed and tested. It defines similarity of transactions with genetic resources with regard 
to the choice of governance forms and creates the ground for design recommendations for a 
model-clause instrument. A mix of methods including exploratory and standardised data 
collection and the corresponding evaluation techniques are applied. Literature review and 
exploratory interviews and group discussions served to choose appropriate theories, narrow 
down the set of variables, and operationalise the theory for quantitative analyses. To verify 
the developed theories correlations between transaction variables and transaction-cost proxies 
(problem analysis) respectively governance elements (governance analysis) are tested. 
The problem analysis shows that transaction costs can be an impediment for the creation of 
ABS agreements. Factors inducing transaction costs (transaction cost factors) can be 
distinguished in three categories: (1) the nature of the transaction subject and the utilisation 
intention (e.g. uncertainty and complexity of the provider contribution), (2) the institutional 
transaction environment in the provider country (including property rights systems, 
information management about ABS, and the organisation of access negotiations), and (3) 
user characteristics, such as access to legal and management capacities. 
Menus of model contract clauses can substitute users and providers‟ lack of capacities for 
formulating agreements in contractual form. Complementary guidelines would be required to 
support the translation of individual cases content-wise for each relevant contract element. 
Several transaction cost factors cannot be tackled by a voluntary model-clause instrument, 
among others search of market information, information about the value of resources, and 
several aspects of the provider countries‟ transaction environment. It can therefore be stated 
that the effects of a voluntary instrument like model clauses are limited. However, particularly 
for small companies and small-scale research it could make a substantial difference, since 
lack of legal capacities is most prevalent in these user groups. 
 The governance analysis provides a basis for the development of menus of model clauses and 
complementary guidelines. Contract elements with relevant governance functions, such as 
monetary and non-monetary compensation, conflict resolution mechanisms, contract duration 
and contracting approach, and design options for each element are identified empirically and 
functional differences explained theoretically. Transaction attributes, user, provider, as well as 
demand characteristics assumingly determining governance choice are identified and 
characterised for transactions with genetic resources. The operationalisation of governance 
forms and explanatory variables for quantitative analyses in this research field is a major 
contribution to the literature, which previously was limited to qualitative surveys and case 
studies. 
The results of hypotheses tests in the framework of the governance analysis indicate that 
several explanatory variables are relevant as predicted. Variation of provider contribution and 
synergy effects of non-monetary benefit-sharing are significantly associated with several 
governance elements. This supports a triangulation of theories as suggested. Several classical 
transaction-cost hypotheses are not supported, though. In the framework of future research the 
theory could be further developed and the operationalisation of certain variables refined. 
Homogeneity of cases within certain user-industries, e.g. pharmacy is not confirmed. A 
differentiation of contract standardisation in accordance with user sectors is therefore not 
recommended. Instead, an instrument is suggested that provides a menu of model clauses for 
each functional contract element reflecting the different governance options, e.g. different 
types of monetary compensation varying in attributes of flexibility and opportunism-control. 
Contracting parties would characterise their case according to the transaction variables 
identified as relevant and therewith receive recommendations for adapted contract clauses for 
each functional contract element. 
 
 
 Kurzfassung 
Zugang zu genetischen Ressourcen und die gerechte und ausgewogene Aufteilung der aus der 
Nutzung entstehenden Vorteile (kurz: Zugang und Vorteilsausgleich oder ABS) ist ein 
zentrales Thema in der Konvention über die Biologische Vielfalt. Zugang und 
Vorteilsausgleich soll ökonomische Anreize zum Erhalt der Biodiversität schaffen. Die 
Umsetzung in der Praxis ist bisher jedoch noch nicht zufriedenstellend erreicht. 
Transaktionskosten für die Gestaltung von Vereinbarungen zwischen Nutzern und 
Bereitstellern von genetischen Ressourcen werden häufig als wesentlicher Hinderungsgrund 
genannt. Im Rahmen der Konsultationen für ein internationales ABS-Regime wurde 
Vertragsstandardisierung in Form von freiwilligen Modellklauseln für ABS-Verträge als 
Gegenmaßnahme vorgeschlagen. Um das Potential und Ausgestaltungsmöglichkeiten eines 
solchen Instruments zu eruieren, hat die internationale Gemeinschaft Forschung zu dem 
Thema gefordert. 
Der Fokus der Analyse in dieser Arbeit liegt auf den Nutzern genetischer Ressourcen, da 
diese die Nachfrageseite des Marktes bilden. Im ersten Schritt werden Probleme der 
Gestaltung von ABS-Vereinbarungen identifiziert und anhand von Theorien der Neuen 
Institutionenökonomik analysiert. Darauf basierend können die Chancen und Grenzen des 
Instruments beurteilt werden. Anschließend wird ein Governance-Theorie Konzept, 
basierende auf Transaktionskostenökonomik und Strategischem Management, entwickelt und 
getestet. Dieses Theoriekonzept definiert Ähnlichkeit von Transaktionen mit genetischen 
Ressourcen mit Hinblick auf die Wahl vertraglicher Steuerungsmechanismen und bietet die 
Grundlage für Empfehlungen zu einem Modellklausel-Instrument. 
Es wird ein Methodenmix mit explorativer und standardisierter Datenerhebung und 
entsprechenden Auswertungsmethoden angewendet. Leitfadengestützte, explorative 
Einzelinterviews und Gruppendiskussionen dienen dazu relevante Theorien auszuwählen, die 
Variablensets einzugrenzen und für eine Operationalisierung der Theorie für quantitative 
Analysen. Zur Überprüfung der entwickelten Theorien werden schließlich Korrelationen 
zwischen Transaktionsvariablen und Transaktionskosten (Problemanalyse) bzw. Governance-
Formen (Governance-Analyse) getestet. 
Die Problemanalyse hat gezeigt, dass Transaktionskosten einen Hinderungsgrund für das 
Erzielen von ABS-Vereinbarungen darstellen können. Transaktionskosten-Faktoren können in 
drei Kategorien unterschieden werden: (1) Die Natur des Transaktionsobjektes und der 
Nutzungsweise (z. B. Unsicherheitscharakteristika und die Komplexität des Beitrags durch 
den Bereitsteller), (2) die Transaktionsumwelt im Bereitsteller-Land (einschließlich 
Eigentumsrechtssystem, Informationsmanagement für ABS sowie die Organisation des 
Zugangsprozesses), und (3) Eigenschaften des Nutzers, wie z.B. Zugang zu juristischem 
Knowhow und Managementkapazitäten eine Rolle. 
Eine Auswahl von Modelklauseln für ABS-Verträge kann fehlendes juristisches Knowhow 
von Nutzern sowie Bereitstellern für die Formulierung einer Vereinbarung in Vertragsform 
 substituieren. Weitergehende Guidelines, eine Art Gebrauchsanweisung zur Auswahl 
geeigneter Klauseln, ist für die Übersetzung der individuellen Eigenschaften eines Falles in 
geeignete Inhalte für sämtliche relevanten Vertragselemente notwendig. Mehrere 
Transaktionskostenfaktoren können überdies nicht durch Modellklausel-Instrument 
beeinflusst werden, unter anderem die Suche nach Marktinformationen sowie 
Informationsbeschaffung über den Wert von Ressourcen und einige Aspekte der 
Transaktionsumwelt in Bereitsteller-Ländern. Es kann also konstatiert werden, dass die 
Effekte des Instruments auf die Umsetzung von ABS eher begrenzt wären. Insbesondere für 
kleine Unternehmen und Forschungsprojekte mit sehr begrenztem Budget, könnte jedoch eine 
erhebliche Erleichterung geschaffen werden, da für solche Nutzer juristisches Knowhow am 
ehesten ein begrenzender Faktor ist. 
Die Governance-Analyse liefert eine Grundlage für die Entwicklung von Modellklauseln und 
ergänzenden Guidelines. Vertragselemente mit Steuerungsfunktionen, wie monetäre und 
nicht-monetäre Kompensation, Konfliktlösungsmechanismen, Vertragsdauer und Art der 
Vertragsschließung, sowie die Ausgestaltungsformen dieser Vertragselemente in der Praxis 
wurden identifiziert und die  unterschiedlichen Wirkungsweisen mit Hilfe der Theorie 
aufgezeigt. Transaktionsattribute, Eigenschaften von Nutzern und Bereitstellern sowie 
Nachfrageheterogenität, die in Transaktionen mit genetischen Ressourcen angenommener 
weise die Wahl der Governance-Form determinieren, wurden identifiziert und verschiedene 
Ausprägungsmöglichkeiten definiert. Die Operationalisierung sowohl von Governance-
Formen als auch erklärenden Variablen für quantitative Analysen in diesem Forschungsfeld 
ist ein wesentlicher Beitrag dieser Arbeit zur Literatur. Diese war zuvor begrenzt auf 
qualitative Befragungen und Fallstudien. 
Ergebnisse der Hypothesentests im Rahmen der Governance-Analyse bestätigen die Relevanz 
eines Großteils der erklärenden Variablen. Die Variation des Transaktionsgegenstandes 
(Beitrag des Bereitstellers) und Synergieeffekte von nicht-monetärem Vorteilsausgleich sind 
signifikant korreliert mit mehreren Governance-Elementen. Dies spricht, wie  vorgeschlagen, 
für eine Triangulation der Theorien. Mehrere klassische Transaktionskosten-Hypothesen 
wurden hingegen nicht bestätigt. Im Rahmen zukünftiger Forschung kann die Theorie und die 
Operationalisierung der Variablen weiterentwickelt werden. 
Homogenität der Fälle innerhalb bestimmter Nutzerindustrien, z.B. Pharmazie, wurde nicht 
bestätigt. Die Differenzierung eines Instrumentes entsprechend Nutzersektoren wird daher 
nicht empfohlen. Stattdessen wird ein Instrument vorgeschlagen, das für jedes wichtige 
Vertragselement eine Auswahl an Modellklauseln mit unterschiedlichen 
Steuerungsmechanismen beinhaltet, z.B. Klauseln für unterschiedliche Formen monetärer 
Kompensation, die sich hinsichtlich der Eigenschaften Flexibilität und Opportunismus-
Kontrolle unterscheiden. Die Vertragsparteien würden ihren Fall hinsichtlich der als relevant 
identifizierten Transaktionsvariablen charakterisieren und so für jedes Vertragselement 
Empfehlungen für die Auswahl der passenden Modellklauseln erhalten. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem statement 
Access to and the utilisation of genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
arising thereof (short: Access and Benefit-sharing, or ABS) is a central issue in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (CBD 1992, Art. 1). ABS was intended as an 
instrument to overcome market failure for genetic resources. Member countries agreed to 
mutually recognise the national sovereignty for regulating access to and use of genetic 
resources, and thereby set the cornerstones for an improved property rights system. The aim 
was to strengthen economic valorisation of genetic resources and thereby create incentives for 
biodiversity conservation (OECD 2003: 7). In contrast, before the CBD was enacted 
biological diversity and hence genetic resources were understood as a “heritage of mankind”, 
with free access for all and available without restrictions (FAO 1983, Art. 5).  
It is widely agreed that over 15 years after the adoption of the convention, ABS is not 
working in a satisfactory way. Fewer agreements between users and providers of genetic 
resources have been concluded than expected; as a result less benefit-sharing is happening 
than was originally hoped. A concretisation of the ABS provisions to improve implementation 
is a major target in the further development of the convention. At the Johannesburg Summit, 
United Nation member countries officially adopted a resolution that an international regime 
on access and benefit-sharing should be implemented under the umbrella of the CBD. The 
timeframe for negotiations on the ABS regime ended with the 10th Conference of the Parties 
to the CBD (COP 10) in Japan in October 2010. 
In the consultations legal uncertainty and transaction costs for reaching and implementing 
ABS-agreements were issued by government representatives, user representatives and 
“external” ABS experts (CBD 2001: 15; CARRIZOSA, 2004; GEHL SAMPATH 2005; HOLM-
MUELLER ET AL. 2005; OECD 2003: 26; RICHERZHAGEN 2007: 105). 
Incremental transaction costs for acquiring genetic resources are viewed as an impediment to 
their demand, since users‟ (companies and researchers) time and financial resources are scare 
(cf. OECD 2003: 26). In particular, researchers from academic institutions and small 
companies with limited access to financial and human resources for lengthy and legally-
demanding ABS procedures are assumed to be concerned. 
1 Introduction  
 
 
2 
 
  
Moreover, genetic resources under the scope of ABS regulations compete with resources 
available without such obligations, for instance resources that were put into ex-situ collections 
(e.g. private or public gene banks) before the CBD came into effect. Some users substitute 
natural product research with other types of research methods, e.g. combinatorial chemistry. 
And finally, though illegal, users can try to access in-situ material without concluding ABS 
agreements. This might happen with or without the awareness of existing regulations (HOLM-
MUELLER ET AL. 2005; KATE AND LAIRD 1999). Under the aspects of substitutability and cost 
sensitivity, transaction costs can be assumed to play a significant role with regard to 
concluding ABS agreements. 
A promising option to reduce transaction costs and to increase legal certainty is 
standardisation that simplifies transaction procedures. In a previous user survey, 
standardisation scored well among a range of suggested measures to improve ABS 
implementation (HOLM-MUELLER ET AL. 2005). Several authors recommend applying 
standardisation in various forms, mostly with the argument of transaction costs reduction and 
improvement of legal certainty (cf. YOUNG 2004; BARBER ET AL. 203; UGALDE 2003; VISSER 
ET AL. 2000). Contract standardisation, which is in the focus of this research, has not been the 
subject of in-depth research in the literature so far. 
In the beginning of 2007 the German Federal Agency for Nature Conservation (BfN) initiated 
a research project for an investigation of new instruments for an international regime on 
access and benefit-sharing. The focus of the project was on measures to support the creation 
of ABS agreements by reducing transaction costs and improving legal certainty for users and 
providers. Under consideration of previous research and recent developments within the CBD 
negotiations, a problem analysis on the level of bilateral ABS agreements and a governance 
analysis of contracts for transactions with genetic resources were defined as the main fields of 
investigation. Based on the results of this project, recommendations for a potential contract-
standardisation instrument were to be developed. The present dissertation was written based 
on this research project. 
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1.2 A closer look at the research subject 
The research subject is access and benefit-sharing, or more precisely transactions with genetic 
resources. ABS has several dimensions, however, which are important for the development of 
this work. 
The political dimension of access and benefit-sharing 
Access and benefit-sharing was developed as multinational institutional framework for using 
the value of genetic resources in research and in the commercial sector for achieving the 
objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which are 
 Environment conservation => biodiversity conservation for ecological reasons, e.g. 
ecosystem functions; 
 Distributive justice and development => transfer of financial and technological resources, 
know-how to developing countries, internalisation/compensation for positive global 
externalities of biodiversity existence/conservation; distribution of property rights for 
genetic material and traditional knowledge (cf. OECD 2003: 8; YOUNG 2004: 286); and 
 Trade and commercial policy, intellectual property rights issues => access to genetic 
resources for (commercial) utilisation. 
The convention builds the institutional frame for ABS with several pillars. Article three is the 
basis, as it affirms and secures the sovereignty of the countries over their genetic resources 
(CBD 1992: Art. 3). Moreover, article three states that it is the responsibility of CBD member 
countries “to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to 
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” (CBD 
1992: Art. 3). Article 15 contains more “concrete” provisions related to access and to benefit-
sharing (CBD 1992: Art. 15). Figure 1 summarises the most important matters of the ABS 
articles and illustrates the linkages between the regulations and the three objectives stated in 
Art. 1 of the convention. 
1 Introduction  
 
 
4 
 
  
Source: Authors‟ illustration, based on CBD, 1992 
Figure 1: Access and benefit-sharing provisions in the Convention on Biological Diversity 
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The scope of the ABS provisions is limited to the utilisation of genetic resources (as a part of 
the biological diversity) (CBD 1992, Art. 1 and Art. 15). In this context, genetic resources are 
defined as “genetic material of actual or potential value” and genetic material covers “any 
material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity” 
(CBD 1992: Art. 2). The utilisation of biological resources as raw biological material is 
therefore originally not covered by the convention text on ABS. However, if biological 
resources are also used for their genetic information, for example to produce offspring, the 
utilisation would fall under the scope of ABS (cf. Latorre 2005: pp. 38). According to TEN 
KATE AND LAIRD (1999) “it is widely accepted that the scope of Article 15 [of the CBD] is 
confined on the use of genetic resources for their genetic purpose” (pp. 17). National ABS 
regulations and bilateral contracts demonstrate however, that the interpretation of scope has 
been heterogeneous in reality so far. 
The CBD articles are legally binding international law. Hence, they are binding for countries, 
but not directly for private entities such as companies and research institutions that want to 
use genetic resources. By ratification the member countries commit themselves to implement 
the CBD provisions on national level and translate ABS into domestic law, administrative 
regulations and policy measures (CBD Art. 15.7). So far, the convention leaves plenty of 
room for countries to individually define national ABS systems including the distribution of 
property rights over genetic resources and the authority to negotiate Prior Informed Consent 
(PIC), Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT) and benefit-sharing. Since the member countries have 
different interests and capacities the national systems are very different. 
The convention text provides corner stones for ABS systems, but the practical implications 
for exchange between users and providers result from the national ABS-systems. Hence, the 
institutional transaction framework is to a great extend determined by the domestic ABS 
institutions in the respective provider country. However, the CBD is an evolving convention 
and ABS is constantly under further development. Concretisation of the provisions is one 
major goal of the negotiations for an international ABS regime. 
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The stakeholder dimension of access and benefit-sharing  
Users are private companies as well as public or semi-public research institutions acquiring 
genetic resources for utilisation in basic research, applied research, and research and 
development for marketable (intermediary) products. In the past 15 years a hand-full of 
empirical studies have been conducted aiming at identifying sectors or groups of users and 
potential users to describe and analyse the demand side in the market for genetic resources 
(cf. FRISON AND DEDEURWAERDERE 2006; HOLM-MÜLLER ET AL. 2005; TEN KATE AND LAIRD 
2000; LAIRD AND WYNBERG 2005). Figure 2 compiles the main groups of users or areas of 
utilisation for genetic resources. 
 
Source: Authors‟ own illustration, based on Holm-Müller et al. 2005: 18. 
Figure 2: Users of genetic resources 
- Pharmaceutical industry 
- Botanical medicine 
- Cosmetics, fragrances 
- natural personal care 
products 
- Plant breeding (crops, ornamentals, 
fruit, vegetables, other econ. plants) 
- Spice and medicinal plants 
- Plant protection 
- Animal breeding 
- Food 
- Energy 
- Environmental remediation 
- Material 
-  etc. 
Healthcare 
Agriculture Biotechnology, others 
Body care 
Public research institutions and Ex-situ collections 
- Researchers at Universities and other institutions                                     
(pharmaceutical biology, chemistry, taxonomy, materials, etc.) 
- Botanical gardens, Zoos, Herbariums, Museums 
- Gene banks, microorganism collections 
1 Introduction  
 
 
7 
 
  
The ABS provisions under the CBD are directed at entities supplying genetic resources in 
particular transactions, whereby the provider can take various forms. In the convention text a 
provider is defined as a “country providing genetic resources”. This encompasses “genetic 
resources collected from in-situ sources, including populations of wild and domesticated 
species, or taken from ex-situ sources, which may or may not have originated in that country” 
(CBD Art. 2). In practice, genetic resources are held by a multitude of different types of 
entities. 
A specific genetic resource may have one country or region of origin, but several source 
countries, because genetic information spreads over time naturally or by human impact. In 
reality, intermediaries play an important role in the trade with genetic resources. They can 
roughly be divided in two groups: commercial intermediaries (broker companies) and non-
commercial intermediaries (botanic gardens, public gene banks, etc.) (cf. DROSS 2005: 126).  
We can distinguish providers with respect to their legal nature and their relation to genetic 
resources, for example, how they acquired the material. Another relevant factor is the country 
in which a providing entity is located. As elaborated, member countries to the CBD are 
required to develop domestic systems to regulate access and to define benefit-sharing 
requirements for genetic resources falling under their territory. The implementation on 
country level varies significantly. 
CARRIZOSA analysed national ABS systems and identified several criteria in which these vary. 
1: The concept of ownership as applied for genetic resources in the territory of the provider 
country
1
. 2: The scope of regimes including the types of resources, activities and actors. 
3: The design of access procedures. 4: In some countries ABS systems have different 
regulations for access requests depending on whether the access is for commercial or non-
commercial purposes. 5: Regulations regarding the specification on compensation 
mechanisms. 6: Enforcement and monitoring mechanisms to be included in ABS agreements 
(2004: p. 17-19). 
 
                                                 
1
 See also OECD 2003: 27-28 
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Contract standardisation for access and benefit-sharing agreements  
Standardisation of ABS has been suggested for consideration in the framework of an 
international regime repeatedly during the official debates in the last ten years. The Panel of 
Experts recommended so-called standard Material Transfer Agreements (sMTAs) as a 
measure to reduce transaction costs in developing mutually agreed terms (CBD 2001: 15). 
This approach is also mentioned in the Bonn Guidelines (CBD 2002: 12). Based on 
submissions by member countries the CBD Secretariat prepared an analysis of GAPs in 2006. 
SMTAs were therein referred to as measures to overcome problems in bilateral ABS 
negotiations, such as unbalanced bargaining power resulting from asymmetries in 
information, knowledge, negotiation skills and capacity (CBD 2006: 2 and pp. 11). 
As a result of the consultations with stakeholder groups, the EU adapted their proposal in the 
submissions for ABS WG 5 and 6 in the year 2007. Instead of obligatory standard contracts 
like the sMTA, they suggested sectorally adapted, voluntary “menus of model clauses for 
potential inclusion in Material Transfer Agreements” (CBD 2007a: 49). 
The following rationales for this approach were given: 
 The reduction of transaction costs as the general contract conditions are standardised; 
 A higher legal certainty because standard options have already been tested on their 
workability; 
 Balancing negotiation power and protection of the weaker party by limiting the choices 
and hence constraining the use of power in MTA negotiations: and 
 Simplifying the information exchange through utilising electronic networks, which is 
possible by standardising information in transactions (ibid. pp. 49). 
Several member countries stated interest in this idea. It was noted in the report that further 
research on the applicability and feasibility of such an instrument should be done, especially 
regarding the heterogeneity of the different sectors engaging in genetic resources‟ transactions 
(ibid.). 
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The proposal was included in the official negotiation agenda for an international regime at the 
Conference of the Parties (COP9) in Bonn, 2008. The Final COP report refers to “menus of 
model clauses for potential inclusion in MTAs” as a component to be further elaborated with 
the aim of incorporation in the international regime (CBD 2008: 115-117). 
1.3 Status of the literature  
The level of analysis for ABS in this research is the transaction, which is in many cases a 
long-term project or research collaboration between parties from different countries. In the 
framework of the transaction genetic resources, and possibly related information and/or 
services, are transferred from a provider to a user. Two questions related to this user-provider 
relation are in the focus of interest in this research: (1) problems occurring in initiating and 
implementing transactions, and (2) how do transactions differ with regard to contractual 
solutions for governing the exchange-relation. Answers to these two questions shall lead to 
arguments for and against contract standardisation for ABS and to design options for such an 
instrument. 
This research is the first on contract standardisation for ABS agreements; nevertheless, it can 
build on a range of different types of publications on related aspects of ABS or transactions 
with genetic resources. Publications providing the basis to this research shall be presented in 
the following. The focus, type of contribution and the limitation of the relevant topical 
literature is summarised briefly. The relevant findings, however, are taken up in the respective 
theory chapters of the thesis. 
After the CBD was adopted, the community called for research on various access and benefit-
sharing issues. Today several studies on bioprospecting
2
 agreements exist. TEN KATE AND 
LAIRD (1999) carried out the most comprehensive cross-sectional survey on demand for 
access to and the commercial value of genetic resources 1999. Their study included various 
fields of utilisation. The authors describe transaction relations and types of benefits arising 
from the utilisation. The study gives also a good overview on technical and financial aspects 
of the utilisation process in different branches. 
                                                 
2
 Bioprospecting refers to the process of looking for potentially valuable genetic resources and biochemical 
compounds in nature (REID ET AL. 1993) 
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Several shorter papers and research reports have been published since ten KATE AND LAIRD‟S 
book, some by the same authors. These publications were mostly aimed at keeping the ABS 
community, and especially decision makers, informed about trends in different user sectors. 
With such background information the development of ABS measures should be supported 
(cf. LAIRD AND WYNBERG 2005; LAIRD ET AL. 2006). Publications of this strand create a 
broad and, at the same time, deep insight into different fields of utilisation, which is of 
particular value for the governance analysis in this research. Also, they give a good overview 
on benefit-sharing practice. However, the information is derived from the description and 
comparison of findings from a range of (supposedly) similar interviews and the evaluation 
and interpretation is based on “expert knowledge”. Causalities on transaction characteristics 
and governance are drawn without any explicit theory framework. A specification of the 
methods applied for evaluation of primary and secondary data is also lacking.  
Besides cross-sectional surveys, there exist a range of publications basing on in-depth case-
studies on bioprospecting agreements. Stakeholders, main elements of the agreement 
(particularly benefit-sharing) and sometimes framework conditions are described. Some 
authors generalise and draw tendencies from the comparison of several case studies under 
certain aspects (cf. CBD 2008). Again, the set-up of case-studies and the interpretation is 
based on expert knowledge, and not motivated by a (explicit) theory framework.  
An exception in this branch of the topical literature is GEHL SAMPATH (2005). She uses 
transaction cost economics and economic theory of contracting to investigate market 
imperfections for bioprospection in the area of pharmaceutical R&D and biomedicine. The 
focus is on property rights issues. She analyses the utilisation process and ABS agreements as 
background information to discuss and develop recommendations for property rights systems 
that minimize transaction costs while balancing interests of different stakeholder groups 
(commercial interests of users, compliance with property rights for access and traditional 
knowledge, as well as biodiversity conservation). GEHL SAMPATH applies an 
“interdisciplinary law and economics methodology”, whereby theoretical considerations are 
substantiated by examples of ABS agreements. The information stems mostly from the 
literature and partly from personal communication with stakeholders of bioprospecting 
collaborations. 
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A further exception are MULHOLLAND AND WILMAN (2003) who investigate the question as to 
whether (monetary) incentive structures in bioprospecting agreements can be optimised in a 
way to induce an economically optimal level of provider effort for biodiversity conservation. 
The authors develop a dynamic economic model based on assumptions of (formal) contract 
theory (principal-agent theory) to predict provider efforts. With this model at hand 
compensation structures in existing bioprospecting contracts are analysed. The focus and 
method of the paper differs from the present research. However, some assumptions on market 
imperfections, as well as findings on transaction and governance characteristics inherent in 
their model, shall be considered in the theory framework in this study. 
Another strand of literature deals with the analysis and comparison of national ABS systems. 
By discussing empirical experiences of the different systems RICHERZHAGEN (2007) defines 
“success factors” and recommendations for policy making derived, mostly on the national 
level in provider countries. The author employs new institutional economics to develop the 
framework of analysis, and compare three domestic ABS systems to derive and test the 
critical factors. CARRIZOSA ET AL. (2004) as well as LEWIS-LETTINGTON AND WANYIKI (2006) 
are two further examples of publications based on comprehensive provider country-case 
studies. Here findings are generated without an explicit theory framework, though. However, 
all three studies provide valuable starting points for developing the theory framework for 
problem identification and analysis in this research. 
A few cross-sectional user studies investigate institutional insufficiencies in provider 
countries as sources for implementation problems for ABS agreements (FRISON AND 
DEDEURWAERDERE 2006; HOLM-MUELLER ET AL. 2005; LATORRE 2005). 
In a paper on economic issues of ABS, the OECD (2003) discusses theoretical reasons for 
market failure for genetic resources. As critical issues are identified: (1) property rights 
regimes for genetic resources (the national system is are the most relevant in this research), 
(2) uncertainty and imperfect information regarding the timing and quantity of returns on 
bioprospection, and hence the value of genetic resources in the intended utilisation, (3) 
transaction costs for acquiring genetic resources, as well as the (4) bargaining context 
including unbalanced power, e.g. due to the market form, and information asymmetries 
regarding the subject of transaction as well as knowledge of the market, access to lawyers, 
etc. (p. 22-27). In an additional comparison of case studies the range of characteristics for 
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several governance elements in ABS agreements are described, such as monetary and non-
monetary benefit-sharing and the timing of when contracts are concluded. References to the 
previously developed theory framework are weak, though. The aim of the project and the role 
of each stakeholder in the project were identified as factors influencing the choice of benefit-
sharing mechanisms among others. Many other “explanatory” factors of potential relevance 
are not considered in the comparison. 
The issue of standardisation has been taken up by several authors working on potential 
instruments for enhancing the implementation of ABS. Work by VISSER ET AL. (2000) 
indicates that transactional costs borne in individually negotiated transactions with genetic 
resources can be very high and significantly reduced by applying standardisation of 
transaction procedures and benefit-sharing obligations. BARBER ET AL. (2003) refer to 
standardisation in the context of the certificate of origin discussion. They recommend a 
standardised “gene flow documentation” to simplify the recognition of the existence of PIC, 
to increase legal certainty, to reduce transaction costs, to facilitate tracking of genetic 
resources, to increase the trade in genetic resources, and support more flexible ABS rules and 
procedures (UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY 2003: 38). UGALDE (2007) suggests documentation 
standards for genetic resource transfer and standards for benefit-sharing obligations for 
genetic resources as elements of an international ABS regime (p. 36). DROSS AND WOLFF 
recommend procedural standards for ABS to keep down the transaction costs for a certificate 
of legal provenance for genetic resources acquired from in-situ sources (2005: pp.134). All 
these publications are based on the considerations of legal experts. An analysis based on 
economic theory regarding the applicability and feasibility of respective suggestions is 
lacking, even though transaction costs are mentioned as arguments in almost all publications. 
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1.4 Objectives of the research 
This research has two overall objectives: it aims at bringing forward the debate on contract 
standardisation as an ABS instrument, and it shall contribute to the literature on transaction 
costs and governance-choice for transactions with genetic resources. To achieve these goals 
the following set of research questions affiliated with two aspects of transactions with genetic 
resources are defined and shall be answer in the framework of the present dissertation: 
1. What types of transaction costs characterise ABS agreements? 
2. Do transaction costs impede the creation of ABS agreements? 
3. Can a voluntary “model-clause instrument” tackle the 
identified problems and support the creation of ABS 
agreements? 
4. How can governance forms for transactions with genetic 
resources under the scope of the CBD be characterised and 
distinguished? 
5. What factors determine the choice of governance forms in the 
case of transactions with genetic resources (relevant 
transaction characteristics)? 
6. How can a “model-clause instrument” be designed taking into 
account theory-based findings on interrelations between 
governance forms and transaction characteristics? 
7. Is the sectoral approach a feasible concept to characterise cases 
with respect to adapted model-clauses?  
Problem analysis 
Governance analysis 
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The transaction process, including its stages and activities, has to be specified. Types of 
transaction costs arising in each stage and the sources, as well as determining factors shall be 
identified. New institutional economic theories shall be consulted to guide exploratory 
research on these questions. Based on the theory and the findings hypotheses on interrelations 
of transaction costs and transaction characteristics shall be developed, and tested with the 
author‟s empirical data. The findings of the problem analysis are discussed with regard to the 
features of a model-clause instrument for ABS agreements, and conclusions on the chances 
and limitations of the measure will be deduced. 
An in-depth discussion of current problems is a prerequisite to evaluate the general chances 
and limitations of an instrument based on contract standardisation for enhancing the 
implementation of ABS. Tackling the problem subject creates therewith a justification for 
further research on design aspects of the model-clause instrument. 
According to theory, standardisation is only suitable for circumstances where similar 
economic interaction is carried out repeatedly (cf. KESTING AND SMOLINSKI 2007). What 
constitutes similarity with respect to contract standardisation for transactions with genetic 
resources, however, has not yet been defined. On the basis of economic theories, i.e. the 
governance approach of transaction cost economics and elements of strategic management 
theory, a framework for a governance analysis shall be developed. Ways to characterise and 
distinguish contractual solutions for ABS agreements and factors contributing to the variation 
of contractual solutions shall be identified for this framework. 
In a subsequent step, with the help of literature and findings from exploratory research, 
transaction variables and the governance variables shall be operationalized in form of 
standardised, “closed” questions. Sets of theory-based hypotheses about interrelations of 
governance elements and transaction variables shall be specified and tested with the author‟s 
empirical data. The development of the governance-hypotheses framework and the 
operationalisation of the variables for this type of analysis are a major contribution to the 
literature, moreover, a foundation of a possible design-concept for a model-clause instrument. 
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In the political debate, a sectoral differentiation of ABS instruments was suggested. It is 
assumed that transactions differ in accordance with sector affiliation, since the way of 
utilisation (the R&D methods) vary. With the help of the previously developed and tested 
theory the sectoral approach to contract-standardisation for ABS transactions shall be revised. 
1.5 Research approach and structure of this work 
This research focuses on individually negotiated agreements for transactions with genetic 
resources between users (companies and research institutes) and entities in source countries 
acting as officially appointed providers. Intermediary providers, such as international culture 
collections or gene-banks, are of less relevance, since they usually apply highly standardised 
procedures. Moreover, they are the holders of genetic resources (not owners) and do not 
represent a specific provider country as the official access authority. Since intermediaries do 
not possess the same property rights over the resource, the motivation and behaviour of such 
entities can be assumed to diverge from that of an initial resource owner. 
In the problem analysis, transaction cost economics and property rights theory as well as 
principal-agent theory are employed to guide the exploratory investigation, and to interpret its 
results. The results are then condensed into a set of hypotheses on associations between 
transaction costs and transaction characteristics.  
The standardisation theory is used as the starting point for developing a similarity concept for 
transactions with genetic resources. Governance theories interrelating contractual forms with 
characteristics of the transaction, the user, and the provider serve to specify the governance-
theory framework. A triangulation of theories from new institutional economics and strategic 
management has been suggested in the literature and tested in empirical studies before, but 
not in the field of transactions with genetic resources. It is appropriate to test the synthesis of 
both theories in this context, since user and demand-characteristics are not considered to be 
explanatory variables in transaction cost economics, but indicated in the literature to vary 
significantly among bioprospecting projects. 
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A mix of methods including literature review, exploratory and standardised data collection 
and the corresponding evaluation techniques is applied for both research questions. Literature 
and the exploratory research serve to choose appropriate theories and narrow down the set of 
variables for closer investigation. Moreover, they provide information required for the 
operationalisation of the variables for quantitative analyses. The quantitative methods are 
aimed at testing the developed theory and therewith provide more profound findings for 
answering the research questions and indicate issues for further investigation.     
The dissertation is structured in nine chapters. The introduction (chapter 1) provides the 
background and problem statement for this research and introduces the research subject 
“access and benefit-sharing for genetic resources”. A short overview on the relevant literature 
is given and the research goals and the contribution of this dissertation are stated. The 
introduction chapter concludes with an overview on the research approach and an outline of 
the structure. 
The chapter on methods (chapter 2) elaborates the empirical approach. The three main 
methods: literature review, exploratory investigations, and a standardised online survey for 
user companies are specified. Chapter 3 provides the theoretical framework to the problem 
analysis and the governance analysis. The concepts of the theories and their contribution to 
the exploratory research are elaborated. 
In chapter 4 the results of the exploratory research are presented including the evaluation of 
existing model agreements, standard contracts and guidelines as well as the interviews and 
focus groups. Based on findings in chapter 3 and 4, variables for quantitative analyses are 
operationalised and hypotheses-frameworks for the research questions are specified in 
chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the standardised-online survey for user companies. The 
evaluation is structured in four main parts. First, a one-dimensional evaluation of the survey-
questions including characteristics of bioprospecting projects and governance forms employed 
therein is given. Subsequently, bivariate evaluations are presented to test the hypotheses on 
factors inducing transaction cost (here also called transaction cost factors), governance 
determinants and finally sectoral homogeneity of transactions with genetic resources. 
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In chapter 7 the results of the problem analysis are discussed. Findings on the transaction 
process and transaction costs are summarised, transaction cost factors are evaluated and 
conclusions as to how a model-clause instrument could tackle the identified problems are 
drawn. 
The results of the governance analysis are discussed in chapter 8. This includes a discussion 
of the theory framework with the contributions and limitations of this work to the theory. The 
results are evaluated with respect to design options for a model-clause instrument, which 
makes the contribution of the governance analysis to the debate on ABS-instruments. Finally, 
limitations of the methodological approach are discussed. 
The study closes with an outlook on suggestions for future research that evolved from this 
work. A short reflection is also provided on the findings of this work with respect to the 
outcomes of COP 10 in Nagoya in October 2010.  
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2 Methods and empirical approach  
This dissertation is composed of two main thematic parts, each with a different focus, but 
linked through the same research subject and overall research question. One part investigates 
mainly implementation problems for ABS in bilateral transaction agreements, while the other 
deals with governance forms and governance decisions for transactions with genetic 
resources. For both parts, a mix of methods for data generation is applied including literature 
review, exploratory data collection as well as a cross-sectional, standardised online survey, 
and corresponding data analysis. For reason of synergy, questions on both research issues 
were covered in the same survey. To some extent, the same evaluation methods were used. To 
avoid repetition, a comprehensive description of methods is given in this chapter. 
The overall research design is displayed in Table 1. The methods applied in the different steps 
are evaluated more in depth in the following sections. 
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Table 1: Research design of the present dissertation 
Phase Goal / Content Methods / working steps 
Exploration Developing the overall research 
question 
 
 
Analysis of official documents on ABS 
Attendance of ABS WG5 & COP 9 to follow up 
developments in ABS-negotiations 
(observation of negotiations and discussions 
with negotiators & stakeholders) 
Review of the topical literature for 
standardisation ideas for ABS 
Structuring Specification of subquestions to 
approach overall research question 
Choice of theories for further 
investigation on subquestions 
Defining methods for empirical 
investigations 
Study of literature in the area of 
standardisation (theory and application, but no 
relevant application in the field of transactions 
with genetic resources) 
Study of empirical transaction cost- and 
governance-literature => broadening from 
initially only transaction cost economics to 
other strands of NIE-theory & further theories 
Specification 
of the 
analytical 
framework (I) 
Developing theory frameworks as 
guidelines for exploratory empirical 
research  
Adaptation of theory frameworks & 
operationalization of governance 
theory (specification of variables & 
hypothesis) for data collection with 
standardised questionnaire and 
quantitative data analysis 
In-depth study of the topical ABS literature with 
respect to (a) implementation problems on the 
transaction level, and (b) governance forms, 
and governance choice factors 
Attendance of ABS WG6 
Individual exploratory interviews with users 
Analysis of existing model & standard 
contracts, guidelines for ABS agreements  
Group discussions with different user groups 
Specification 
(II) 
Empirical 
research 
Conduction of standardized, cross 
sectional user survey 
Testing the theory framework 
Data collection (definition of population, 
identifying multiplicators, choice of survey-tool, 
creating questionnaire, carrying out survey) 
Data evaluation (evaluating quality if data, 
choice of method, data evaluation) 
Evaluation of results with respect to the theory 
Specification 
(III) 
Interpretation 
Answering research questions 
Defining contribution to the literature 
Policy recommendations 
Interpretation of the results with respect to 
research questions 
Defining contribution & limitation of research 
Source: Author. 
2 Methods and empirical approach 
 
 
20 
 
  
2.1 Literature analysis and review of existing model agreements and guidelines 
The topical literature dealing with access and benefit-sharing on the transaction level was 
screened for information on initiation and implementation problems and governance related 
issues, as well as for theoretic models developed by other authors to approach these questions. 
Relevant information was noted, and supplemented by an in-depth review of governance 
theory and its application in fields other than genetic resources. Based thereupon the author‟s 
empirical findings from an exploratory pre-survey were discussed and complemented to 
develop refined theory frameworks on both research questions. 
The identification and examination of existing model and standard agreements as well as 
guidelines for the creation of ABS contracts is the first step towards learning how contractual 
forms for transactions with genetic resources can be characterised and operationalised for this 
research; it supplements other types of literature used to generate a theory framework for the 
governance analysis. The existing instruments are examined regarding contractual elements 
and design of these elements (how are contract-clauses designed). Moreover, in some cases 
information about the developers‟ considerations regarding linkages between the utilization of 
genetic resources and the design of the instrument are given. 
To extract information the models of legal contracts and guidelines, which are formulated in 
the style of legal documents, are analysed with a set of questions at hand that were developed 
on the basis of preexisting understanding of governance theory. In some cases additional 
personal communication with the institutions that developed or implemented the instruments 
was carried out. 
2.2 Exploratory empirical research: interviews and group discussions 
The first step of empirical research was qualitative and exploratory. Qualitative methods are 
recommended for the exploration of new and complex research fields with limited previous 
knowledge, if the logic and interrelation of phenomena are the main goals and shall lead to the 
specification of hypotheses for new research questions (cf. BORTZ AND DÖRING 2009: 308f.; 
LAMNEK 2005: 242f.; SCHÖNHAGEN AND WAGNER 2007: 7). 
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Representatives of industry associations were interviewed and information from “side events” 
during ABS Working Group 5, 6 and 7 as well as COP 9 were gathered. In side events 
stakeholders presented cases of ABS agreements and industry associations or research 
representatives gave background information about the utilisation of genetic resources, and 
their organisations‟ perceptions about useful ABS regulations and instruments. 
A series of problem-oriented interviews with individual users, companies (pharmacy, biotech, 
and plant breeding) and researchers from public or semi-public research institutes was 
conducted. Additionally, three group discussions with four to eight participants were held.  
The specific advantage of focus group as a method is that the communication tool is close to 
reality; hence, participants‟ statements can be assessed authentically. In the discussion, 
participants can be inspired by each other‟s contributions and therefore more and different 
kinds of information might be generated (cf. BORTZ AND DÖRING 2009: 319; SCHÖNHAGEN 
AND WAGNER 2007: 9). 
2.2.1 Object of investigation of the exploratory pre-survey 
The subject matter of the exploratory interviews and group discussions are users‟ experiences 
and practice with the initiation and implementation of projects including access to genetic 
resources, or the procurement thereof, as well as related rights, information and services. The 
aim was to evaluate whether a common practice exists within a particular research group, and 
to substantiate the theory concepts for both thematic research questions. Additionally, 
participants were asked to assess how feasible and applicable contract-standardisation for 
ABS agreements is from their point of view. 
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2.2.2 Defining the research group for the exploratory pre-survey 
The construction of samples for interviews as well as for group discussions was determined 
by several factors: the target groups that were chosen, contacts that could be established 
(partly with assistance of intermediaries, such as the German Research Foundation and 
industry associations), as well as addressees‟ willingness to participate and for the focus 
groups the ability to communicate in German. 
As elaborated in chapter 1, genetic resources serve as an input for various uses and purposes 
in a multitude of fields. Since the literature (cf. TEN KATE AND LAIRD 2000) indicates that 
ABS works differently in different industry sectors, and differently in the commercial versus 
the public research sector several user groups should be considered in this study. However, 
the scope of the exploratory inquiry had to be narrowed down. Three important groups of 
users were selected as research groups, namely researchers from public or semi-public 
institutions (Group A); second, pharmaceutical and industrial biotechnology companies 
(Group B) and third, plant breeding companies in the fields of agricultural crops (Group C1) 
and horticulture (Group C2). The target group “researchers from public or semi-public 
institutions” is of particular interest for this study, because stakeholders and representatives of 
this group call for simplified ABS procedures for basic research. However, so far no workable 
concept for distinguishing between basic and applied research with respect to ABS 
implications exists. Pharmacy and biotech were selected as a research group due to their 
economic relevance and because previous studies indicate that companies from these branches 
have entered into comprehensive ABS agreements with provider countries. Plant Breeders 
have a specific role in the debate on an international ABS regime, because they are partly 
concerned with the ABS system of the ITPGRFA and have therewith experiences with the 
standardised procedures of ABS for resources from the Multilateral System. Several large 
plant breeding companies and sector associations are requesting the extension of the scope of 
the sMTA to all genetic resources used within plant breeding. 
To recruit participants for the exploratory interviews, a contact network with intermediary 
institutions (industry associations
3
 and the German Research Foundation) was established. 
They helped to identify potential participants and provided contact details. E-mails with a 
                                                 
3
Bund Deutscher Pflanzenzüchter (BDP), Deutsche Industrievereiningung Biotechnologie (DIB), Verband 
forschender Arzneimittelhersteller (VfI) 
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short description of the project and the request to agree to an interview were sent out. 
Addressees that did not respond within a certain timeframe were called and asked for the 
reasons and invited a second time. More details about the survey are summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2: Details of survey “exploratory interviews with users of genetic resources”  
Target Group Number of 
participants 
Type of interview Period 
Researchers from public or semi-public 
research institutes (varying disciplines) 
5 
Telephone 
interviews + one 
email 
April and May 
2008 
Pharmaceutical companies and Biotech 
companies 
4 Face-to-face 
January to 
March 2008 
Plant breeding  companies (crops, seed 
industry), and representative of German 
Plant Breeders Association (BDP) 
5 + 1 
Telephone interview 
+ face-to-face with 
BDP‟ representative 
December 
2008 and 
January 2009 
Representative of International 
Community of Asexually Reproduced 
ornamental and fruit plant varieties 
(CIOPORA) 
1 Face-to-face 
May 2008 
 
Source: Author. 
A similar recruitment procedure as for the individual interviews was applied to invite users 
for the focus groups. In the pharmaceutical and Biotech group some participants participated 
in of both surveys. Details of the survey are listed in Table 3.  
Table 3: Details of survey “focus groups”  
Target Group Number of 
participants 
Location and Duration  Period 
Researchers from public or 
semi-public research institutes 
(varying disciplines) 
7 
4 hours (with coffee break), Institute 
for Food and Resource Economics, 
University of Bonn, Bonn 
7
th
 of July 
2008 
Pharmaceutical companies 
and Biotech companies 
4 
3 1/2 hours (with coffee break), 
Gustav-Stresemann-Institute, Bonn 
12
th
 of 
September 
2008 
Breeding companies in the 
field of Asexually Reproduced 
ornamental and fruit plant 
varieties 
4 
1 ½ hours, International Trade Fair 
for Plants, Technology, Floristry and 
Sales Promotion, Essen 
29
th
 of 
January 
2009 
Source: Author. 
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2.2.3 Survey instruments in the non-standardised exploratory pre-survey 
The qualitative interviews were conducted as semi-structured expert interviews. The 
interviews were guided by a set of open questions, which are based on theoretical and 
practical considerations, as well as findings from the topical literature and from stakeholder 
contributions in the political debate. 
Each interviewee received an e-mail with the guiding questions beforehand. Interviews with 
representatives of pharmaceutical and biotech companies were conducted face-to-face; the 
interviews with participants from the two other groups were carried out by telephone due to 
long traveling-distances. The duration of telephone interviews varied between 45 minutes and 
1½ hours; face-to-face interviews were longer varying from 1½ to 3 hours. In both cases 
clarification of remaining questions was accomplished by e-mail. 
The arrangement of the group discussions varied according to the participants‟ previous level 
of knowledge regarding ABS in general and practical experiences as well as time restrictions. 
In both respects the conditions for the group discussions with researchers from public and 
semi-public institutions (Group A) and pharmaceutical as well as biotech companies (Group 
B) were very positive. The majority of participants had extensive experiences with the 
procurement of genetic resources and the negotiation of ABS agreements. Moreover, several 
participants were following and engaged in the political debate on ABS. The conditions for 
the group discussion with horticultural plant breeders (Group C1) were less optimal. 
To guide the focus groups for key group A and B the participants were informed beforehand 
in an e-mail about the main discussion.  For exemplification an overview of core elements of 
existing model contracts on contractual elements of ABS model-agreements (findings from 
the analysis of existing instruments) was enclosed. The meeting was opened with a short 
presentation of the research project and an outline of the topics and objectives for the 
discussion. During the course of the meeting one person of the organisation team took notes 
which allowed the course of discussion and the statements made by the different participants 
to be reconstructed afterwards (cf. BORTZ AND DÖRING 2009: 319-320). The discussion was 
not recorded to guarantee an open atmosphere in which all participants could speak without 
restraint. 
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2.2.4 Evaluation of the exploratory pre-surveys 
The interview protocols were distributed after the meeting and participants were given the 
opportunity to correct any misunderstandings and respond to remaining questions. Following 
the method of qualitative content analysis (cf. MAYRING 1995 referred to in LAMNEK 2005) 
the first information was reassembled and the protocolled contributions restructured with the 
help of guiding research questions. The results were then analysed and discussed in an 
interpretative manner. 
2.3 Standardised online survey for user companies 
As a continuation of the exploratory empirical research an international, anonymous, 
standardised online survey for users of genetic resources was conducted. Subject matters were 
users‟ experiences and assessments related to the procurement of genetic resources in general 
and the characterisation of a specific ABS project. The case-specific part was mostly 
dedicated to the governance analysis. 
The target group of this survey was limited to the private sector, but including many different 
fields of utilisation of genetic resources: pharmacy, biomedicine, biotechnology in other fields 
than pharmacy and plant breeding, plant breeding (seed and horticulture), biocontrol agents, 
cosmetics and care. 
2.3.1 Development of the questionnaire 
A standardised questionnaire with a total number of 51 questions
4
 was developed, based on 
the theory, which was specified with the help of the topical literature and the findings from 
the exploratory pre-survey. The vast majority of questions are coded as closed questions 
meaning that the respondent is requested to select from a given set of answering options. 
Depending on the subject matter of the variable the answering options are coded as (a) 
dichotomous (yes / no; option one or two), (b) nominal scale (selection out of more than two 
options but without logical ranking), or (c) ordinal scale (ranking, but not necessarily same 
distance between options). This approach was applied with the aim of generating standardised 
data for quantitative statistical analysis. 
                                                 
4
 Not all questions are evaluated in the framework of this dissertation. 
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The questionnaire is composed of three thematic parts. Part one consists of questions dealing 
with the users‟ sector affiliation, the general approach to procurement of genetic resources as 
well as companies‟ experiences and strategies to keep transaction costs low. Moreover, 
participants were asked to assess the relevance of a set of institutional factors in provider 
countries and characteristics to differentiate supply/demand aspects of genetic resources with 
relevance for the choice of a provider country. Part 1 of the questionnaire could be answered 
by all companies using genetic resources irrespective of the source of the resources (ex-situ or 
in-situ, national authority or commercial intermediary). 
Questions in the second part of the survey were used to gain information about the practice of 
governance solutions for ABS agreements. Following the overall bottom-up approach in this 
research, the source of information should be the users‟ experience and practice in real 
transactions with genetic resources. The focus of interest is on cases in which resources are 
obtained from their source country and negotiations with authorised entities have taken place. 
Since due to confidentiality reasons, no access to contract documents in detail was possible, 
the following approach was applied: based on governance theories and the analysis of existing 
model and standard agreements as well as exploratory surveys relevant elements of contracts, 
overall governance forms, and factors supposedly determining which governance form is the 
most efficient were identified. These create the variables of the developed theory frameworks 
for the problem and the governance-analysis. All variables were then operationalised in a way 
that allowed them to be surveyed in a standardised online questionnaire. In the end, the 
surveyed questions characterised each bioprospecting case on a very detailed level, whereby 
anonymity of the respondent remains. 
A filter between part one and two of the questionnaire limited the sample in the second part to 
companies experienced in negotiations with authorised entities in countries where the genetic 
resources occur in-situ (even if intermediaries have been involved for support). Guidelines 
(Table 4) explained how the respondent should identify an adequate project and use it as a 
reference to answer questions in the case-specific part. Hence, each participant characterised 
in detail one particular project. The questions were formulated in a way to ensure that as much 
information as possible was revealed in order to be able to distinguish between cases, but 
aspects known to be sensitive (e.g. amount of monetary benefit-sharing, the concrete source 
country) which might have deterred participants were left out. 
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Table 4: The guidelines for the case specific part of the online survey 
In this part of the survey, we request that you recall a specific case of procuring genetic 
resources.  
Please select a case for which the following factors apply (as closely as possible): 
- The genetic resources were acquired directly from their country of origin, whereas officially 
authorised actors from the provider country were involved in the negotiations (even when 
intermediaries are or were involved for support) 
- The provider country in not a European Union member state and not the USA  
- The main features of the agreement have been legally defined at the time of the survey. 
- The agreement has at this point not been revoked and there is also no foreseeable revoking of 
the agreement.  
- It is chronologically the last case you can remember well and the last case for which you have 
the most possible knowledge. 
Note: In following sections, the case that you have selected will be referred to as the project. 
Source: Author. 
In the third part of the questionnaire company data were surveyed including the size (number 
of employees, turnover) etc. Moreover, the companies indirect capabilities, such as the level 
of experiences with complex projects, e.g. with partners from developing countries, were 
requested. 
2.3.2 Reliability and validity of the online questionnaire 
Several researcher colleagues cross-checked the questionnaire. Moreover, a pre-test with two 
company representatives was conducted. To create a common understanding of important 
terms such as genetic resources, provider countries, ex-situ, and intermediaries a set of 
definitions was given on the introductory side (see Table 5), as well as some principle 
guidelines regarding how to answer questions and how to deal with questions that cannot be 
answered. 
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Table 5: Selected definitions included in the guidelines to the online survey  
Genetic Resources: Encompasses in this survey the usage of genetic information of plants, animals, 
Microorganisms (all creatures except humans) 
- as starting point in developing active compounds for intermediary or end products 
- for identification (and modification) of genes for breeding purposes 
- as Elements of vaccines 
- for the development of inactive compounds in products 
- as instruments in the research and/or production process 
Ex-Situ: the genetic resource is stored outside its natural habitat for preservation purposes or to 
make it available for research. 
Provider country: In this survey, this is the simplified term for the country in which the genetic 
resource can be found in its natural habitat. 
Intermediaries: Institutions (such as gene banks, botanical gardens, research institutes) as well as 
commercial enterprises that mediate between the authorities and local/indigenous groups in the 
provider country on one hand and the enterprises interested in access on the other. 
Source: Author. 
In an online survey a specific challenge to respect the trade-off between maximising the 
response rate for vital questions and minimising the dropout rate. A number of questions 
required for the most important evaluations were selected and modified as compulsory 
questions; the respondent has to answer questions of this type to proceed to the next “page” in 
the questionnaire. Other questions were configured in a way they could be skipped. In multi-
item questions it was possible to skip single items as well. This approach has an effect on the 
data: the sample size varies between questions. But instead of sorting out cases with 
“missing” values for certain questions, each question was evaluated with the respective 
sample size. The reason is that data on this topic is very scarce and hence valuable. 
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2.3.3 Recruitment of participants for the online survey 
The recruitment of survey participants was a challenge in many respects. The subject matter 
of the survey is very specific, and the population is identifiable only to a limited extent. There 
exists no official or unofficial database listing (all) companies that use or have been using 
genetic resources. Not even stakeholder associations have full knowledge as to which of their 
member companies belong to the target group. Second, the topic is highly political and many 
companies are reluctant to provide data. Third, even if a company uses genetic resources, it is 
difficult to identify and reach the responsible contact person. 
A mix of non-probability sampling methods was applied. Existing literature about ABS and 
bioprospecting cases was screened for company names and contact persons; the same was 
applied to participation lists of ABS WG meetings. Moreover, the internet was searched for 
scientific conferences in the field of natural products research and companies; contact persons 
were noted if available. Different sources were searched for industry associations in relevant 
fields. In total about 38 associations were contacted via e-mail and/or telephone. They were 
informed about the research project and invited to distribute the survey invitation to member 
companies or to provide the contact details of companies potentially belonging to the target 
group. About eleven associations actively supported the survey. The number of contacts per 
association varied greatly, as some selected only companies supposedly belonging to the 
target group, while others distributed the invitation to all member companies. Following a hint 
from an expert publishing in the fields of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and genetic 
resources, the survey invitation was even placed in different “linked-in groups”, an internet 
platform for professional networking. After a period of time, if there was no response to the 
initial invitation, a reminder was sent. Companies for which a telephone number and a contact 
person were available were called. 
As distribution channels were used for which the number of invitation recipients is unknown, 
an exact number of addresses cannot be reported. The number of known addressees is about 
600. However, it has to be noted that assumingly not only companies actually using genetic 
resources (target group) received the invitation. Additionally, in many cases, someone who 
was not the responsible contact person might have received the e-mail. Therefore, it does not 
appear useful to calculate a response rate. The sampling details are summarised in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Technical details of the online survey 
Tool EFS survey, online survey in German and 
English 
http://www.globalpark.de/efs-uebersicht/efs-
survey.html  
Period November and December 2009 
Approximate number of addressees About 600 
Number of questionnaires evaluated for Part 1 of 
the survey 
Up to 77 
Number of questionnaires evaluated for Part 2 of 
the survey 
Up to 41 
Source: Author.  
A number of incidents during the course of the survey are worth reporting. Several addressees 
answered that they are not users of genetic resources. Although a pre-test was conducted, 
some company representatives indicated that they had problems with the definition of the 
term “utilisation of genetic resources”; some said the questionnaire was too long, others had 
difficulties to abstract their reference project in order to be able to answer the questions using 
the standard answering options. 
2.3.4 Evaluation methods 
The survey data was evaluated with the statistics program SPSS. The methods include one-
dimensional, descriptive evaluations such as frequency counts, cumulated frequencies and 
Median (appropriate measure for mean value for data with ordinal scales). Due to the limited 
sample size and data quality (non-normally distributed
5
 and data scaling
6
), bivariate 
evaluation methods were chosen to analyse patterns in the data, and to evaluate previously 
defined hypotheses about correlations between governance variables and transaction 
characteristics. Table 7 gives an overview on which measure was applied for what type of 
combination. 
                                                 
5
 All variables were tested for normal distribution with the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test. Almost none is normally 
distributed, though, which has to be considered for the choice of measures and tests in further evaluations. 
6
 None of the variables has a metric scale.  
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Table 7: Statistical measures applied in the evaluation of the online company survey 
 Dichotomous Nominal Ordinal 
Dichotomous Fisher‟s exact test Contingency-Coefficient Mann-Whitney U test 
Nominal X (not applied) Kruskal Wallis-test 
Ordinal X X Kendall‟s Tau 
Source: Author. 
Fisher’s exact test  
Fisher‟s exact test is a nonparametrical significance test for bivariate evaluations of 
dichotomous variables. It tests for independency in contingency tables; the null-hypothesis 
that the “relative proportions of one variable are independent of the second variable” 
(MCDONALD 2009: 70). The test is applied instead of the chi-square test, for small samples 
and if data sets are sparsely distributed, such that one or more cells have an expected 
frequency of five or less (cf. BOSLAUGH AND WATTERS 2008: 196; MCDONALD 2009: 70). 
The probability value is calculated based on the hypergeometric distribution: 
 
 
The following example of a contingency table shall exemplify the way of calculating p  
 
7 2 9 (r1) 
5 6 11 (r2) 
12 (c1) 8 (c2) 20 (n) 
P= 
n!a!b!c!d! 
r1!r2!c1!c2! 
a=7, b=2, c=5, d=6 
r1=9, r2=11,  
c1=12, c2=8 
n=20 
P= 
20!7!2!5!6
! 
9!11!12!8! 
= 0.196  
   (2-Tail) 
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he p-value is calculated in the same way for more extreme contingency tables with the same 
sum of rows and columns as the original table. The probability values are then added up. If 
the summoned p-value is lower than .05 the null hypothesis can be rejected, otherwise the 
association between the two variables is not considered significant (cf. BOSLAUGH AND 
WATTERS 2008: 196).  
Contingency coefficient  
The contingency coefficient is applied in bivariate evaluations, if one variable is nominal and 
the other dichotomous (2 x k or k x 2 -tables). The calculation of the coefficient is based on 
chi-square value 
 
 
The coefficient can take values between one (perfect correlation) and zero (no correlation). 
However, the value one is never achieved (cf. CLEFF 2008: 90-91; BROSIUS 1998:411). 
For information on the calculation of chi-square and formulas please see CLEFF 2008: 82-87 
or BROSIUS 1998: 404-405). 
n  is the sample size 
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Kendall’s tau 
For bivariate combinations of ordinal scaled variables Kendall‟s tau, a non-parametric rank 
correlation coefficient is applied (cf. CLEFF 2008: 80). It measures the strength of association, 
and indicates the direction of association. It is carried out on the ranks of data evaluating the 
similarity between two sets of ranks
7
 to a same set of objects
8
.  
First, for both sets all values are put in order and asserted a rank (the values of variable x: 2, 5, 
7, 2, 3, 3 become ranks R(y): 1, 3, 4, 1, 2, 2). In the second step, the rank-values of one set (in 
this example variable x) are re-ordered ascending (anker-set (R(x): 1, 2, 2, 3, 4) and the rank-
values of the second set are reordered in accordance with the first set (does not necessarily 
result in a monotone ascending order for second set). Then, all existing combinations of rank-
pairs of variable y are compared (R(y1)-R(y2) …  R(y3)-R(y4)). It is counted, how often the 
rank for the second observation of the pair has a higher (nonconcordant) and how often a 
lower (concordant) rank compared to the first observation of the pair. Now the number of 
concordant pairs is put in relation to nonconcordant pairs, to measure the so-called symmetric 
difference between the two sets. 
The Kendall‟s coefficient of correlation is obtained by normalizing the symmetric difference 
so that it will take values between −1 and +1. The sign indicates the direction of association 
and 0 indicates absence of association. -1 reflects the “largest possible distance” between the 
two variables and +1 the “smallest possible distance”. The correlation coefficient is modified 
for data sets with ties
9
 and different types of cross-tables. Tau-b and Tau-c both correct for 
ties. Tau-b is suitable for square tables and Ta-c for rectangular tables (cf. ABDI 2007: 1-3; 
CLEFF 2008: 118-124; BROSIUS 2007: 416-417). 
The “tau test” is used to evaluate whether the results can be generalised to the population. It is 
a non-parametric hypothesis test and therefore is robust against non-normally distribution. 
Tau is interpreted as “the difference between the probability for these objects to be in the 
same order […] and the probability of these objects being in a different order […].” (ABDI 
2007: 2-3, and see also CLEFF 2008: 118-124; BROSIUS 2007: 416-417; NELSEN 2001). 
                                                 
7
 The two sets of ranks are the values for the two variables which are tested for correlation. 
8
 The set of objects is the cases of the sample included in the evaluation. 
9
 The term “ties” means that several observations of one set have the same value and therefore the same rank. 
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The Formula for calculating Kendall‟s tau: 
 
Mann-Whitney U test and Kruskal-Wallis test 
In bivariate evaluations with one dichotomous and one ordinal scaled variable the 
nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test can be applied. It tests whether two independent 
samples
10
 originate from the same distribution. The test is based on the comparison of ranked 
answering values for both groups (samples). First, the values of both groups are subsumed in 
one group and sorted in ascending order. Each value is assigned a rank in accordance to its 
position. If two values have the same rank, an average rank is calculated and adapted for these 
values. For both groups the sum of ranks is calculated and divided by the size of each group. 
Based on the sum of ranks the U-value is calculated, which in turn is used to conduct the 
significance test. In a first step it is calculated how often a value of the first group is higher 
than a value of the second group and vice versa. The lower of both values is represented in the 
Mann-Whitney-U value, which is calculated as following: for each value of the second group 
the number of values with a lower rank in the first group is counted and added up. Hence, 
each value of the first group is counted several times. Based upon these two measures (sum of 
ranks and Mann-Whitney-U value) the significance for the null-hypothesis is calculated. Is the 
asymptotic significance smaller or equal to 5% the null-hypothesis is to be rejected (cf. 
BROSIUS 2007: 740 and 758-760; BÜHL 2005: 318-320). In this study, the Mann-Whitney test 
it is applied to test the null-hypothesis that users answering differently on the dichotomous 
question (one sample: yes, and the other: no) do not give significantly different answers on 
the second, ordinal scaled variable. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test is applied in a similar way, but it compares not only the distribution 
of two but n samples. In this study it is used for combined evaluations of nominal with ordinal 
scaled variables. The categories of the nominal variable represent the different samples. 
Again, the test is based on a comparison of ranking value (cf. BROSIUS 2007: 741 and 764-
766; BÜHL 2005: 330-332). 
                                                 
10
 Dependent samples would mean that the data is collected from the sample at two different points in time. 
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3 Theory  
New institutional economics builds on the assumption that in many contexts the paradigm of a 
perfect market
11
 is not consistent with reality. The implication is that adequate institutions are 
useful to support economic interaction. Contract standardisation is such an institutional 
instrument, and it has been raised in the debate on an international ABS regime for reducing 
transaction costs and increasing legal certainty for transactions with genetic resources. 
An in-depth analysis of problems on the level of user-provider relations in ABS negotiations 
has been lacking so far. Therefore, it is hard to assess how far such an instrument, in 
particular in form of menus of voluntary model-clauses, is actually feasible for the stated goal. 
Moreover, the applicability of contract standardisation is generally limited, and requires a 
certain level of homogeneity or similarity of the “object of standardisation”. The question is 
what constitutes similarity requirements in the case of ABS with respect to contract 
standardisation? 
This chapter provides the theoretical foundation to both main research questions: the problem 
analysis and the governance analysis. Since the main concepts of new institutional economics 
and particularly transaction cost economics are employed for both research questions, the 
chapter is not strictly separated in a theory chapter for each research question. The structure of 
the chapter does not follow the order in which evaluations of the various surveys are 
presented in the following chapters either; it is build up in a way to give a consistent overview 
on the different theories reflecting also their interrelations. 
Standardisation theory led the way to transaction cost-economics and management strategies 
as a tool for the governance analysis. Therefore, the contribution of the standardisation theory 
is highlighted first (3.1). Subsequently, the basic assumptions and terms of new institutional 
economics shall be provided (3.2). Transaction cost economics is presented including a 
specification of the terms transaction and transaction costs in the context of the study (3.3.1). 
Transaction attributes and other factors considered relevant for transaction costs and variation 
of governance forms are elaborated (3.3.2), as well as governance forms and functional 
elements of governance arrangements (3.3.3).  
                                                 
11
 Among others the paradigm of the perfect market assumes homogeneous goods, perfect information, and zero 
transaction costs (FRITSCH ET AL. 2003: p. 27). 
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Subsequently, the interrelation of transaction characteristics and governance forms is framed 
as a foundation to the governance analysis (3.3.4). Finally, the contribution of three main new 
institutional economics theories - transaction cost economics, property rights theory and 
agency theory - to the problem analysis is elaborated. 
3.1 Contribution of standardisation theory  
Standardisation can be understood as a form of regulation, comparable to markets and 
organisations, including the creation and propagation of rules for economic interaction 
(BRUNSSON AND JACOBSSON 2002:  4-11). Standardisation is often implemented to 
supplement and support other institutions, such as markets or hierarchies. Various forms can 
be found, for instance, product or production standards, a set of common definitions of terms 
relevant in the context of certain transactions, a contract standardisation, or routines for the 
procedure of decision making and action taking. The purpose and the mode of operation 
depend on the subject of standardisation. 
It should be noted that in spite of the many positive features associated with standardisation, 
negative aspects and problems have been identified as well. Developing and distributing 
standards causes costs. Not always the most appropriate, but the standard favoured by the 
most powerful negotiation party prevails. Moreover, standards can impede innovations and 
the on-going discussions and research on the matter of efficiency and feasibility of the 
implemented system (KESTING AND SMOLINSKI 2007: 427; MÜHLENKAMP 1999: 23; SFG 
INSTITUTIONENANALYSE FH DARMSTADT 2003: 20). Such potential drawbacks should be 
considered when defining the degree of standardisation for an ABS instrument.  
A special form of standardisation relevant for this study is the negotiation routine. KESTING 
AND SMOLINSKI (2007) define negotiations by two dimensions: (1) the problem-solving 
dimension, which tackles the substance of negotiation, and (2) the communication dimension, 
which is related to the parties involving in the negotiation (p. 422). Routines are defined as “a 
person‟s ability to substitute deliberate planning and decision making with replication”, 
whereby replication is understood as “the application of former solutions to current problems 
[...] in a well-founded manner”. This substitution can be gradual and limited to certain aspects 
(ibid. 421).  
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The authors state that negotiation routines may “[…] to improve the efficiency of the result” 
(ibid. 426). Routines substitute deliberate planning, if solutions found in former problem-
solving processes can be adopted (ibid. 426). Lessons learned from former negotiations can 
help to avoid mistakes, and using routines allows for economising scarce capacities.  
The predefinition of negotiation procedures and the limitation of possible outcomes can also 
reduce the problem of asymmetric information and unbalanced negotiation power. Planning 
reliability can be increased this way, and negotiation time reduced. Legal certainty is 
improved and costs for control of contract enforcement on both sides are lowered (SFG 
INSTITUTIONENANALYSE FH DARMSTADT 2003: 19; KLEINALTENKAMP 1993: 97). 
A contract standardisation for ABS, or more concrete the model-clause instrument under 
discussion, is comparable to a negotiation routine. Such an instrument shall be based on 
stakeholders‟ practice of contracting. Users and providers would contribute with their 
experiences to formalise the contents of main contractual elements in model clauses; they 
develop the routine in a participative manner. 
As elaborated before, negotiation routines cannot be applied for random transactions. The two 
dimensions identified by KESTING AND SMOLINSKI (2007) are criteria for the applicability. 
The better the criteria similarity of the problem and stability of the transaction context are 
fulfilled the better knowledge can be transferred from one problem to another. 
Transferring the concept of KESTING AND SMOLINSKIS to this research comprises the 
definition of “problem similarity” for transactions with genetic resources and related rights 
and services. This shall be done with the help of governance theories. In KESTING AND 
SMOLINSKIS‟ model “context stability” is understood as the similarity of transaction parties an 
actor faces in varying relations. With respect to ABS this can be understood as the similarity 
of strategies, needs and requirements of different providers of genetic resources
12
. An 
additional dimension of the “transaction context” is the transaction environment including the 
institutions in place in a provider country, such as legal, administrative and policy measures 
for access and use of genetic resources. 
                                                 
12
 Providers‟ strategies refer here mostly to the assessment of elements of ABS, for instance the importance of 
benefit-sharing measures, the assessment of the value of genetic resources, etc.  
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The model-clause approach stipulates voluntary application and sets of model clauses rather 
than one or several fully standardised contracts. Hence, the providers‟ sovereignty to decide 
on access requirements is not affected by this instrument. The instrument would suggest 
benefit-sharing types but no amounts, and the provider obviously participates in the process of 
selecting and substantiating the model clauses. The instrument leaves room for heterogeneity 
of providers‟ strategies and variation between domestic ABS institutions meaning that full 
context stability is not assumed or required. 
In the next step, theories should be identified that can be employed for a specification of 
context stability and problem similarity in the context of transactions with genetic resources. 
The governance approach of transaction cost economics and strategic management were 
found to deal with explaining variation of efficiency of governance forms (contracts and 
contractual elements) by highlighting a whole range of characteristics distinguishing 
transactions. 
3.2 New institutional economics – an overview and definitions 
Theories under the umbrella of new institutional economics provide a framework for 
explaining how alternative institutions
13
 influence the economic process and how institutions 
evolve (cf. RICHTER AND FURUBOTN 2003: 50; MARTIENSEN 2000: 6). New institutional 
economics is concerned principally with the “formal rules (constitutions, laws, property 
rights)” creating the environment of economic interaction and with governance structures for 
“managing” economic interaction (WILLIAMSON 2000: 596-598). 
The term new institutional economics was established by O.E. WILLIAMSON (1975:1) (cf. see 
RICHTER AND FURUBOTN 2003: 39 referring to WILLIAMSON 1975). The addition “new” 
demarks new institutional economics from institutional theories, which attempt to explain 
institutions while maintaining the assumptions of neoclassical economics (MARTIENSEN 
2000: 7). This relatively new theory field in economics is often referred to as an advancement 
of neoclassical theory in the sense that new assumptions are integrated into the analytical 
framework making it more realistic (RICHTER UND FURUBOTN 2003: 3). The perspective or the 
unit of analysis also differs from neoclassic economic theories. Neoclassical theory works 
                                                 
13
 The term “institution” in the context of this research is defined in one of the following sections. 
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with marginal analysis, wherein the economic actor is described through a production or 
utility function. New institutional economics, in contrast, works on the basis of discrete 
structural analysis of governance solutions (WILLIAMSON 2000: 600). 
Three main elements of the new institutional economics are property rights theory, principal 
agent theory (formal contract theory) and transaction cost economics (cf. RICHTER AND 
FURUBOTN 2003: 40-42). Property rights theory deals with aspects of the institutional 
environment, whereas transaction cost economics and principal agent theory are mostly 
applied for analysis on the level of governance structures. Transaction cost economics deals 
with ex-post analysis of contracts/governance structures, while agency theory traditionally is 
applied for analysis of ex ante incentive alignment (ibid. 599). 
All three theories are based on the assumption that human behaviour is characterised by 
bounded rationality (imperfect information is rational) and individual utility maximisation, 
also called opportunism (cf. PICOT ET AL. 2002: 70; WILLIAMSON 1998: 30ff). WILLIAMSON 
2000 complements the attribute of conscious foresight (p. 601). These and additional relevant 
terms shall be defined in the following sections. It should be noted, however, that for most of 
the terms several definitions exist. Interpretations diverge, for example, depending on the 
research contexts. Here definitions are chosen with respect to transactions with genetic 
resources under the framework of the CBD. 
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Transaction 
According to RICHTER & FURUBOTN (2003), a transaction is a “technical mechanism” for the 
“transfer of a good or a service across a technically separable barrier” as well as the “transfer 
of property rights” (p. 592). In this study a transaction refers to the transfer of rights to access 
and use genetic resources, and related information and rights (e.g. exclusivity rights) from a 
certain provider to a certain recipient (user). The transaction could also include services 
related to the resources, such as collecting samples, preparing samples and material 
evaluations. In return, the provider receives some kind of reward or compensation, so called 
benefit-sharing, which can be monetary and/or non-monetary, for example, know-how 
transfer, technology transfer or support of inventorisation and taxonomisation of 
biodiversity
14. The exchange relation constitutes what in political terms is called “access to 
genetic resources and sharing of benefits arising from the utilisation thereof”. 
Institution(s) 
OSTROM defines “institutions [...] as the sets of working rules that are used to determine who 
is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what 
aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or 
must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their 
actions. All rules contain prescriptions that forbid, permit, or require some action or 
outcome.” (1997: 51). RICHTER AND FURUBOTN (2003) characterise institutions as systems 
with “rules that are connected to each other in a formal or informal manner that include a 
provision for their execution” serving to govern the conduct of individuals. Examples of 
institutions are contracts, markets, companies, and states (p. 7). 
                                                 
14
 The Bonn Guidelines list a range of monetary and non-monetary benefit-sharing measures (Bonn Guidelines, 
Appendix II Paragraph 1 and 2), and case study based literature shows that a variety of measures is applied in 
practice (cp. GEHL SAMPATH 2005; SECRETARIAT OF THE CBD 2008). 
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MARTIENSEN (2000) discusses several definitions and summarises in conclusion the following 
key characteristics of institutions. Institutions are “rules in social behaviour, which 
- prohibit, demand or allow certain behavioural patterns in recurring situations,  
- evolve through processes of the “invisible hand” or through public or private contracts, 
and 
- are either incentive compatible or compliance is enforced through external authorities” 
(MARTIENSEN 2000: 16)
 15
. 
This definition encompasses institutional arrangements (contracts) as well as the institutional 
environment. The latter contains basic rules governing individual conduct, whereas 
institutional arrangements are explicit negotiation directives decided upon by contracting 
partners which serve to mediate the economic relationship (cf. SCHIRM 2004: 59).  
This research refers to several types of institutions related to genetic resources and access and 
benefit-sharing:  
(1) Contracts, or more general governance solutions adopted between users and the 
providers of genetic resources (institutional arrangements); 
(2) National ABS regimes in provider countries including administrative, legislative and 
policy measures. These institutions constitute a part of the transaction environment for 
genetic resources (institutional environment); and 
(3) Implementation instruments for ABS that are under consideration for inclusion in an 
international ABS regime. Such instruments would also be part of the transaction 
environment for genetic resources (institutional environment). 
                                                 
15
 For more definitions and a critical discussion thereof see MARTIENSEN 2000: 12-26. 
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Institutional transaction environment 
New institutional economics asserts that for the economic process the institutional 
environment is important. WILLIAMSON (1991) describes the institutional environment as a set 
of parameters (i.e. political, social, and legal) that leads to a shift in the comparative costs of 
governance (p. 287). As the transaction environment can encompass a source of uncertainty 
(cf. RICHMAN AND MACHER 2006: 42; SUTCLIFFE 1998: 2ff.), it can be assumed to be a 
determinant of transaction costs. 
In the case of transactions with genetic resources subject to CBD provisions on ABS, the 
institutional environment is a complex issue. What varies among ABS cases is the 
institutional transaction environment in provider countries. It is composed of several 
elements, such as the property-rights distribution for genetic resources, and the administrative 
requirements for access to genetic resources (cf. CARRIZOSA 2004: 14-25). 
Governance 
Williamson defines governance as “[...] an effort to craft order, thereby to mitigate conflict 
and realize mutual gains.” (WILLIAMSON 2000: 599). In this research governance is used as 
synonym for the institutional (contractual) arrangement developed and established between a 
user and a provider to manage transactions with genetic resources, related services and rights. 
Transaction costs 
MARTIENSEN (200) defines transaction costs as “welfare loss that would be avoidable, if the 
right institution was chosen” (p. 117). RICHTER AND FURUBOTN (2003) define transaction 
costs as “resources to create and run an institution (or organisation) and to ensure compliance 
with its rules” (p. 12). PICOT ET AL. (2003) focus the term on the governance of transactions: 
transaction costs are “all sacrifices and drawbacks that transacting parties have to bear to 
realize the exchange, including initiating costs, costs to reach agreement, execution, control 
and adaptation” (p. 68). WILLIAMSON (1990) uses the term friction-costs in this context to 
describe misunderstandings and conflicts between transaction partners leading to impediments 
and breakdowns (p. 325). In this research it is assumed that appropriate institutions or 
institutional measures can reduce but not necessarily completely obviate transaction costs. 
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Bounded rationality 
The acquisition of information in a transaction process causes efforts and is therefore not 
costless. Transaction parties remain partially uninformed if the costs for gathering information 
exceed the (expected) benefits incremental information would create. Asymmetric 
information or generally incomplete information can thus be rational. The amount of 
information costs depends to a great extent on the information characteristics of the subject of 
the transaction, which in this research are genetic resources, related information, rights and 
services (PICOT ET AL. 2002: 54; RÖSCH 2007: 129f.). 
Bounded rationality is acknowledged in the ABS literature as characteristic for user-provider 
relations. Often neither the provider nor the recipient of genetic material can with reasonable 
effort foresee at the contracting stage what the utilisation outcomes of the genetic resource – 
in other words, the benefits – will be (GEHL SAMPATH 2005: 65; CARRIZOSA 2004: 73). 
Opportunism 
Opportunism is also circumscribed as “behavioural uncertainty”. Parties engaging in 
economic interactions face uncertainty induced by the possibility of a counterparts‟ 
opportunistic behaviour. It is assumed that each party might try to make transactions work to 
their own advantage, particularly under the presence of asymmetric distribution of knowledge. 
According to WILLIAMSON, the ex-ante choice of the “right” form of governance to prevent 
opportunism “[...] is central to the transaction cost economics exercise” (WILLIAMSON 1996b:  
152 and 1998: 30ff.). The suspicion or apprehension of opportunistic behaviour is sufficient to 
raise transaction costs, as the other party will take actions to protect himself against such 
behaviour (KERSTEN 2004: 58ff.). This holds particularly, if it is difficult and costly to 
determine the trustworthiness of the transaction partner ex ante (WANG 2002: 161ff.). 
However, the assumption of opportunism in transaction cost economics has evoked a lot of 
criticism from researchers of other disciplines, e.g. structural sociologists and behavioural 
researchers. They argue that embeddedness and trust can alleviate the hazard of opportunism. 
Reputation is also discussed as a factor that can prevent opportunism (MEULEMAN ET AL. 
2006: 4, referring to MAYER ET AL. 1995; ZAHEER AND VENKATRAMAN 1995; HILL 1990; 
PARKHE 1993). 
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In the case of genetic resources, asymmetric information fostering opportunistic behaviour 
can occur before contracting, e.g. when providers misrepresent the value of their supply, when 
users are dishonest with their intentions for the product, and ex ante in monitoring 
relationships (cf. GEHL SAMPATH 2005: 65; RICHERZHAGEN 2007: 118ff.). 
Conscious foresight 
Conscious foresight is the third attribute of human behaviour underlying the analysis of new 
institutional economics. It captures the actors‟ ability of looking ahead and anticipating 
potential hazards. Insights achieved thereby can be considered in decisions on governance 
structures (WILLIAMSON 2000: 601, and 2003: 922-923). 
3.3 The concept of transaction cost economics 
Transaction cost economics is developed in two main fields. The measurement part deals with 
identifying, measuring and explaining transaction costs. The governance part uses the 
transaction cost minimising argument to explain the variation of governance forms for 
transactions. The core message is the discriminating alignment hypothesis that “transactions, 
which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which vary in their 
cost and competence, so as to effect a (mainly) transaction cost economizing result” 
(Williamson 2003: 926). This means that the transaction characteristics determine how 
relevant each governance property is for reaching organisational efficiency.  
The link between the two approaches is that transaction characteristics are assumed to explain 
the depended variable in both analyses: the level of transaction costs on the one hand and the 
choice of a governance form on the other hand. Moreover, governance forms as such are 
viewed as sources of transaction costs: efforts for initiation, implementation and enforcement 
differ among governance forms. Therefore, it is necessary for both research questions to 
elaborate the concepts of transaction and transaction costs, transaction characteristics and 
governance forms. 
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3.3.1 Specification of transaction and transaction costs for access and benefit-sharing 
Although transaction costs have been mentioned as a major impediment for the successful 
conclusion of agreements between users and providers (cf. OECD 2003: 26), a comprehensive 
definition of the term for the research subject “transactions with genetic resources and related 
rights and services” does not exist yet. It shall be substantiated in the following based on the 
general definitions provided in chapter 3.2. 
The “creation and running of an institution” RICHTER AND FURUBOTN (2003) define as 
transaction costs, refers in this research to the “bilateral” governance arrangement for a 
transaction (or a set of transactions) with genetic resources and related services, rights and 
information. The interest is on efforts related to the initiation, conclusion and implementation 
of this “bilateral” governance arrangement, whereby the focus is on the user entity. 
Transaction costs borne by the provider are not investigated explicitly. 
The aspect of “friction costs” WILLIAMSON (1990) uses in his definition shall be of specific 
relevance in the analyses. The international debate on the CBD level reveals that there are 
highly divergent views on the very basic provisions for ABS (what resources should be 
covered, what is an appropriate basis for fair benefit-sharing…). This indicates that in 
negotiations for concluding bilateral contracts communication problems and 
misunderstandings are likely to be significant. 
In the literature three types of transaction costs are distinguished: (1) market, (2) firm, and 
(3) political/governmental transaction costs. Political transaction costs are “the costs of 
establishment, maintenance and modification of the formal and informal political order of a 
system” and the “operating costs of a state” (RICHTER AND FURUBOTN 2003: 63-65). For the 
problem analysis on the transaction level these transaction costs are not relevant. When 
discussing the pros and cons of a standardisation-based ABS instrument in a larger context, 
they must be taken into account of course. 
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In different phases of economic interaction, different types of transaction costs arise. 
WILLIAMSON distinguishes between ex ante and ex post transaction costs (1990: 22ff.), while 
other authors identify three phases. The latter approach shall be adopted in this research as 
well, since it better fits the often complex procedure of concluding an ABS agreement. For 
market transaction costs this would be: (1) Search and information, (2) Bargaining, and (3) 
Monitoring and enforcement (RICHTER AND FURUBOTN 2003: 59-61). 
Some activities are typical for just one phase. Deciding, planning, arranging, and negotiating 
are activities that might take place in any of the three phases, however. 
Types or indicators of transaction costs user entities might have to bear in the chain of 
concluding an agreement could be the following: 
 Labour (working time of employees) 
 Travel expenses that arise because site visits, meetings, participation in conferences 
are required 
 Costs for arranging meetings 
 Hiring external consultants (for example, lawyers) 
 Costs of internal coordination, preparation of decisions in negotiations 
 Opportunity costs of the time invested in “managing” the transaction (ibid.) 
VISSER ET AL. (2000) is the only study that was found in the literature that defines transaction 
cost types and monetises them for transactions with genetic resources. The authors compare 
transaction costs of bilateral agreements with those of several options of a standardised 
multilateral exchange-system
16
. The scope of the study is, however, limited to the exchange of 
“by breeding unchanged” genetic material between users (breeders) and gene banks (national 
gene banks and CGIAR gene banks). The data stems from informed guesses and expert 
knowledge of the team of authors.  
                                                 
16
 At the time of the study of VISSER et al. (2000), it had not yet been established what form the future 
multilateral system would take. For this reason the study worked with four options: from exclusively bilateral to 
unrestricted multilateral access to all PGRFA collections. (cp. Ibid.: 7). 
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The following cost components are considered: 
 Negotiation costs (costs for lawyers), 
 Costs that are connected to accessing the resource (“pre-distribution tracking costs”) 
 Costs following access to the resource for monitoring and enforcement of the contract 
(“post-distribution tracking costs”). 
3.3.2 Transaction characteristics and further transaction cost factors 
As mentioned before, new institutional economics theories shall be supplemented with 
aspects of strategic management
17
 for the identification of factors determining transaction 
costs and governance choice. Both theories deal with the nature of economic relationships on 
the contracting level. Complementarity of the two theories for governance analysis has been 
suggested in the literature (cf. ERLEI 1999: 69; MASTEN and SAUSSIER 2000: 224
18
; SHAN 
1990: 129-131). However, while new institutional economics has been used in the analysis of 
bioprospection and ABS agreements in the past, strategic management, to the best of my 
knowledge, has not been considered in this area. In this work a framework of contract theories 
from the institutional economics side and strategic management aspects is used for identifying 
determinants for governance choice and transaction cost determinants. 
OLIVER WILLIAMSON identified three major transaction attributes: asset specificity, frequency, 
and uncertainty (WILLIAMSON 2002; WILLIAMSON 1979: 239) as determinants for transaction 
costs and governance efficiency. 
                                                 
17
 Strategic management is a branch of business administration. It consists of many branches with different 
focuses. The overall subjects are development, planning and implementation of goals and the organisational 
concept of organisations. The objects of analyses are strategies, structures and systems. The resource-based 
view, which will be consulted in this work, is one of the branches of strategic management (cf. GRANT AND 
NIPPA 2006, NAG ET AL. 2007; Ritson 2008). 
18
 “The structure of contractual agreements may vary with, among other things, the objectives of the contracting 
parties, underlying production relations, and the nature and size of informational and strategic impediments to 
contract formation and enforcement. As a consequence, theory provides no unifying structure for the 
specification and testing of contract design hypotheses.” (MASTEN and SAUSSIER 2000: 224). 
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Other researchers supplemented the theory with additional explanatory factors, partly from 
the principal-agent theory. MILGROM AND ROBERTS (1992 and 1995) found that transaction 
complexity and performance duration are further relevant transaction attributes (referred to in 
Altman und Johnson 2004: 3).
19
  
A further variable to be included is the transaction environment, here the variation of national 
ABS systems, since it is referred to as source of uncertainty in the literature and transaction 
costs in the public debate. 
Access to specific complementary assets or rights for creating competitive advantages is 
considered relevant for governance choice in strategic management. It shall be included in the 
governance analysis for transactions with genetic resources as well as variation of indirect 
capabilities or capacities of the user entity. 
These characteristics distinguishing ABS-cases are elaborated more in depth in the following. 
Asset Specificity 
WILLIAMSON defines asset specificity as: “[The] degree to which an asset can be redeployed 
to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value” (cf. 
WILLIAMSON 1996a: 59; see also cf. PICOT ET AL. 2002: pp. 70). 
Relation specific investments can take the form of:  
- Physical assets, e.g. specific machinery, laboratory equipment, hard- or software etc. 
required to execute the activity subject to the transaction  
- Human assets, e.g. learning by doing or specific training of employees for activities 
related to the transaction project 
- Site specificity, e.g. choice of location to economise on transport costs, share inventory or 
easy information exchange, proximity to resources that are subject to the transaction 
                                                 
19 MILGROM AND ROBERTS (1992 and 1995) found also that difficulties of measuring performance and 
connectedness are relevant transaction attributes (referred to in Altman und Johnson 2004: 3). Grant adds 
measurability of the value created by the transaction and interdependency with other transactions (2006: 209-
210). 
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- Dedicated assets, which Williamson defines as “discrete investments in general purpose 
plant that are made at the behest of a particular customer” 
- Brand name capital (presumably not relevant in the context of this research) 
- Temporal specificity, which refers to the risk of losses due to hold-ups in the further 
utilisation of the transaction subject, if the provider does not deliver in time, quantity, and/ 
or quality (WILLIAMSON 1991: 281 and 1998: 36). 
Relationship-specific investments require governance safeguards for economic rents, because 
the investor cannot exit the relation (transaction) without loss due to the “specificity” of his 
investments, if disturbances require adaptation. Since the other party is aware of this, the 
“investors‟ position” in renegotiations would be weakened. The other party might take 
advantage of this and act in an opportunistic manner or at least hold up processes and 
therewith cause loss of economic rents (cf. ibid.; ALTMAN, KLEIN & JOHNSON 2007: 3; DYER 
1997: 536). 
SAMPATH states that opportunistic behaviour, legal uncertainty and insufficient enforcement 
measures for contracts can cause problems in bioprospecting projects if relation-specific 
investments are or will be made (2005: 65). She found that particularly temporal asset 
specificity is a critical factor in bioprospecting R&D projects in the field of pharmacy and 
botanical medicine. At certain stages in pharmaceutical research the reliable supply of raw 
material (quantity, quality and schedule) is crucial; the process is vulnerable for hold-ups and 
investments made in the course of R&D are at risk. Similar problems can arise if intellectual 
property rights over traditional knowledge are issued at a late stage of R&D process (ibid: 95-
98). 
Asset specificity is in the theory and in empirical studies most often treated as an exogenous 
variable (see argumentation above). However, specific investments can very well be viewed 
as part of the governance structure, hence a decision variable (MASTEN AND SAUSSIER 
2000: 231). 
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Primary Uncertainty 
Primary uncertainty can be defined as the degree to which adjustments of exchange terms 
during a transaction are necessary and how predictable these adjustments are ex ante 
(cf. PICOT ET ALL 2002: 70). In other words, to what extent can the implementation of the 
transaction (including rent sharing) be structured ex ante? Sources for primary uncertainty are 
various; in general, we can say that the more complex and dynamic the activities underlying 
the project are, the more difficult ex ante anticipation will be (GRANT 2006: 420). How far 
this applies to a certain transaction depends on the characteristics of the transaction object and 
the intended use of the transaction object. 
The topical literature indicates that many sources of primary uncertainty can be attributed to 
transactions with genetic resources or the utilisation of genetic resources (GEHL SAMPATH 
2005: 65-66). 
The technological process of utilisation can be uncertain in the sense that unforeseeable 
investments might become necessary (technological uncertainty). Moreover, due to the nature 
of the R&D process, marketable or in general commercial valuable outcomes might be 
predictable only to a limited extent. Often, neither the provider nor the recipient of genetic 
material can foresee at the contracting stage what the outcomes of the investigation with the 
resource – in other words, the benefits – will be (scientific uncertainty and commercial 
uncertainty) (CARRIZOSA 2004: 73; Dedeurwaerdere 2005: 474; GEHL SAMPATH 2005: 65; 
OECD 2003: 24-25). The economic rents from marketing a product/intermediate product 
based on genetic resources can also be uncertain due to volume uncertainty resulting from 
volatile or new markets or products (market or demand uncertainty) (SHELANSKI 1995: 339). 
The performance duration can be interpreted as the duration of the delivery from the provider, 
or what makes more sense in the case of genetic resources: the utilisation duration. How long 
it takes until the user knows, whether and what amount of commercial benefits will arise from 
the utilisation influences all four other types of primary uncertainty. 
Uncertainty needs to be examined in connection with relation-specific investments; without, 
transaction cost economics does not predict that primary uncertainty influences efficiency of 
different governance forms (cf. RICHMAN AND MACHER 2006: 7; SHELANSKI 1995: 339). 
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Frequency of Economic Interaction 
Different governance forms for transactions require different levels of effort for their initial 
implementation. The costs accruing for each additional transaction vary. A reduction in costs 
for the individual transaction might outweigh higher implementation efforts if a certain 
number of transactions are reached (PICOT ET AL. 2002: 71). Therefore, if transactions are 
frequent, parties respond by investing in governance structures (high initiation costs) that 
increase reliability and are cost effective per transaction (low costs of individual transaction). 
GEHL SAMPATH stresses this aspect in her analysis of bioprospecting cases (2005: 69). 
Heterogeneity of demand 
Strategic management suggests “access to relevant complementary assets” as a strategic 
determinant for the choice of governance forms. Exclusive access to rare resources and/or 
related information might be a strategically relevant complementary asset (OECD 2003: 20). 
Cost reduction in input allocation and outsourcing of labour intensive working-steps in the 
utilisation procedure are further strategically motivated factors of choosing a certain 
governance arrangement. These factors differentiate demand for genetic resources, related 
services and rights. They are not directly linked to the transaction cost minimisation goal but 
rather indicate a plurality of logics of governance choice (cf. DEDEURWAERDERE 2005: 475).  
The nature of demand and the complexity of the provider contribution can be assumed to 
influence both, the governance arrangement and the transaction costs. 
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The transaction environment 
It is assumed that the transaction environment with its economic, institutional, and cultural 
aspects influences the efforts required to initiate and negotiate an exchange with genetic 
resources as well as the governance form adopted for the executive phase of the transaction 
(cf. WILLIAMSON 1990: p. 25ff). Butter stresses in particular the relevance of cultural and 
ethical factors as a source of environmental uncertainty, since they might influence the risk of 
opportunistic behavior and evoke communication problems. They require additional 
information gathering and/or consultancy (BUTTER 2007: 7). In the governance approach of 
transaction cost economics, the transaction environment is often considered static and 
therefore not included as potential explanatory variable in empirical analysis. For 
bioprospection, however, the transaction environment can be assumed to be non-static and 
highly relevant, because users acquire resources from all over the world, from sources with 
highly different transaction environments. In the topical literature the relevance of this aspect 
for bioprospection is mentioned by several authors (cf. GEHL SAMPATH 2005; HOLM-
MUELLER ET AL. 2005; OECD 2003; RICHERZHAGEN 2007). 
Relevant institutional factors are the availability of information regarding the responsible 
authorities (National Competent Authorities), and procedural routines among entities within 
the provider country. A higher level of experience and the application of efficient routines 
were named as assets of a provider country (OECD 2008: 68). The lack of familiarity of the 
responsible government authorities with the market, legal factors and the scientific and 
technological process in the fields of utilisation for genetic resources, on the other hand, are 
criticised as drawbacks and impediments in negotiations (LAIRD AND WYNBERG 2005: 33). 
MARTHUR ET AL. (2004) identified relevant institutional factors in provider countries among 
others from company statements on ABS strategies. The company Diversa chooses provider 
countries collaboration by (among others) the legal framework (simple, complete, including 
standardised procedures for exporting samples, Intellectual Property Rights protection…), and 
the political will of the country (training of officials on bioprospecting issues). Appropriate 
scientific capabilities (skills, equipment, and infrastructure) and unique and protected habitats 
are further selection criteria (p. 13). 
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Indirect capacities 
Indirect capabilities or capacities
20
 are competences in interacting with, for example, 
economic suppliers and alliance partners (ARAUJO ET AL. 2003; LOASBY 1998). In the theory 
“resource based view” (KASCH AND DOWLING 2008: 1766), which belongs under the umbrella 
of strategic management, companies or more generally economically active entities are 
viewed as pools of resources and skills or capabilities (GRANT 2006: 176). Indirect capacities 
are assumed to increase with experience in cooperating (KALE ET AL. 2002; SIMONIN 1997), 
because experience builds up routines, which protect tacit knowledge or tacit information and 
reduce uncertainty in communication with transaction partners (GULATI 1999: 413; KATILA 
AND MANG 2003). Hence, the level of experience is assumed to influence relative costs of 
different governance forms. Empirical studies show that a high level of indirect capabilities 
increases the likelihood of a company to engage in complex governance structures, since the 
costs of implementing complex governance structures are relatively lower compared to 
companies lacking such capacities (GULATI 1999: 413; KATILA AND MANG 2003).  
Since this research focuses on the procurement of genetic resources from source countries and 
under compliance with the respective domestic regulations, the aspect of indirect capacities 
seems highly relevant for transaction costs and the choice of governance forms. Genetic 
resources are used in many different fields and presumably by companies of different sizes 
and researchers with different levels of experience in executing long-term complex projects, 
particularly with partners in developing or newly industrialising countries. It can be assumed 
that users with different levels of indirect capacities apply different transacting strategies and 
face different levels of transaction costs. 
                                                 
20
 The terms “capacities” and “capabilities” are here used as synonyms.  
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3.3.3 The concept of governance forms 
Principal-agent theory, relational contract theory, and WILLIAMSON‟S governance approach 
of transaction cost economics (TCE) can be attributed to the governance branch of new 
institutional economics (RICHTER AND FURUBOTN 2003: 171-172). However, the assumptions 
about the governance choice differ to some extent among these theories. 
Principal-agent theory considers only formal contracts as a governance form. The main 
purposes of contract design are risk transfer and incentive alignment as means to overcome 
problems of asymmetric information (MASTEN AND SAUSSIER 2000: 216 and 228). It is 
assumed that contracts specify the parties‟ obligations for every contingency on the basis of 
the information available at the time the agreement is carried out (ibid. p. 220).   
The theory of relational contracts views governance forms as relations rather than as discrete 
transactions (WILLIAMSON 1991 referring to MCNEIl 1974). In contrast to classical contracts 
personal relations between the parties are important. Friction is accepted as a normal part of 
the relation, and the contract contains mechanisms for cooperative conflict resolution. 
Relational contract types are suggested for governing economic interaction in “imperfect 
markets”, in which the stipulation of all eventualities in a contract is very costly (RICHTER 
AND FURUBOTN 2003: 168-170). Relational contract elements can be assumed to play an 
important role in transactions with genetic resources, since the market for genetic resources is 
characterised by market imperfections and the utilisation by uncertainty. 
Some authors view relational contracts as intermediary governance forms and consistent with 
transaction cost economics (MASTEN AND SAUSSIER 2000: 226). This shall be assumed in this 
research as well. 
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Williamson„s governance approach of transaction cost economics provides an analytical 
framework to interrelate transaction attributes and human behavioural factors with 
coordination (governance) forms for transactions. Governance choices are thought to be made 
against the background of economizing transaction costs.
21
 Production costs are considered, 
but are not in the focus of analysis in the governance approach of transaction cost economics 
(Williamson 1985).  
Transaction cost economics recognizes that incomplete contracts can be rational, for example, 
if due to uncertainty not all contingencies can be anticipated or if measurability and 
verifiability of contract fulfillment through third parties (e.g. courts) is limited and hence 
external enforcement restricted (RICHTER and FURUBOTN 2003: 269). It is important to note 
that this understanding of information deficiencies diverges from asymmetrical information in 
principal-agent theory. In transaction cost economics the role of contracts to align incentives 
for agents to reach certain effort levels is acknowledged (MASTEN and SAUSSIER 2000: 225). 
However, contracts are first and foremost understood as “devices for structuring ex post 
adjustments and for constraining wasteful (rent-dissipating) efforts to influence the 
distribution of gains from trade, including, especially ex post bargaining and “hold-up” 
activities in transactions supported by relationship-specific investments. [Moreover, contracts 
shall prevent from] [...] ex ante sorting and search in contexts where additional information 
serves merely to redistribute rather than expand the available surplus [...]” (ibid. 216 and 225). 
Transaction cost economics has been criticised for insufficiently capturing strategic 
considerations (BELLO ET AL. 1997: 118-119; SHAN 1990). Companies using genetic resources 
can be assumed to aim for long-term goals (profitability). Strategic management theories treat 
the governance mode as a strategic variable to pursue long-term profitability by improving the 
competitive position (ibid. 130).
22
 The resource-based view focuses on creating or acquiring 
strategically relevant and unique resources to reach such goals, in particular the improvement 
                                                 
21
 What the governance approach of transaction cost economics does is defined varyingly in the literature; the 
message, however, is somewhat the same. PICOT ET AL. describe transaction cost economics as a measure to 
analyse the performance relationships between transactors, and the optimisation of these (PICOT ET AL. 2002: 79 
and 85). SHELANSKI AND KLEIN see the aim of transaction cost economics as “explaining […] contracting 
arrangements observed in practice“ by using efficiency arguments (SHELANSKI AND KLEIN 1995: 341). 
According to MASTEN “[…] transaction cost economics offers […] a set of normative rules for choosing among 
alternative governance arrangements” (MASTEN 1993: 119). 
22
 Competitiveness as long-term strategic goals for public research institutions is not merely related to financial 
profitability but to scientific recognition and visibility, e.g. through publications. 
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of the competitive position. Companies might strive for strategic alliances or cooperation to 
acquire strategically relevant genetic resources and related rights, and information.  
The concept of “indirect capabilities” in the resource-based view reflects the heterogeneity of 
the human capital resources in companies. Indirect capabilities are assumed to influence the 
relative costs of engaging in complex relations and therefore the choice of engaging in such 
governance forms to acquire strategically relevant resources (KASH and DOWLING 2008: 
1767). 
Competing governance forms  
Theory and empirical studies distinguish between market transactions (competition) and the 
hierarchical organisation of economic activities. Between these two generic governance forms 
exist many intermediaries. 
Characteristics of the market transaction are a homogeneous, standardised “subject matter of 
transaction” (ex-ante information is easy to obtain) and perfect competition. As a result, 
transaction parties are not dependent on each other. They can switch partners without 
economic loss (cf. RICHTER AND FURUBOTN 2003: 196). Hierarchical coordination, on the 
other hand, means that economic activities are integrated and governed under a corporate 
headquarters (cf. ibid. p. 197). 
In general, a simple, complete formal contract would be applied for the market transaction. 
The more the transaction type shifts to the integrated end, the more informal mechanisms are 
applied. Intermediary governance forms are governed by so-called hybrid contracts
23
 (DA 
SILVA AND SAES 2007: 450-451). The relational contract, which has many characteristics of 
internal governance, is a special type of hybrid contract. WILLIAMSON defines evenly unified, 
internal governance as relational contracting (1995: 253). 
In the literature on bioprospecting, a vast variety of design options for governance elements 
(referred to as ABS-agreements or bioprospecting contracts) are described. SAMPATH 
identified three general types of contractual relationships in her research, which is specific to 
the pharmaceutical sector: (1) long-term multilateral contracts between different actors (she 
                                                 
23 Hybrid means that the contract is subject to negotiations between the transacting parties. 
3 Theory  
 
 
57 
 
  
calls it research collaboration), (2) a sequence of bilateral contracts (private research 
collaboration), and (3) the acquisition of material via commercial intermediaries or public 
culture collections, gene banks or botanical gardens (spot market transaction) (2005: 26ff.). 
The latter type of transaction is, however, not the focus of interest in this research. A look at 
case studies in other publications indicates that highly integrative governance measures, such 
as technology transfer and training of the provider as well as joint IPRs, are applied 
compensation mechanisms as well as market based monetary benefit sharing, such as fixed 
prices for amounts of biological material (cf. TEN KATE AND LAIRD 1999; GEHL SAMPATH 
2005). 
A comprehensive theory-based framework for the empirical comparison of governance forms 
from a broader sample including other application fields is lacking so far. One goal of this 
research is therefore the characterisation of governance forms for transactions with genetic 
resources in a way that they can be investigated and compared empirically and interrelated 
with transaction characteristics. 
WILLIAMSON developed a concept to distinguish “competing” governance forms by their 
properties regarding costs and competencies:  
1: Incentive intensity: Markets provide incentives for competition; if the transaction partner 
performs insufficiently, the other party can switch to a different provider. Hierarchy lacks this 
kind of incentive (WILLIAMSON 1998: 37). It is assumed that the effort level contributed by an 
actor has less of an immediate effect on the compensation within an organisation compared to 
a classical market transaction. In hierarchical governance, incentives (e.g. wage increases or 
bonus payments) have the intention of safeguarding cooperative behaviour (WILLIAMSON 
1991: 275). 
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2: Administrative controls: Incentive intensity and administrative control measures are 
instruments to safeguard actors‟ behaviour in the transaction relationship. At higher levels of 
integration more forms of administrative controls and sanctions are available, but bureaucratic 
costs rise at the same time. Depending on the requirements regarding other governance 
characteristics (e.g. adaptability), incentive intensity and administrative control measures are 
to a certain extent substitutes (ibid. p. 280). 
3: Adaptation: Adaptation: Presumably, problems in transaction relationships arise if the 
adaptation to new circumstances is required. Mechanisms for adaptation are therefore a 
central challenge of an organisation. Different governance forms support different kinds of 
“changes”, since they have different properties of adaptation (WILLIAMSON 1991: 278; 
1996a: 26; 2003: 924-925).  
The kind of adaptation required depends on the type of disturbance. WILLIAMSON (1991) 
differentiates disturbances regarding (1) the requirement for coordinated adaptation and (2) 
with respect to consequentiality (p. 278-280). 
Adaptability to changes in demand or supply - where prices are good indicators 
(uncoordinated adaptation) - is higher at lower integration levels. A coordinated response is 
superior for adaptation to more complex disturbances, for instance if several levels of R&D 
and/or the production chain are involved and a wider range of information and information 
exchange is required.  
Coordinated response can be carried out under both hybrid and integrated governance, but 
there are significant differences. In hybrid modes autonomous ownership theoretically elicits 
stronger incentives, which encourages adaptation to less complex disturbances. Contractual 
safeguards and administrative mechanisms in relation to bilateral-dependency support 
adaptation to complex disturbances. The problem of hybrid modes in long-term relationships 
is the subsequent gap-filling and adaptation due to incompleteness of contracts. This opens 
opportunities for costly and time-consuming ex post bargaining over the distribution of 
economic rents (causing poor adaptation of the transaction until resolved) and inefficient 
propositions ex ante. Therefore, with increasing consequentiality of complex disturbances, 
integration is favoured over hybrid forms to achieve transaction cost minimising adaptation 
(ibid.). 
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4: Applicable Contract law: WILLIAMSON distinguishes between three main types of 
contract law regimes: classical contract law, neoclassical contract law and transaction-specific 
relational mechanisms (for bilateral governance and unified governance). For market 
transactions classical contract law is applicable, meaning that dispute settlement is external 
with legal mechanisms relying on courts. In intermediary governance types contracts remain 
incomplete due to uncertainty. This is why external contract law (courts) is inefficient and 
neoclassical contract law (third party assistance, arbitration) or relational, transaction-specific, 
mechanisms that are increasingly administrative are frequently applied (1991: 271-272; 1995: 
236ff). 
The more complex and long-term relations become, the more frequently special adaptive 
dispute settlement measures are employed (WILLIAMSON 1991: 271-273; 1998: 46). At the 
same time, the more relational a contract, the weaker the legal commitment becomes. The 
importance of conventions and internal enforcement thereby rises.  
Relational, implicit contract law might provide insufficient safeguards to bilateral governance 
if transactions are exposed to highly consequential disturbances and the risk of opportunism 
rises. In such cases integration would be the governance form of last resort. Stakeholders 
should work out disputes themselves or appeal to the hierarchy for a decision. The results 
presumably would rely on instrumental reasoning and mutual accommodation. 
To sustain a cooperative and constructive atmosphere between transacting parties, avoiding 
dispute resolution through courts can be vital (1995: 238 and 244). Arbitration is a type of 
dispute resolution that envisages a continuation of the relationship, which distinguishes it 
from most other types of external contract law. Another rationale for applying forbearance is 
that the transfer of in-depth knowledge regarding circumstances and the efficiency of different 
options to external courts might be quite prohibitive (1991: 275-276). 
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Williamson defines each generic mode of governance by a syndrome of the attributes 
elaborated previously (see Table 8). 
Table 8: Attributes that define three viable modes of governance 
Governance 
Structures 
Governance Attributes  
 Incentive Intensity Administrative control Contract law regime 
Spot market ++ 0 ++ 
Hybrid + + + 
Hierarchy 0 ++ 0 
Source: Williamson 1991: 281 and 2003: 925-926 (++ = much; + = some; 0 = little) 
From governance properties a concept of functional units - here called “governance 
elements” - shall be derived and tested in this research, with discrete observable 
characteristics incorporating WILLIAMSONS‟ governance attributes. The choice to operate on 
the level of governance elements rather than complete contract or agreement types results 
from a lack of information. The variety of contractual forms is “virtually unlimited” and the 
literature does not provide empirically tested, discrete contract types for transactions with 
genetic resources. Another reason is that the latest suggestion for an ABS-instrument actually 
envisages “menus of model clauses” rather than “complete” model contracts. 
Three main observable governance elements have been defined basing on Williamson‟s 
“properties” concept:  
(i) Compensation or pricing structure 
(ii) Stipulated or implicit dispute resolution mechanisms 
(iii) Duration of contracts (short versus long-term)  
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Pricing/compensation mechanisms generally vary concerning the time period and means of 
determining the final compensation as well as what it responds to, e.g. the market price, 
negotiations, or the future outcome of economic activity based on the transaction object. In 
bioprospecting contracts, a combination of different monetary benefit-sharing measures is 
often utilised, e.g. per sample payments and royalties. Risk-sharing (the user‟s investments) 
and incentives for ensuring that material deliveries fulfil quality and quantity requirements in 
a longer run are mentioned as determinants for non-monetary benefit-sharing in ABS 
agreements (cf. OECD 2003: 29-30; MULHOLLAND AND WILMAN 2003: 427- 431). 
Of particular interest in the case of ABS is non-monetary benefit-sharing, which can be 
affiliated with the governance category pricing-mechanism as well. Non-monetary benefit-
sharing measures can also be viewed as relation-specific investments with a purpose beyond 
compensation. Capacity building, joint intellectual property rights (IPRs) or joint publications 
can strengthen mutual trust and create dependency for the provider as well. Non-monetary 
benefit-sharing could therefore be viewed as an integrative, hierarchical governance 
mechanism for the creation of interest harmonisation and to prevent opportunism. 
Observable characteristics of dispute resolution mechanisms found in the theory are (a) the 
stipulation of external contract enforcement through courts, (b) the stipulation of arbitration, 
(c) the stipulation of proceedings for internal dispute resolution including measures of trust-
building and mutual information. In the case of transactions with genetic resources, a well-
defined legal regime, which is a precondition for (exclusively) external enforcement, is 
however, lacking (cf. Dedeurwaerdere 2005: 477; OECD 2003). Also, full hierarchical control 
and enforcement is not achievable in the case of bioprospecting projects, since full integration 
of the “provision of genetic resources” by a user entity is not possible.  
Contract duration can vary continuously. For ABS agreements it might cover the timeframe 
of the actual exchange between the transacting parties, or the timeframe of utilisation. 
The concretisation and operationalisation of the governance elements for transactions with 
genetic resources shall be carried out with the help of a literature review and several 
exploratory research steps, such as the study of existing model-agreements, guidelines and 
standard contracts for ABS agreements, as well as exploratory stakeholder interviews and 
group discussions with users. The adapted theory framework is presented in chapter 5.3. 
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3.3.4 Interlinking transaction characteristics and governance 
In this section the fundamental hypotheses on the connections between overall governance 
forms and the typical transaction characteristics are sketched. Based on these findings, sets of 
hypotheses shall be specified for transactions with genetic resources in chapter 5.3. These will 
be tested with data from a cross-sectional survey in chapter 6. 
According to WILLIAMSON (2003), the very basic regularity of aligning governance forms 
with transaction attributes is that with increasing bilateral dependency (e.g. due to asset 
specificity by both parties) and “complex” disturbances (we deal with ex-ante uncertainty, in 
other words the possibility that certain disturbances occur), coordinated response and 
safeguards against opportunistic behaviour gain importance. Due to bounded rationality, 
uncertainty leads to incomplete contracts. However, under the presence of asset specificity 
uncertainty induces a move from spot market to hybrid solutions or integration. Whether 
autonomy should remain or unified governance is superior depends on the level of asset 
specificity and consequentiality of disturbances (p. 926). Transaction relations “for which the 
requisite adaptations to disturbances are neither predominantly autonomous nor bilateral but 
require a mixture of each, are candidates to be organised under the hybrid mode” 
(WILLIAMSON 1991: 283). 
The differentiation of disturbances (uncertainty) is vital. In the literature market and demand 
uncertainty refers to rather “simple” disturbances, detected easily through price shifts and not 
requiring a coordinated response. Technological uncertainty raises the risk of opportunism. If 
the investments or other types of adjustments in the process have to be coordinated among 
several transaction parties, coordinated response becomes important. Figure 3 indicates that 
several types of uncertainty have to be considered simultaneously. If a transaction is 
characterised by types of uncertainty pointing towards opposing governance solutions, the 
decider has to evaluate the trade-offs in the individual case.  
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Source: Author based on WILLIAMSON 1991: 282-285; 1998: pp. 38; 1995: 116-117; RICHMAN AND 
MACHER 2006).  
Figure 3: Decision tree interrelating asset specificity and uncertainty with governance modes 
Hierarchical coordination becomes more advantageous as idiosyncrasies (due to asset 
specificity) increase. The choice between relational contracting and vertical integration is then 
a matter of weighing the relevance of coordinated adaptation against incentive intensity. The 
different types of uncertainty that characterise economic interaction are the determining 
factors. 
The influence of frequency on the advantageousness of governance forms is also interrelated 
with asset specificity. If asset specificity is high and coordinated response to disturbances is 
important, the transaction frequency adds to the advantageousness of integrated governance 
forms (WILLIAMSON 1995: 259). 
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Source Author‟s: based on Williamson 1995: 246-253 and Williamson 1998: pp. 38. 
Figure 4: Decision tree interrelating transaction attributes with governance modes 
Figure 4 shows that for transactions without asset specificity it does not matter whether the 
transaction is recurrent or occasional. In both cases market governance is most efficient. If 
intermediary or high levels of asset specificity are at hand, frequency matters. Here we find a 
differentiation between trilateral (dispute resolution with third party assistance), bilateral (see 
above) and hierarchical governance forms. 
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The influence of strategic aspects on governance forms is manifold. If companies seek 
exclusive access to resources and/or information for competition reasons, the supplier makes 
specific investments by granting exclusivity. If additionally the outcome of the utilisation is 
uncertain, governance structures have to include relational monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms and participatory compensation mechanisms. 
Cost factors could be a strategic motivation for outsourcing of the preparation of samples and 
initial material evaluation, for example. Specific investments might be required in the context 
of outsourcing, such as training or laboratory facilities to enable the provider to carry out a 
specific service. Governance forms are presumably adopted to provide safeguards for these 
strategically motivated investments. Since the user can be assumed to have an interest in 
sustaining the relationship, relational rather than classical dispute resolution mechanisms shall 
be established. 
Another strategic aspect affecting governance decisions in ABS agreements is noted by 
CARRIZOSA (2004). Setting up cooperative projects with local counterparts to acquire access 
to genetic resources is a common strategy to expedite the access process (local entities are 
familiar with local customs and bureaucracy) and to bring legitimacy and transparency to the 
project (p. 17-19). 
3.4 Contribution of the new institutional economics theories to the problem analysis 
In the following subchapters the contribution of (1) transaction cost economics, (2) property 
rights theory, and (3) the principal-agent theory to the analysis of problems occurring in the 
implementation of ABS-agreements will be discussed. The theories shall guide exploratory 
interviews and group discussions for identifying transaction cost sources, types and 
determinants. Based thereupon a framework of hypotheses on transaction costs and 
transaction characteristics is specified in chapter 5.4 and tested with data from the online 
company survey in chapter 6.2. 
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3.4.1 The contribution of transaction cost economics  
The measurement of absolute transaction costs and the comparison of different cases are 
hardly found in the literature. Previous studies and exploratory interviews indicate that such 
data could hardly be collected for transactions with genetic resources under the scope of the 
CBD. However, what is relevant and identifiable in this research are types of costs and the 
users‟ individual assessments of transaction costs as impediments to the implementation of 
ABS agreements. Moreover, sources of transaction costs are of interest and are identifiable. 
Transaction cost economics postulates that the transfer of resources, goods, rights or 
information can be carried out at low (without significant) transaction costs, given that the 
market is “perfect”. The theory further suggests a set of “external factors” and transaction 
characteristics that in reality violate the assumption of a perfect market. These factors induce 
certain problems of economic interaction requiring governance beyond standard forms and 
therefore transaction costs can be significant. In the following sections three parts of new 
institutional economics are elaborated with the aim of identifying such external factors and 
transaction characteristics. 
3.4.2 The contribution of property rights theory to the problem analysis 
It was previously indicated that in transaction cost economics the institutional environment is 
thought to be a relevant factor for transaction costs. It is stipulated in the relevant literature 
(cf. GEHL SAMPATH 2005: 78-79; OECD 2003; RICHERZHAGEN 2007) that the organisation of 
property rights for genetic resources in provider countries is an essential part of the 
institutional environment.  
For the problem analysis, property rights theory shall be employed to specify characteristics 
of institutional frameworks in provider countries that may influence transaction costs in the 
implementation of ABS agreements. 
The basis of the property rights theory is the specification and allocation of property rights for 
scarce resources. Property in this context has many definitions; for this research we consider 
physical (biological resources) and intangible entities (genetic information) as property. 
Rights concerning property are (1) the right to use and control the property, (2) the right to 
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benefit from the property and the obligation to bear losses, (3) the right to transfer or sell the 
property, and (4) to exclude others from the property. The different rights can be owned by 
one person or jointly by a group of persons (cf. LIPPERT 2005: 17; MARTIENSEN 2000: 224-
225; PICOT ET AL. 2002: 55).
24
 
The CBD states that their member countries have the sovereign rights over genetic resources 
in their territory and that they shall implement national systems to execute these rights. 
Depending on the system of goals and pre-existing institutions, countries come to diverging 
conclusions on how to allocate property rights for genetic resources. CARRIZOSA (2004) 
analysed national ABS systems in provider countries with regard to this question. Relevant 
factors he identified are the ownership-system for genetic resources, access procedures, and 
regulations for Prior Informed Consent (PIC).  
Natural resources can be privately or communally owned or state property. In the first case, 
private or communal landowners do not need the state‟s approval to market biological, 
biochemical, or genetic resources. Regimes applying the latter approach require 
bioprospectors to obtain a permit from the state and to negotiate access with the individual or 
collective owner or holder of the land or ex-situ collection where the biological or genetic 
resource is found (ibid. p. 14). 
                                                 
24
 Property rights theory postulates that in a world with transaction costs, the structure of property rights 
influences the decisions of economic actors in a distinctive and predictable way. This means that property rights 
determine resource allocation (MARTIENSEN 2000: 113). Political or administrative decision makers can use 
property rights allocation as an institutional element to pursue certain goals, for example, to attract users by 
facilitating access through well-defined and transparent property rights for genetic resources. On the 
transactional level, contracting parties can use the specification of property rights as incentive measures to foster 
certain behaviour, for example, to reduce behavioural uncertainty (cf. ibid. p. 9). Both aspects of property rights 
are relevant for this research. For the problem analysis, however, property rights systems as part of the 
transaction environment are of the most interest. Property rights alignment as a governance element in 
transaction relations are taken up in chapter 6. 
In the topical literature property rights theory is also employed in the discussion of incentive-alignments for 
biodiversity conservation (GEHL SAMPATH 2005: pp. 102-123; OECD 2003: 22-23; RICHERZHAGEN 2007: 
109-110, SWANSON AND GÖSCHL 2000). This, however, is not the focus of this research. Issues of the 
property rights system on the provider country level are investigated as a potential source of transaction costs. 
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Access procedures differ among others in terms of timeframe. CARRIZOSA sees differences in 
the negotiation of PIC and benefit-sharing agreements as main reasons. The requirement for 
PIC is an essential part of establishing the national sovereignty of member countries over their 
genetic resources. However, national systems vary regarding from whom and how often PIC 
has to be obtained before access is granted. In some cases only actual providers have to be 
consulted in others additionally state authorities have to be involved in benefit-sharing 
negotiations. It also varies whether PIC has to be obtained from local communities. 
Involvement of state authorities and local communities supposedly impede negotiations and 
lead to higher transaction costs (2004: 22-25). 
Similar to CARRIZOSA (2004), RICHERZHAGEN (2007) identified the property rights 
assignment and administrative complexity of access procedures for genetic resources as 
relevant success factors for provider countries aiming to implement the CBD goals, what 
includes the successful implementation of ABS agreements. Moreover, she supplemented 
“good governance” as a further critical factor of the institutional environment in provider 
countries. Good governance comprises political stability, control of corruption, rule of law, 
and accountability (p. 113 referring to KAUFMANN ET AL. 2006: 4), factors of the property 
rights system that determine enforceability. 
3.4.3 The contribution of principal-agent theory to the problem analysis 
At the core of the principal-agent theory is asymmetric information between parties in an 
economic relationship. In the worst case scenario, asymmetric information might omit market 
transactions (adverse selection) (cf. RICHTER UND FURUBOTN 2003: 175f.). Signalling and 
control are suggested as counter measures (cf. ERLEI ET AL. 1999: 157f.) against principal-
agent problems, but they induce costs and welfare loss due to inefficient resource allocation. 
These costs are called agency costs (PICOT ET AL. 2002: 87). The principal-agent theory 
contributes to the problem analysis by supplementing the theoretical framework with the 
aspects of asymmetric information and agency costs. 
Information asymmetries between user and provider of genetic resources are conceivable in 
both directions and ex ante (before the conclusion of an agreement) as well as ex post (during 
the course of a transaction and afterwards, when compensation is due, since this might be 
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carried out over a longer timeframe). The user and provider might face problems observing 
and assessing the efforts and actions (hidden action) taken during the project by the respective 
other party. Parties might also have relevant information and fail to share it with the other 
(hidden information). Opportunistic behaviour in one of the two described ways is referred to 
as the “moral hazard” problem (cf. RICHTER UND FURUBOTN 2003: 173f.). 
User entities usually have more information about their interest in the genetic resources, the 
costs of the utilisation process (for example research and development or investments) and the 
availability of substitutes for the providers‟ service. Supposedly they can also better predict 
the commercial outcomes of the utilisation. Providers on the other hand might have private 
information on the quality of samples or the biodiversity in a specific area. Moreover, users 
cannot without costs safeguard providers‟ compliance with exclusivity agreements (cf. OECD 
2003, GEHL SAMPATH 2005: 65-67; MULHOLLAND AND WILMAN 2003: 419, 432f; 
RICHERZHAGEN 2007: 118-119; REID ET AL. 1993: 38). 
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4 Empirical results I – exploratory analyses 
This dissertation is founded on three main empirical analyses: (1) an evaluation of existing 
guidelines, model- and standard-contracts for transactions with genetic resources, (2) 
exploratory interviews and group discussions with users of genetic resources, and (3) a 
quantitative, standardised online survey for user companies. The first two steps are 
exploratory. The findings shall feed into the discussion of both research questions, but are 
also aimed at substantiating findings from the literature and theory for operationalising and 
specifying the theory concepts for quantitative analyses. 
Evaluations of the exploratory research are presented in this chapter. 
4.1 Existing guidelines, standard and model contracts for ABS agreements 
Various institutions have already developed contract-standardisation based instruments for 
transactions with genetic resources and related services, mostly for supporting a certain group 
in implementing the CBD provisions on ABS. The range of measures spans the Bonn 
Guidelines, a set of non-binding and rather general guidelines for elements of Material 
Transfer Agreements (CBD 2002), to fully-fledge standardised contracts. An example for the 
latter type of instrument is the standardised Material Transfer Agreement (sMTA) of the 
International Treaty ABS-regime (FAO 2006). Besides these multilaterally developed 
instruments initiatives on different stakeholder levels have evolved. 
A set of instruments shall be evaluated as a starting point for identifying relevant contract 
elements and different design options. The different solutions are compared regarding 
contents and with respect to the level of standardisation. 
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Nine guidelines, model- and standard-contracts were analysed: 
- CBD Bonn Guidelines 
- IISD ABS-management tool 
- ITPGRFAs standard Material Transfer Agreement 
(sMTA)  
- Australian Governments ABS Model MTA  
- Biotechnology Industrial Organisation (BIO) 
Model-MTA for transactions with genetic 
resources 
- Science commons model 
- Micro-organisms Sustainable Use 
and Access Regulation 
International Code of Conduct 
(MOSAICC) and Model 
Agreement 
- US National Cancer Institutes‟ 
Letter of Collection (LOC) & 
Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) 
4.1.1 Guidelines for ABS agreements 
The Bonn Guidelines were developed by the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on ABS 
and adopted 2002 at the sixth Conference of the parties to the CBD. They shall give guidance 
to providers and users, among others by providing recommendations for elements to be 
included in Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs) for transactions with genetic resources 
under the scope of the CBD. The Bonn Guidelines also give an overview of forms of 
monetary and non-monetary benefit-sharing (CBD 2002: Appendix II, pp. 17-20). 
The Swiss “ABS management tool” was developed by ABS-experts under the direction of the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). Like the Bonn Guidelines it is a 
voluntary instrument, which users and providers can use as guidelines in the negotiation and 
implementation of ABS-project. It is more detailed and gives more concrete suggestions for 
the design of contract elements agreements compared to the Bonne Guidelines, though. 
Both guidelines suggest similar elements or issues to be regulated in ABS contracts; the full 
list is displayed in Table A 1. The functional units of contracts defined in the theory chapter 
could be identified in both guidelines: the duration of the agreement, the enforcement and 
dispute resolution measures, and the compensation or pricing mechanisms. 
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Enforcement of the contract / dispute resolution arrangements 
The Bonn Guidelines do not go into details 
regarding suggestions for contract 
enforcement and dispute resolution 
mechanisms applicable in ABS-relations. 
The management tool on the other hand 
names four dispute resolution mechanisms 
with different contract laws. The 
stipulation of courts means that contracts 
are enforced externally. Arbitration, which 
means third party assisted conflict resolution is an intermediary form, while meeting of the 
parties and mediation are clearly on the administrative controls‟ side.   
Compensation (benefit-sharing) 
The suggestions for monetary benefit-sharing are quite similar in both guidelines (Table 9). 
The management tool gives some more practical examples, though.  
Table 9: Suggestions for monetary benefit-sharing for genetic resources in the Bonn Guidelines and in the 
IISD ABS management tool 
CBD Bonn Guidelines IISD ABS management tool 
Access fees/fee per sample collected or 
otherwise acquired 
Compensation per sample, Collecting fee (by 
collector, by source), Handling fee  
Up-front payments Fixed fee (one-time, recurring, staged (different fees 
for different periods) 
Milestone payments 
Payment of royalties 
Revenue sharing/royalty (% of revenue from testing 
activities, - of revenues of middleman from supply 
activities, -  of net sales of covered products) 
License fees in case of commercialization Offset or deductions from amounts owed 
Source: Authors‟, based on CBD 2002: 18-19 AND IISD and STATE SECRETARIAT FOR ECONOMIC 
AFFAIRS 2007: 26. 
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The Management tool suggests considering the following issues for designing the royalty 
structure in an ABS agreement: 
(a) relative contribution of partners to invention and development; 
(b) information provided with samples; 
(c) novelty or rarity of sample organisms; 
(d) degree of derivation of the final product from the genetic resources supplied; and 
(e) likely market share of the final product (IISD and STATE SECRETARIAT FOR ECONOMIC 
AFFAIRS 2007: 39). 
Some measures the Bonn Guidelines assign with monetary benefit-sharing (supposedly 
because they imply monetary efforts from the user) are in this research categorised as non-
monetary benefit-sharing measures. The reason is that in the governance analysis benefit-
sharing is understood as pricing mechanism with purposes to steer in the first line the 
providers‟ behaviour. If the user pays money into a trust fund, which is used to finance 
biodiversity conservation, education or infrastructure (see Table 10) the provider does not 
receive direct financial benefits, even if the user compensates with money. 
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Table 10: Suggestions for non-monetary benefit-sharing for genetic resources in the Bonn Guidelines and 
in the IISD ABS management tool 
CBD Bonn Guidelines IISD ABS management tool 
- Fees to be paid to trust funds supporting conservation & 
sustainable use 
- Access to scientific information relevant to conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity 
- Fund conservation programs 
- Trust Fund 
Joint ownership of relevant IPRs 
 
- Research funding 
- Collaboration, cooperation and contribution to …  
… scientific research and development programs, particularly 
biotechnological research activities, where possible in the 
provider country. 
 … in education & training 
- Participation in product development 
- Sharing of research and development results 
- Fund and/or educate source‟s 
own drug development and 
research efforts  
- Fund and facilitate education 
programs and other expertise 
- Transfer of knowledge and technology  
- Capacity building for receiving knowledge & technology  
transfer 
- Admittance to ex situ facilities of genetic resources & 
databases 
- Technology-transfer initiatives 
- Provide equipment 
 
Fund cultural programs 
Institutional capacity building 
- Fund infrastructure projects 
- Funds or personnel for services 
Source: Author, based on CBD 2002: 19 and IISD AND STATE SECRETARIAT FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 
2007: 26. 
None of the guidelines gives concrete suggestions on the duration of a contract for ABS 
agreements. 
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The Management tool states that contracts should be adapted to the individual case; it refers to 
a paper by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)
25
 in which five different 
contract types are mentioned for transaction with genetic resources. They are thought to be 
applied in different stages of a transaction (the initiation phase versus the implementation 
phase) and for different types interaction or relation between user and provider (material 
transfer versus research cooperation). Also specific contracts for handling tacit information 
are recommended (IISD AND STATE SECRETARIAT FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 2007: 20). 
The Management tool also provides suggestions for the concretisation of the subject matter of 
transaction including the specification of demand, respectively the providers‟ contribution. 
This includes also the frequency of transaction. In the governance analysis these factors are 
explanatory variables (governance-choice determinants). 
Both instruments state that the 
contract should be adapted to the 
individual case. We can understand 
that this means the contract should 
be adapted to the specifics of the 
subject matter of transaction, and 
the nature or special needs of the 
transacting parties. However, 
neither of the guidelines explicitly 
demonstrates how to interrelate the 
design options of contract elements 
with the case-characteristics. Let 
alone explaining why certain 
options are appropriate under 
certain conditions. It is left to the 
user of the guidelines to consider 
which of the suggested options fit 
for the individual case. 
                                                 
25 (WIPO), WIPO/GRTKF/IC/7/9 July 2004. “Genetic Resources: Draft Intellectual Property Guidelines for Access and Equitable Benefit-sharing,” prepared by the WIPO 
Secretariat. 
Source: IISD and State Secretariat for Economic Affairs 2007: 
24-29, and CBD 2002:  17-20 
Figure 5: Types of provider contribution in ABS 
agreements differentiated in the IISD ABS management-
tool and in the CBD Bonn Guidelines for ABS 
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4.1.2 Standard and model agreements for transactions with genetic resources 
The following instruments go beyond guidelines in terms of the standardisation-level. 
However, except for the plant treaties‟ sMTA, all measures are model contracts and voluntary 
rather than obligatory standard-contracts. Table 11 displays the responsible institution and 
institutional level, the target group, and the stated intentions for the seven measures.  
The instruments are designed by different types of institutions for different target groups. 
However, the simplification of compliance with ABS requirements and the reduction of 
transaction costs are key intentions in all cases. Some instruments (1, 3, 4, 5) are designed by 
interest organisations specifically for their members (Pharmacy, Biotech, academic research); 
other instruments are developed by provider (2) or intermediary entities (6). The Australian 
model contracts were developed and established by the government of Australia in its 
function as a provider country. Australia implements therewith its national biodiversity 
strategy, which includes the attraction of foreign R&D and to support national research by 
reducing transaction costs and increasing legal certainty. The MOSAICC model contract has 
inter alia the aim of contributing to the implementation of ABS for Microorganism 
Collections (as intermediaries). 
Table 12 subsumes further characteristics of the instruments, such as the object of transaction 
for which they are thought to be used, the type of transaction, and the praxis of benefit-
sharing suggested in the model. 
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Table 11: Main characteristics of existing standardisation measures for ABS contracts 
 
Responsible 
Institution 
Target group Stated Intentions 
1: sMTA 
in the 
ITPGRFA 
 
Multilateral 
level Governing 
Body of the 
ITPGRFA  
Commercial & non-
commercial users, 
though restricted to 
research, breeding, 
training for food & 
agriculture 
Simplifying access to and exchange of 
genetic resources for food and agriculture 
(supporting food security & quality), 
lowering transaction costs 
2: 
Australian 
Model 
MTA  
Australian 
Government, 
Department of 
the 
Environment, 
Water, Heritage 
and the Arts 
Developed by gov-
ernment institution in 
its function as a 
provider of genetic 
resources. Guidance 
tool in ABS 
negotiations with 
commercial users. 
Meeting CBD obligations for ABS; 
Minimising transaction costs; Encouraging 
R&D; Avoiding decision-making delays; 
Facilitating flexible access arrangements 
for lengthy or even unlimited periods 
3: BIO 
Model 
MTA 
US Biotech 
Industry 
Association 
BIO 
Members of BIO, 
mainly biotech-
companies for 
bioprospecting 
activities 
Educating & supporting bioprospecting 
activities 
“[…] providing a useful "roadmap" for a 
BIO company […] in bioprospecting 
activities.” 
4: LOC 
and  MOU 
US National 
Cancer Institute 
(NCI) 
Cancer fighting and 
prevention research, 
commercial and non-
commercial utilisation 
Providing a legal mechanism and 
fundamental framework for international 
cooperation; Balancing interests; 
Transcending national barriers, clearly 
defined common understanding of 
transactions 
5: 
Science 
commons 
Science 
commons 
Researchers 
Initiative 
Target group: not-for 
profit researchers from 
all scientific fields 
utilising genetic 
resources. For profit 
entities are affected 
indirectly when 
involved in genetic 
resource transactions 
with the target group. 
Lowering transaction costs, simplifying 
negotiations for material transfers between 
institutions (academia & for-profit) 
Providing infrastructure for web-based 
transactions 
Avoiding impediments 
Improving accessibility and exchange of 
data, material, and metadata on genetic 
resource utilisation in research 
6: 
MOSAICC 
MTA 
Belgian 
Coordinated 
Collections of 
Microorganisms 
Ex-situ collections for 
microbial genetic 
resources 
(intermediaries who 
obtain microbial 
genetic resources to 
extend their 
collections) 
Facilitating access; Helping collections to 
make appropriate agreements; Increasing 
uniformity in MTA contents & defining a 
minimum set of information; Electronic 
handling of digitalised MTAs (fast, cost-
effective, reliable management of  MGRs 
Sources: FAO 2006: 10-11; AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE 2005a and 2005b: 
both 3 and 26; AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE 2004: 9; BIO Model MTA: 1 and 
8; NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE 1988b: 1; ROSENTHAl 1997: 4; WILBANKS, J. AND J. BOYLE 2006; personal communication 
with PHILIP DESMETH (April 2008); BCCM 2000: II.2-II.4, 1.8
4 Empirical results I – exploratory analyses  
 
 
78 
 
  
Table 12: Main characteristics of standardisation initiatives for ABS contracts continued 
 
Object of 
transaction 
Kind of 
transaction  
Understanding of Benefit-sharing 
sMTA of  
ITPGRFA 
Plant genetic 
resources held 
in ex-situ 
collections 
Spot market, limited 
complexity 
Monetary benefit-sharing is triggered only in 
cases where restrictive IPRs are applied to 
R&D outcome; flows into a multilateral fund, 
distribution through projects which are 
chosen according to multilaterally agreed 
priorities 
Australian 
Model 
MTA  
Biological 
resources 
including GRs, 
organisms and 
parts of 
organisms, 
populations, 
&any other 
biotic 
components 
[…] with actual 
or potential use 
Rather complex 
transactions; it is 
deemed most useful 
for procurement of 
in-situ resources 
Threshold recommendations for monetary 
benefit-sharing; distinguished by sector and 
gross revenue of the product concerned (0 to 
5%). 
Recommendation to adjust amount and form 
of benefits depending on: market conditions, 
characteristics of the specific access 
agreement, Circumstances of contracting 
parties. 
BIO 
Model 
MTA 
Physical 
samples of 
“regulated 
genetic 
resources” 
(under CBD); in 
situ or ex situ; 
materials that 
contain 
functional units 
of heredity 
Bioprospecting 
agreements 
involving collecting 
activities and 
procurement from 
ex-situ collections 
Benefits shall be defined depending on inter 
alia: 
- needs of the providers (including 
indigenous or local communities),  
- the commercial value of the transferred 
physical samples, 
- the intended use of the samples, 
- Likelihood of using the samples to create a 
commercially viable product   
LOC &  
MOU 
Plants, micro-
organisms, and 
marine macro-
organisms 
LOC: acquisition of 
GRs from region-
specific collectors; 
MOU: research 
collaborations 
between with 
source country 
institutions 
Contain clauses about appropriate 
compensation (e.g. royalties); 
Base for defining monetary benefit-sharing: 
contribution of both parties, and relationship 
between the originally isolated product and 
the marketed drug 
Science 
commons 
All kinds of 
biological 
materials 
Material & 
information, not for 
complex research 
collaborations 
Does not contain benefit-sharing suggestions 
MOSAICC 
MTA 
Microorganism 
genetic 
resources 
(MGRs) 
Checklist for 
complex 
transactions; 
Model MTA is 
applicable to simple, 
more routine 
transactions 
Payment of royalties should depend on the 
successful commercial utilisation; partly 
dedication to technical & scientific 
cooperation programs; Recommendation: 
negotiate preliminary agreement on 
monetary benefit-sharing before starting 
R&D that could lead to commercialization 
Sources:  ibid.  
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As Table 12 shows the measures are partly designed for different types of resources. The 
model contracts established by the Australian Government, the US National Cancer Institutes, 
the US National Health Institutes, and Science Commons are thought to be applied for 
transactions with a whole range of materials, all covered by the term genetic resources. The 
ITPGRFAs standard Material transfer agreement was developed for transactions with specific 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA), Annex I resources. In the 
meantime several intermediary institutions use it also for non-Annex-I resources, but still only 
for PGRFA. The MOSAICC Model-MTA is restricted to specific types of genetic resources, 
microorganisms.  
The instruments can also be differentiated by the level of complexity of the exchange-
relation they are thought to be applied for. The treaties‟ sMTA and the Australian instrument 
provide comprehensive contracts. However, while the treaties‟ sMTA is a standard contract, 
the Australian sMTA is actually a model contract which shall be adjusted for individual ABS-
projects. The different levels of standardisation supposedly reflect the different level of 
complexity of transactions the instruments were designed to cover. The Australian sMTA is 
thought to be used for complex transactions, involving access to in-situ material, own 
sampling activities, maybe in the framework of research cooperation projects. The ITPGRs‟ 
sMTA, in contrary, is mainly applied to spot market transactions. It is not designed to govern 
complex relations between entities in provider countries and users, but for accessing and 
inserting material in international ex-situ collections. 
The National Cancer Institute provides different model contracts for transactions with 
different intensity of cooperation between user and provider. MOSAICC also has developed 
two instruments: a model Material Transfer Agreement for “simple” transactions and a MTA-
checklist for customised, more complex transactions. 
Benefit-sharing is a core element in all models, except those that are developed only for 
transactions within the academic environment. Monetary benefit-sharing is concretised to 
numeric provisions only in the plant treaties‟ sMTA. The Australian model-contract provides 
quantitative recommendations for monetary benefit-sharing (AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE 2005a and 2005b: 28). The other measures 
name possible types and give reference points for the definition of royalties, mostly the 
economic value of the genetic resource in the R&D process.  
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The providers‟ assessment of the resources value is reflected in terms like “circumstances of 
both parties shall be considered when benefit-sharing is appointed”. Costs of conservation and 
opportunity costs of the provision are not reflected in the models. 
The range of monetary benefit-sharing measures that could be identified from the model-
agreements (see Figure 6) is similar to the Bonn Guidelines and the Swiss ABS management 
tool (see Table 9). The suggestion of postponing benefit-sharing negotiations until a certain 
step in the utilisation process respectively commercialisation is accomplished (BIO Model 
MTA and in the MOSAICC instrument) was not found in either of the guidelines, though. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, based on FAO 2006: Art. 6.7 and Annex 2; Australian Government, Department of Environment 
and Heritage 2005a and 2005b: Art. 3.1.1 and Schedule 3; BIO Model MTA: Art. 5; National Cancer Institute 
1988b: Art. 12; BCCM 2000: I.8 and II.4. 
Figure 6: Monetary benefit-sharing measures suggested in model and standard contracts for ABS 
Non-monetary benefit-sharing measures are elaborated more detailed in the Australian sMTA 
and in the MOSAICC instrument. The only instrument without explicit references to capacity 
building or information-transfer is the BIO model MTA. All measures that were found are 
listed in Table 13. Again, the suggestions overlap to a great extent with the guidelines.  
Royalties   (% of Sales or % of 
Gross Exploitation Revenue) 
Milestonepayments  
Initial, up-Front 
payment  
Negotiate benefit-sharing terms & conditions by a point in the future 
(e.g. a date when certain types of research activities are performed; or 
when a product is commercialized) 
Immidiate fee 
Fixed fee upon use of the 
material in a research or 
experimental setting 
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Table 13: Non-monetary benefit-sharing suggested in model & standard contracts for ABS 
Non-monetary benefit-sharing measures suggested in model agreements 
Taxonomic duplicate of each Sample taken 
Biological Information of the Samples taken 
Making non-confidential information about R&D with the genetic resources available 
Access Party provides research funding to local research institution 
Access Party enters into a joint venture with a local research institution, and with a local Company 
or research institution for screening or developing commercial products containing the Sample 
Collaboration for contributing scientific research and development 
Training, Capacity building for e.g. taxonomy and general microbiology 
Technical and scientific co-operation 
Technology transfer 
Exchange of information and publication policy 
Transfer of test results for material 
Establishment of conservation facilities in the country of origin, or development of agreements 
between on the one hand countries of origin having no conservation facilities yet and on the other 
hand foreign microbial genetic resources centers 
Transfer of knowledge that is relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity 
Source: Author, based on FAO 2006: Art. 6.3, 6.9 Australian Government, Department of Environment and 
Heritage 2005a and 2005b: both Art. 3.1.2-3.1.3 and Schedule 4; National Cancer Institute 1988b: Art. 5.b; 
BCCM 2000: II.3. 
Except for the ITPGRFA sMTA all systems differentiate requirements in ABS procedures for 
commercial and non-commercial utilisation of genetic resources. As a general rule the 
requirements are higher for commercial access purposes. 
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Not all instruments provide recommendations or standards regarding the duration of 
contracts. The BIO Model MTA suggests using a contract term of ten years (BIO Model-
MTA, Article 7, p. 10). The wording in the standard contract of the ITPGRFA Multilateral 
system is that “This Agreement shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force” 
(Article 9, Duration of Agreement, p. 7). We interpret this as a contract without termination. 
The Letter of Collection and the Memorandum of Understanding (both by US NCI) suggest 
initial contract duration of five years and thereafter renewal based on mutual agreement 
(LOC, p. 5; MOC, p. 5). However, both documents contain an article on benefit-sharing 
which notes that the duration of R&D in Pharmacy may require 10-15 years until eventually a 
drug can be marketed (LOC, Art. 9, p. 3; MOU, Art. 12, p. 4). The Australian Model 
Agreement does not contain a standard on contract duration. 
The Australian Model MTA contains a clause on dispute resolution, which requires the 
contract partners to employ legal proceedings only as measure of last resort that means if 
bilateral negotiations failed. The BIO Model-MTA contains placeholder paragraph for dispute 
settlement procedures and a commentary explaining that appropriate mechanisms depend on 
the Transferor(s) (provider), and, if the agreement is about to govern bioprospecting activities 
international arbitration is recommended being included in the repertoire (BIO Model-MTA, 
Article 7.8, p. 10-11). The MOU contains no explicit clause on dispute resolution; however, 
the agreement includes several items that manifest close collaboration. The closing paragraph 
contains the wording “[…] this MOU will lay the basis for a mutually successful cooperation 
[…]” (MOU, p. 5). The other model agreements do not contain stipulations on which 
measures should or could be applied for dispute settlement at all. 
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4.2 Exploratory interviews and group discussions 
The results of the interviews and group discussions are presented in this chapter. The set of 
guiding questions respectively the subjects proposed for group discussions are introduced 
beforehand. Some questions are relevant for both research questions, others are more directed 
to just one, but provide with relevant background knowledge for both. Therefore, the 
evaluation is presented in one piece. 
Guiding questions: 
1 What are acquisition strategies and demand criteria for genetic resources? 
2 How is the transaction process structured? 
3 How are utilisation / demand characterised? 
4 What kind of problems (transaction costs) are experienced in the process of negotiating 
and implementing agreements for the procurement of genetic resources, and at what 
stages of the process do they occur? 
5 The praxis of benefit-sharing 
6 Handling of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) resulting from the utilisation of genetic 
resources and related information  
7 Exclusivity rights in connection with access to genetic resources and related information  
8 Types of agreements / governance forms for transactions with genetic resources 
9 Acceptance of contract-standardisation, particularly model clauses, as instrument to 
facilitate ABS implementation 
The findings derived on the guiding-question are evaluated separately for all three research 
groups. The information is then condensed in chapter 5 in form of an operationalisation of 
variables for a standardised questionnaire and the specification of hypotheses on the two 
overall research questions. 
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4.2.1 Acquisition strategies and demand criteria for genetic resources 
Access to genetic resources can be sought from various sources. Supposedly the governance 
form and transaction costs vary with the source of acquisition. For material accessions from 
international ex-situ collections standard procedures and contracts are applied. No direct 
negotiations between the source country and the recipient are required. The focus of interest 
in this research is, however, on projects with acquisition of material from the source country, 
with involvement of officially authorised entities. It is in this kind of transactions ABS has the 
chance to be actually implemented, since benefits of different kinds shall flow back to the 
source country and can create conservation-incentives. At the same time transaction costs 
seem to be most problematic in these types of transactions. 
Sourcing strategies were discussed to receive a clearer picture about the relevance of 
transactions with source country actors and the motivation to engage in these obviously more 
complex types of transactions. 
Researchers from public institutions 
Researchers from various disciplines were included in this research group; hence, the variety 
of sources for genetic resources is large. Acquisition of genetic resources from source 
countries or access to genetic resources in specific natural habitats plays an important role for 
several survey participants in this group. Researchers are thus often confronted with the 
challenge of dealing with ABS regulations in source countries. Besides this, material 
exchange among researchers as well as acquisition from international ex-situ collections is 
common praxis. 
Of particular interest with regard to a distinction between commercial and non-commercial 
research with genetic resources, is the common praxis of joint R&D-projects between public 
research institutes and industry. In research fields with a high degree of applicability (e.g. 
pharmaceutical biotechnology) it is common practice that universities and industry acquire 
genetic resources together, as one user entity. 
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Pharmacy and industrial biotechnology 
Users from pharmacy and industrial biotechnology procure genetic resources from 
international ex-situ collections, like the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) or the 
Belgian Coordinated Collections of Microorganisms (BCCM). Biotech companies reported 
that acquisition from or with the assistance of commercial intermediaries (small broker 
companies) is common praxis as well. In that case spot-market transactions take place, and 
simple, classical contracts are used. The “transaction object” in such transactions is usually 
not adapted specifically to the companies demand (e.g. processing and information). 
However, in both fields of utilisation cooperation projects with local research institutions or 
smaller research based companies in provider countries occur as sourcing strategies as well. It 
seems, however, that the companies rather apply one out these two options to access genetic 
resources directly in source countries. 
Especially in the pharmaceutical sector transactions with genetic resources directly from the 
source-country go far beyond the mere acquisition of raw material. Companies outsource 
certain steps in the utilisation process, such as the collection of samples, the characterisation 
of samples and the processing of raw material or isolation of extracts. Even first sample-
evaluations can be part of the “provider contribution”. Information regarding the usability of 
resources can be subject to transaction relations as well. 
Reasons for outsourcing are lower labour costs in provider-countries and the locals‟ better 
knowledge of the vegetation. In some cases the provider entity also takes care of 
administrative access requirements. Local actors may have a better knowledge about specific 
procedures and cultural specifics in dealing with authorities. This specialisation advantage of 
a local partner is a strategic factor which the user employs for the overall success of the 
project. 
The cooperation with local research institutes or research-based companies also serves as 
strategy to safeguard stable, long-term supply with natural resources (if required) and as door 
opener to new markets in the provider country. 
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For the selection of a specific provider country for bioprospecting projects four main factors 
were identified in this research group:  
(1) Rich biodiversity, which has a high chance of delivering material that fits the research 
focus. However, companies pursuit heterogeneous strategies. Some prefer regions with 
undiscovered biodiversity, to higher the possibility of finding new leads. Others go for areas 
where they know plants that are used in traditional medicines can be found. Based on the 
traditional knowledge they focus on specific material and by this avoid investing in projects 
without high risk of hitting any useful material. 
(2) The institutional framework in provider countries, meaning are a general political and 
legal stability, was named as further factor for the selection of a source. In accordance with 
property rights theory, companies stated that transaction costs can get excessive, if the system 
to enforce property rights is insufficient. 
(3) The provider countries‟ attitude towards bioprospection is also a relevant institutional 
aspect. Does the country support bioprospection, is flexible regarding ABS arrangements to 
meet the companies‟ specific needs, and has a similar understanding of fair benefit-sharing, 
are these plus points in the search of a partner country. 
(4) Scientific infrastructure and expertise is the third identified factor of a source-country 
selection in this research group. A certain level of scientific equipment and professionalism is 
required (see also in the literature cf. TEN KATE and LAIRD 2000: 251).  
A similar research focusing was named as relevant factor for good cooperation and therewith 
the selection of a local partner. Also, the providers‟ willingness to learn and his flexibility to 
adaptation in the course of the project are relevant. If research interests match and the 
provider entity has an intrinsic motivation to learn, interest harmonisation would come by 
itself. 
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Plant breeding companies 
Interview partners from this group reported about several ways for acquiring genetic material 
for plant breeding: commercial plant varieties, which are the result of a breeding process, can 
simply be purchased on the market and used for further breeding under the “breeders‟ 
exemption. Breeders might also exchange “material under development” among each other 
using bilateral licensing agreements, and companies have their own collections of material 
from former breeding programs. “Raw” genetic material is acquired from gene banks or 
botanical gardens, as well as via individual expeditions and collecting activities. 
Materials that are acquired from gene banks or botanical gardens are usually (even before the 
sMTA of the ITPGRFA was in place) transferred under standard MTAs, without extensive 
efforts for administrative requirements. Improved varieties which are commercialised and 
available on the market can be used for further breeding purposes without additional 
requirements. In the case of material under development or raw material among breeders, 
informal conventions on licensing terms are applied (at least in some areas). Source countries 
of genetic material that was used to develop the commercial material are not involved in these 
transactions. However, there still exist plant breeders that acquire material directly from 
provider countries, sometimes with the support of intermediaries (private persons or 
companies). Own collection activities organised and conducted by breeding companies were 
also reported by participants of the exploratory survey, but in relation to other procurement 
strategies less common. 
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4.2.2 Structure of transactions with genetic resources 
This question is relevant to identify all steps and transaction costs composing a transaction 
with genetic resources in the sense of the research. 
Users from public research institutions 
The three transaction phases described in Chapter 3.2 (1: search & information, 2: bargaining, 
3: Monitoring and enforcement) were identified in projects described by interview partners 
from public research institutions. Search, information and bargaining are not necessarily 
separated by chronological order, though. The reason is that some instruments for research 
granting require that country, and/or local partners are named already in the research proposal. 
Decisions on a source country, potentially a local research partner, and at least preliminary 
negotiations on the terms of ABS take therefore not necessarily place one after the other. 
Pharmacy and Biotechnology 
Cases described by users of this group proceed more or less in three phases (1) initiation of 
the project including information search, first contact and communication with potential 
partners (providers). The following phase (2) includes the bargaining process and contract 
drafting. It finishes with concluding a contract. The third phase (3) is the implementation of 
the bioprospecting project. If the agreement includes more than just access to resources in a 
specific habitat or previously inventoried resources, the third phase can be further separated in 
an adjustment phase, with adjustments of processing of samples (drying, extraction, cleaning) 
by the provider (often supported and guided through the user, though), and finally a delivery 
phase. 
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4.2.3 How is utilisation characterised? 
The term “utilisation” of genetic resources has several dimensions that supposedly are 
reflected in the transaction relation: 
 The intention of utilisation: Is the intended outcome commercially valuable or not; can 
the access seeking party foresee whether research with non-commercial intentions 
might yield commercially applicable results in the future? 
 Uncertainty involved in the technical process of utilisation 
 Timeframes of the technical process of R&D, which is also an uncertainty factor 
Users from public research institutions 
The applicability and the dedication of research to some kind of “economically useful” 
outcome are of increasing relevance in public research institutions, particularly if external 
funding is to be acquired and/or universities urge researchers to apply for patents whenever 
possible. This of course has implications for ABS negotiations between researchers and 
potential providers of genetic resources. Researchers are bound by their institutional grant 
regulations when defining their position on the issue of “utilisation intention”. For a 
considerable part of research taking place at public institutions, utilisation permits limited to 
publications are not sufficient, even if the researcher himself has no commercial intention. We 
can distinguish three main utilisation types found in ABS agreements involving researchers 
from public institutions: 1. publications; 2. Patents and other IPRs; 3. Licensing/sale of IPRs 
or products commercialised by start-up companies that are spin offs from public research 
institutes. However, starting point for research projects in the public sector is the scientific 
relevance of a question and the motivation to create knowledge. 
Since numerous research disciplines are represented, the technical process of utilisation 
including uncertainty aspects and timeframes vary as well. 
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Pharmacy and industrial biotechnology 
Industrial biotechnology and pharmacy are covered in one research group in the exploratory 
research for practical reasons. First of all biotechnology covers a multitude of techniques and 
methods which are applied in many different fields such as medicine and pharmacy 
(healthcare (red) biotechnology)
26
, agriculture and renewable resources 
(green biotechnology)
27
, and biotechnology in industrial production processes and 
environment protection (white biotechnology)
28
. There exist (particularly big, multinational) 
companies that are engaged in R&D with genetic resources in several fields of biotech and in 
conventional pharmaceutical R&D, hence, genetic resources are used in many different ways 
in this research group. All utilisation is characterised by commercial interest, though. 
One way of differentiating utilisation is along the process stage of R&D, in which the 
resources are inserted. Another option (referred to in model agreements, see foregoing 
chapter) is the differentiation of relation between resource and product: is the genetic resource 
used as model for the design of a product (active leads are used as patterns for synthesised 
molecules), as a tool in a process (biocatalysts in an industrial production process), or in the 
production as active component of a drug (only to name some possibilities). The closeness 
between the genetic resource (as input) and the intended utilisation product varies as well as 
the technical process of utilisation along these categories. However, due to individuality of 
methods, overcuttings and multiple uses of resources within the company it seems very hard 
to conclude from the utilisation sector to primary uncertainty or the duration of the R&D 
process. 
Participants explained that the technical part of the utilisation-chain can roughly be divided 
into three stages: 1st Stage: Efficiency analysis, 2nd Stage: Potential evaluation and 3rd 
Stage: Project development (in Pharmacy: clinical trials). 
                                                 
26
 “Healthcare biotechnology refers to a medicinal or diagnostic product or a vaccine that consists of, or has been 
produced in, living organisms and may be manufactured via recombinant technology (recombinant DNA is a 
form of DNA that does not exist naturally. It is created by combining DNA sequences that would not normally 
occur together).” (http://www.europabio.org/Healthcare/HC_FAQgeneral.htm#6) 
27
 Agricultural Biotech covers technologies used to breed improved crops in a more targeted and efficient way, 
e.g. genetic modification (recombinant DNA or r-DNA technology), Marker Assisted Breeding (increases the 
effectiveness of conventional breeding). http://www.europabio.org/green_biotech/index.htm 
28
 Industrial or white biotechnology uses enzymes and micro-organisms to make biobased products in sectors 
such as chemicals, food and feed, detergents, paper and pulp, textiles and bioenergy (such as biofuels or biogas). 
http://www.europabio.org/Industrial_biotech/IB_about.htm 
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The different steps are often not executed by one single company. A company might 
outsource certain activities, or buy, respectively sell intermediate products. Figure 7 shows the 
complexity of an utilisation-chain that might be typical in this industry sector. However, as 
elaborated above the way of utilising genetic resources varies among the many different fields 
in industrial biotechnology and pharmacy. The activities within the chain lead to various 
intermediate products with different values. Therefore, the willingness to invest in acquisition 
costs, as well as options for benefit-sharing varies. 
Transaction cost economics suggests characterising economic activity with respect to 
uncertainty. Some users reported that in pharmaceutical research with natural resources high 
uncertainty regarding the research process exists. Companies also confirmed the aspect of 
uncertainty regarding consumer demand for products based on research with genetic 
resources, as well as unplanned, additional investments were necessary during the course of a 
bioprospecting project. However, as reason they named not fast technological change but 
insufficient agreements during the contract negotiations. 
Asset specificity is another transaction characteristic governance theory assumes to determine 
governance choice and transaction costs. One survey-participant stated that several years after 
initiation of a project his company could find partners in the provider country with a higher 
scientific expertise. Nevertheless they keep the initial partner, among others because of 
relation specific investments in form of knowledge-transfer and investments in the partners‟ 
equipment, which were made for the partner to be able to process samples as required by the 
user. 
Another user reported about a project in which training for the provider was conducted, 
technology was transferred and a common database-system implemented, such that data on 
screening results could easily be transferred between user and provider. These relation 
specific investments were made to “help” the provider adapt its activities/process in 
accordance to the users‟ specific demand. 
Adaptations of the users‟ existing facilities (labs or plants) can be necessary as well, but 
according to the participants‟ reports in a less extensive way than in the provider countries. 
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It can be noted that several kinds of investments can be required in the framework of 
bioprospecting projects. Regarding the level of specificity assessments were heterogeneous. 
Obviously investments in human resources, training, and capacity building on the provider 
country are highly specific, first because they are bound to employees of the provider entity 
and therefore cannot be reused by the user in case the relation is cancelled, and second 
because they are adapted to the needs of a specific project. 
Investments in machines and technology in the provider country are specific to a certain 
extent: often they could theoretically be reused in other projects, but high freight costs limit 
this option. This could be called site specificity of the project. Temporal specify was not 
indicated as characteristic of bioprospecting projects in this user-group. 
Plant breeding companies 
In this group genetic resources are used to foster innovation in the breeding process and to 
develop marketable products. Access to wild material is mainly used for search and 
integration of diseases-tolerances, and adaptability to extreme habitats, for example, drought 
resistance, daylight- and temperature-requirements. These characteristics shall be transferred 
to commercial varieties. 
The technical procedure of breeding can be distinguished in classical breeding methods (e.g. 
selection breeding) and marker-supported methods (application of biotechnology). This 
distinction is important as it implicates different duration and costs of the research process as 
well as applicable intellectual property rights. Classical breeding results at the utmost in a new 
plant variety, which (in Europe) can only be subject to a plant protection right. This type of 
intellectual property right includes the breeders‟ exemption, which means that the improved 
material can be used for further breeding by other breeders without restriction. Biotechnology 
assisted breeding on the other hand typically yields results that can be protected with patents 
implying significant restrictions for further use (cf. HERRLINGER ET AL. 2003). 
Timeframes for developing new varieties with vegetative propagated ornamental plants vary 
between 3 to 10 years depending on the growth and reproduction cycle of the individual plant 
and on the degree of innovation strived after. Accordingly the costs vary. 
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One crucial difference between the seed industry for agricultural crops and the horticulture 
strand of plant breeding is that in the latter cooperation between the private and the public 
sector is much more seldom. Public engagement in research for breeding of vegetative 
propagated ornamental plants is less intensive and developed than for agriculture and food 
plants (e.g. Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CIGAR), plant 
breeding at universities). The exception is fruit; here public involvement in breeding research 
is also high. 
The chain of breeding, propagating and marketing of vegetative reproduced horticultural 
plants is seldom carried out by one single company. Often steps of this process (e.g. 
propagation) are carried out in typical provider countries, not necessarily the 
country/countries genetic resources used in the process were acquired from, though. 
4.2.4 Users’ experiences with problems in ABS agreements 
Users from public research institutions 
The problems reported by users from public research institutes are summarised in tables three 
and four. They could be divided in (1) problems affiliated with competencies and resources of 
the user and (2) problems associated with institutional factors on the provider side. 
“Provider-centred problems” are mostly shortcomings of provider countries institutional 
system for managing ABS including the transparency of regulations and laws, legal and 
scientific capacities of individuals involved in negotiations, and lack of mutual understanding 
regarding benefit/sharing (see Table 14). 
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Table 14: Provider-centred problems; researchers from public institutions 
 
Source: Author.  
User centred-issues relate to a general lack of information on the CBD and ABS. Since 
natural science researchers are not management or legal experts they also have limited 
capacities for negotiations and contracting, and the legal departments of universities often 
don‟t have the required specific knowledge. 
One interview partner reported about a bigger research project in which an external consultant 
company was hired to take care of communication and negotiations with the provider. In 
many other cases the possibility to fall back on external experts is not given due to financial 
constraints. Anyhow, even if several transactional steps like communication, negotiation, and 
contract drafting are outsourced to consultants, the user has to bear the transaction costs. In 
the above referred case these costs accounted for almost 10 % of the research funding. 
There is also a lack of information at legal departments at research institutions about ABS, 
which can make it difficult for researchers to integrate the MAT and PIC obligations into the 
planning of research projects, and to carry out the required steps in the provider country. 
Negotiation with Providers 
- Lack of competent contact person  
- Lack of expertise on provider side to 
assess access requests (often 
complex research approaches) 
- Unclear hierarchy of responsibility 
regarding ABS issues on provider side 
- Unclear regulations about other 
groups, e.g. indigenous people, that 
have to be consulted (PIC) 
- Providers lack knowledge of legal 
situation 
Benefit-sharing  
- Mistrust of users  
- Fear of exploitation 
- Exorbitant claims for benefit-sharing 
National ABS Laws 
- Lack of transparency 
- Legal systems / procedural requirements 
vary among different provider countries 
- Intransparent distribution of benefits 
increases risk of corruption accusations 
for user 
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Of special interest, and we assume these are typical problems for this group, are issues centred 
on the integration of ABS principles in research planning (see shaded box in Table 15). This 
has much to do with the researchers‟ intermediary position. They are the party engaged in 
direct interaction with providers, but their institution (e.g. the university) and external 
financing bodies decide on research policies, the distribution of research grants and in fact 
often are the contracting authorities in ABS agreements. This means the researchers often are 
the ones initiating ABS agreements, but have a limited say in negotiations. 
In the academic research sector opportunity costs of projects with genetic resources 
procurement from source-countries are an important issue. The success of fund-raising efforts 
for research projects is uncertain and the process is very long-terminated and time-consuming. 
Often several researchers are dedicated fully to one project. Negotiation problems with 
providers can hold-up the fundraising process significantly, and therewith add to the 
opportunity costs. If a project start is massively delayed or even cancelled due to no 
agreement is reached with the provider, a whole research group can be forced to lay down 
their work (at least for a certain time). The opportunity costs can be significant, and can be 
considered as transaction cost element. 
Users from the group public research suggested the implementation of a superordinate entity 
(e.g. at the CBD level, with representatives of providers and users) to check best practise 
initiatives like codes of conduct, guidelines, etc. for ABS regarding their consistency with 
general ABS provisions in the CBD. Such an entity could also provide Guidelines for 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs). MOUs seem to be a useful tool to communicate 
complex research projects to providers of genetic resources. From the researchers‟ 
perspective, the clear communication of what they intend to do with the genetic resources is 
extremely important. Misunderstandings and mistrust are perceived as sources of 
impediments in research projects or even the breakdown of cooperation between users and 
providers. 
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Table 15: User-centred problems in ABS; researchers from public institutions 
 
Source: Author. 
 
General lack of information and awareness of researchers, responsibles at research 
institutions and granting institutions regarding 
- Concernment by ABS regulations 
- Actual political and legal situation 
- limited capacity to achieve & process information on ABS regulations (legal issues are not 
core competence of natural scientists) 
- very limited legal competences regarding ABS of research institutions 
Specific case related problems (characteristics of the provider and the utilisation) 
- Identification of appropriate procedure 
- Finding the authorised partner in provider country to negotiate ABS 
- Identify other groups that have to get involved according to national ABS laws 
- Adapted communication (language, complexity of research intention) 
- Definition of fair benefit-sharing offer (what is the value of access or a specific resource?) 
- Adequate formulation of agreement in contract (legal know-how) 
Integration of ABS in research project planning (internal coordination) 
- Anticipation of research process regarding relevant issues for ABS contract (uncertainty) 
- Consideration of policies of research institution when defining the utilisation intention and 
other MTA elements (e.g. benefit-sharing and IPRs) 
- Researchers‟ communication of ABS towards university, granting institutions and industry 
partners regarding integrating benefit-sharing in project planning 
- Bridging finance for the initialisation and negotiation time before project beginning 
- Back-up plan to safeguard the research project (risk that ABS negotiations fail) 
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Pharmacy and industrial biotechnology 
Interview partners reported about labour costs and travelling expenses as typical transaction 
costs in the project initiation phase. Information search includes research about potentially 
interesting biodiversity rich areas, checking the framework conditions in the country of 
interest including legal framework for ABS, political stability, and the research policy. 
Potential research partners are of high relevance as well. They are selected by research area 
and know-how. Through publications, patent applications information about research methods 
and technological possibilities are acquired. In this phase personal contacts are to be 
established.  
Apart from information search this phase includes internal coordination. Within the company 
the project coordination has to be established, which also generates labor costs. These are 
company transaction costs.  
The initiation phase can be very transaction-cost intensive. One company reported about a 
project, in which approximately two to four full-time employees worked five weeks in the 
initiation phase to get the project started. Another interview partner assumes an initiation 
phase of approximately two years or even longer.  
For contract drafting several departments within a company can be involved including law, 
financials, and the patent department. It is important to note that especially in larger 
companies the management level deals with contractual details while the researchers 
implement the project practically. This requires good internal communication, which was 
described as resource-intensive by several survey participants. One participant stated that 
internal coordination in some cases requires more efforts than negotiations with the provider. 
Internal communications and communication with the provider in the contract negotiation 
phase causes labor costs. In smaller companies without a capable law- (and management) 
department external consultants are hired to support the negotiations. Sometimes also 
interpreters are required. In one case estimated transaction costs equal three to four weeks of a 
fulltime employee from the business-development department for drafting the contract, and 
one week of a lawyer to specify the legal form. 
The duration of the negotiation phase varies depending (among others) on how fast a 
satisfying compromise can be found.  
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The very important adjustment phase in the project is usually characterised by high 
communication efforts. Weak points in the projects, which could hinder a smooth 
implementation in the delivery phase, have to be identified and modified. Transaction costs 
occur in form of labour, material costs and travelling costs, as well as capacity building 
through the user. In one case an interviewee reported that a half time employee is constantly 
working only with communication during the complete adjustment phase. 
Users stated that in the delivery phase (implementation) less transaction costs occur. 
Communication has to take place, in case amounts have to be adapted or quality controls are 
carried out. Quality controls, however, are not seen as a tool to prevent moral hazard as 
principal-agent theory suggests, but rather as an instrument to “help” the provider reaching 
the required standards. In case the standards can‟t be reached the user would not simply 
change partner, but rather take additional measures to support the provider to improve 
performance. 
From a comparison of statements by different interview partners it occurs that larger 
companies with a good international network and experiences regarding information search, 
and complex contracting have much easier to initiate bioprospection projects compared to 
companies without access to such resources. The latter reported about severe problems for 
identifying adequate contacts in provider countries, and to understand the structure of 
responsibilities. It seems that transaction costs are influenced to some extent by the users‟ 
previously established network and capacities.  
Companies that have been active in natural product research since many years established 
over the time strategies to keep transaction costs low. One strategy is to involve 
intermediaries in source countries, may it be research institutions or broker companies. 
Another strategy, especially for large multinational companies with high influence and power, 
is to directly address high level actors in ministries of the provider country (rather the 
department of commerce than that for nature conservation).   
Intermediaries are involved to support or take over dealing with administrative access 
requirements. Intermediaries with local knowledge have easier to understand the rules of the 
game in their country involving language, culture, business practices, and they might face a 
higher level of trust from the authorities. Some user companies also seek to delegate a part of 
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the legal uncertainty and image risk by involving an intermediary. In a contract it is specified 
that the intermediary retains the genetic resources and transfers them to the company only in 
accordance with national access legislation. Another strategy is to choose, if possible, a 
provider country that has un-bureaucratic and transparent access requirements in place. 
A main reason why many companies previously engaged in natural products research ceased 
engagement in this branch are new technologies allowing the substitution of genetic resources 
as input for R&D. The majority of survey participants affiliated with this user group did not 
see transaction costs as a main impediment for engaging in ABS agreements or as reason for 
ceasing natural product research. Some participants explained that in relation to other cost 
components accruing in the chain of R&D, transaction costs for acquiring genetic resources 
were assessed as rather low. However, participants stated that high bureaucratic hurdles are 
seen as potential impediments for the future demand of genetic resources. 
A problem of a rather general nature stated by survey participants from this group is that ABS 
is a strongly politicised issue and the expectations for benefit-sharing are excessive (from 
their perspective). This leads to a difficult atmosphere in negotiations between users and 
providers. Related with this is the public perception of bioprospecting activities. Image risks 
resulting from engaging with providers of genetic resources are seen as a significant threat to 
companies conducting natural product research. Users see themselves as potential victims of 
biopirating accusations. The greatest risk is seen if concerned minorities, for instance a local 
groups or indigenous peoples that have some kind of property rights over resources, do not 
feel or are assumed not to be well represented by their government.  
Plant breeding companies 
With one exception the interview partners did not report severe problems or impediments in 
genetic resources‟ acquisitions. One breeding company reported the failure of an ABS project 
within which the provision of certain land species of a crop was demanded in exchange for an 
exchange of scientific staff and breeding cooperation. The project failed, because the 
providing entity was insecure regarding the national access regulations and finally (two years 
after the request was posed by the company) decided not to grant access. 
In other cases personal contacts and trust established during long-term relationships with 
entities in the provider country eased concluding agreements on material exchange. 
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One participant reported about regular collection expeditions in different countries in 
cooperation with a German gene bank and a gene bank in the target country. This is an 
example for how companies establish cooperation with public (research) entities in source 
countries to delegate dealing with administrative access procedure. 
A significant impediment to demand of raw material from Ex-Situ collections is that such 
material is often described and evaluated only at a very low level. For most plant breeders the 
costs for pre-breeding are too high and in relation the commercial expectations to low. 
Therefor “wild” material from ex-situ collections is often not included in the breeding 
programs though it potentially has interesting characteristics. 
4.2.5 The praxis of benefit-sharing 
In the exploratory survey the users‟ understanding of benefit-sharing and its application in 
praxis were issued. What motivates the choice of measures was discussed. 
Users from public research institutions 
Among the survey participants of this group we found a consensus of willingness to share the 
benefits of research with genetic resources and related information. However, former user 
studies indicated that far from all researchers are aware of the CBD, and ABS, and its 
application in praxis (HOLM-MÜLLER ET. AL. 2005). 
Different forms of benefit-sharing (monetary and non-monetary) were identified in this 
survey-group. Capacity building and technology transfers (the latter in larger, well-staffed and 
financially well-equipped projects) are buzzwords in projects with the involvement of public 
institutions. Often a participatory approach is a requirement for public research funding. 
However, not all institutions and granting bodies necessarily connect this requirement with 
ABS according to the CBD. 
Results-oriented payments are possible, e.g. linked to patent disposal or licensing. Some users 
reported that upfront payments are also performed, for instance as payment in return for 
sample provisions or in terms of infrastructure investments (car that becomes the provider‟s 
property after a cooperation project ends). 
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Pharmacy and industrial biotechnology 
The group discussion showed a controversial understanding of the benefit-sharing concept 
among the company representatives, although, all participants had experiences with 
transactions with genetic resources under the CBD scope. Confusion persists regarding which 
actors should be beneficiaries in order to comply with the CBD. Should benefit-sharing 
always include transfers dedicated to a governmental entity in the provider country, even if 
the transaction takes place without governmental participation? 
Users from industrial biotechnology reported that genetic resources acquired via market 
transactions from commercial intermediaries or ex-situ culture collections are not subject to 
what they understand under term of benefit-sharing. They pay a fee per acquisition/sample. In 
both procurement strategies (commercial intermediary and ex-situ conservation institution) 
users usually do not have direct contact with governmental entities of the “source country“ to 
negotiate ABS requirements. 
Users stated that in agreements with source-countries the terms of benefit-sharing are 
individual from case to case and a matter of negotiation between the parties. Complex models 
are applied in projects with a higher level of collaboration in R&D with entities in provider 
countries. However, the companies‟ capacities for conducting technology transfer or know-
how transfer vary and depend on the size and fields of activity. Also the specific needs of 
providers were referred to as factor for varying measures: what is appropriate differs on a 
case-by-case basis (short and medium-term technology transfer and capacity building versus 
long-term, insecure success profit-sharing). Views regarding royalties as compensation 
mechanism differed among the interviewees; however, they are included in some ABS 
agreements. 
As reference points for equitable benefit-sharing, the participants of the group discussion 
indicated the overall effort required in the process of R&D for developing a commercial 
product, as well as the relationship between the genetic resources as input factors and the 
product (as a measure for the contribution of the resource). Both criteria vary among 
utilisation cases in the survey group. Nevertheless, in the group discussion users agreed that 
rough categories could be defined. 
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The overall tendency in the discussion was that pharmaceutical and biotech companies are 
willing share benefits. However, they criticised unsolved contradictions with common 
practice for economic transactions in their sectors. Some users argued that ABS was thought 
of as a measure to implement a market system for genetic resources. Accordingly, the 
principles of business in international private law should be applied, and payments should 
relate to the supplier and the recipient of the good or the service. A system that obliges 
companies to share benefits with governmental entities, even if these do not actively 
contribute to the transaction, contradicts the business principle.
29
 
Plant breeding companies 
The overall view on benefit-sharing in the agricultural plant breeding sector communicated by 
associations and large companies is that the system of free access to and exchange of 
improved varieties and information is a major act of benefit-sharing as such. However, plant 
breeders interviewed in the frame of the exploratory survey reported about various additional 
forms of bilateral benefit-sharing: bilateral exchange of raw material or material under 
development, exchanges and training of scientific staff, financing of expeditions in which 
source country gene banks participated, cooperation in evaluating material, and collaboration 
in scientific publications. 
The breeders stated that usually the contribution of a single genetic resource to the 
development of a new marketable variety is extremely small. However, this varies among 
plant types, as does the breeding effort required to develop a new variety.  
The general feeling about benefit-sharing among breeders from ornamental horticulture was 
that they should not at all be subject to any additional ABS regime or benefit-sharing 
obligations. They reason that breeders by the nature of their business conduct benefit-sharing: 
 By creating biodiversity (new varieties) and preserve existing biodiversity (varieties 
which are threatened with extinction); 
 In the sense that improved varieties can be used by every other breeder for further 
breeding (International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, short: 
UPOV), even if they are protected with plant protection rights; 
                                                 
29
 This reflects some companies‟ argumentation line, not the authors‟ understanding of ABS. 
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 An essential part of the value chain of this industry is located in typical provider 
countries (societies benefit directly from the creation of jobs and income); and they are 
carried out by other stakeholders than the breeding company. 
The sector representatives recommended to consider that breeding companies are likely to 
transfer monetary benefit-sharing obligations to subsequent stakeholders of the value chain 
(propagators, growers), because the breeders have the smallest margin level. 
4.2.6 Intellectual property rights 
The right to apply intellectual property rights (IPRs) based on the utilisation of genetic 
resources can be viewed as an element of access and utilisation rights users “purchase” from 
providers. However, IPRs are also used as benefit-sharing component, in form of joint IPRs or 
by stipulating the commercialisation of IPRs resulting from the utilisation as trigger for 
monetary benefit-sharing. 
Users from public research institutions 
IPRs have an increasing relevance in the public research sector. They serve as tool for public 
research entities to generate commercial benefits and prestige. 
Some researchers reported about joint IPRs as part of ABS arrangement. In other fields than 
research with genetic resources this form of benefit-sharing is common praxis, particularly in 
collaborations with industry partners. Hence, generally spoken the survey participants of this 
group think of joint IPRs as a good form of benefit-sharing, if the provider contributes to 
research beyond the mere provision of raw material. 
A strong self-interest of provider entities to ease negotiations and simplify administrative 
procedures was mentioned as positive side effect of joint IPRs. They might also serve for 
demonstrating fairness and therewith increase trust. On the other hand, it was mentioned that 
joint patents can create problems at the stage of commercialisation (e.g. licensing to 
subsequent users). All patent holders would have to agree on the terms (both the price and 
with whom to conduct business).  
Legal requirements of joint patents were not discussed in this group. 
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Pharmacy and industrial biotechnology 
The survey participants from this group are familiar with the principle of joint patents. 
However, in the context of ABS they see problems for applying this concept. The patent law 
requires that all patent holders actually contribute to the invention. It is the view of the 
companies that merely the provision of genetic material does not fulfils this requirement. 
One participant described a case in which a joint patent would be applicable: If a provider 
contributes by with traditional knowledge about certain healing powers of a plant, and based 
on this knowledge the company extracts an active component from a plant and develops a 
drug. In this case benefit-sharing could - in accordance with the provider countries national 
ABS regulations - include joint IPRs similar to allowance directives like the German 
Employee`s Invention Law (Arbeitnehmererfindungsgesetz). 
Regarding IPRs for genetic resources transferred under an ABS agreement no common 
practice was identified in this user group. The tendency seems, if resources are acquired via 
commercial intermediaries, more rights are transferred to the user (whether in accordance 
with the respective national law of the source country or not we cannot say). If contracts are 
concluded with authorised public provider entities in source countries, more rights remain 
with the provider. 
Plant breeding companies 
Under European regulations, plant breeders can apply for plant protection rights (PPR) for a 
new variety. Such an IPR is applicable for traditional breeding techniques (selection breeding, 
crossing, cloning). PPRs are granted if a plant variety fulfils certain criteria (HERRLINGER ET 
AL. 2003: 246). The process of achieving such a right is lengthy and costly and a breeder will 
only engage in it if the new variety has sufficient commercial potential. Only selected plant 
breeding products on the market are protected by a PPR. Despite this, plant varieties under 
protection can be purchased and used for further breeding activities by any plant breeder 
without explicit consent of the holder of the PPR (Breeders Exemption in German law30 in 
accordance with the UPOV convention). 
                                                 
30
  http://transpatent.com/gesetze/sortschg 
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Since the 1980s biotechnology has been applied as new technique in plant breeding, one 
example being marker-assisted selection. Since the European Biopatenting Directive (1998), 
products from biotechnological plant breeding can be protected with Biopatents if they fulfil 
the patenting criteria (they are novel, non-obvious, and useful). Plants or parts of plants can be 
part of so-called Biopatents, if they are part of the invention, for instance a certain technique 
to locate, extract and transfer a gene of a certain plant (cf. HERRLINGER ET AL. 2003: 251ff.). 
Biopatents provide a stronger, more exclusive protection right compared with PPRs. 
4.2.7 Exclusivity rights for access to and utilisation of genetic resources 
As elaborated in the theory chapter, the resource based-view assumes that exclusivity 
agreements for certain inputs can be understood as strategy to achieve competitive 
advantages. In the interviews and group discussions we elaborated how commonly exclusivity 
rights are applied, in what form and how this relates to other elements of ABS agreements. 
Users from public research institutions 
This group was found divided on exclusivity rights for genetic resources and related 
information. Most participants argued for an open access approach, which would exclude 
exclusivity rights. However, some researchers stated that exclusivity rights, even if limited in 
duration and to specific fields of research, are an important instrument to safeguard research 
investments. Exclusivity seems to be of relevance only in certain research disciplines, such 
with a high level of applicability, e.g. in pharmaceutical biotechnology. 
If exclusive access increases planning certainty for researchers, it might trigger higher 
investments for the respective research project and therewith enhance the chance of 
commercial valuable benefits. Positive side effects for providers are possible. 
Participants found that potential model clauses on exclusivity should, be limited to certain 
forms of utilisation or research questions and with a limited timeframe. An option could be 
the expiration of the exclusivity right for access/utilisation granted by the provider, if the user 
does not manage to apply for a patent within the defined timeframe. If the user does not 
succeed within an agreed timeframe, the provider can reconsider engagement with other users 
or renegotiation and renewal of the arrangement with the first user. 
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Pharmacy and Industrial Biotechnology 
In this research group, two forms of exclusivity related to genetic resources are applied: 
exclusivity of access and exclusivity of a certain utilisation form. Companies apply both 
instruments to achieve competitive advantages in the sense of a head start to conduct certain 
research steps exclusively, for instance efficiency analyses. 
Access exclusivity increases incentives for users to invest in broad trials of the resource, 
which increases the likelihood of commercial success. The companies state that the level of 
exclusivity a matter of negotiation between user and provider. Users‟ willingness to pay (or 
demand) for exclusivity depends on several criteria, among others anticipation of success, 
uniqueness of the resources, and the level of information available on the resources. It would 
be comparably low for random samples. 
4.2.8 Types of agreements for transactions with genetic resources 
In the interviews and focus groups with two research groups, other aspects of governance than 
benefit-sharing were discussed: the duration of contracts and dispute settlement mechanisms.  
Users from public research institutions 
During the discussion it appeared that most researchers favour long timeframes for access and 
the right to utilise genetic resources, publish results and apply for IPRs. This is, because 
timeframes for research are often very long; of course this varies among disciplines. Short- 
and medium term (e.g. three years) contracts have the risk that when prolongation becomes 
necessary renegotiation requires high efforts and might fail. They see this problem 
particularly in countries with a general unstable political climate or if ABS policies are under 
revision. 
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Pharmacy and industrial biotechnology 
Company representatives stressed that a concretisation of mutual obligations in contractual 
form is important for legal certainty for both parties. However, only some companies 
conclude a full-fledged contract before the first material transfer is carried out. One 
participant reported that specifications on prices and amounts of plant extracts, investments to 
be made during the course of the project and success-based monetary benefit-sharing are 
specified in the initial contract. Amendments during the project are envisaged only to a 
limited extend. After the initiation phase a dynamic, cooperative work between user and 
provider is envisaged to pursuit the stated “common” goals. 
Other companies use the approach of phasing contracts. At each major step in the project new 
contract documents are drafted, respectively existing contracts are renegotiated and amended, 
or the transaction relation is cancelled. Financial details would not be negotiated before the 
company has found a commercially promising lead in the samples provided under the initial 
Material Transfer Agreement. 
A potential reason for the heterogeneity of contracting approaches in similar fields of 
utilisation is the variation of internal decision procedure in companies and different demand 
patterns, especially outsourcing strategies. 
The discussion participants elaborated that the duration of the final contract should cover the 
actual cooperative work, but also the terms of potential patents. They agreed that the praxis 
was very heterogeneous and individual from case to case. 
In this research group we could discuss enforcement mechanisms applied in bioprospectning 
projects. It is important to note that although the written contracts comes in several cases 
close to a complete contract, communication, trust-building and interest harmonisation were 
referred to as the most important enforcement mechanisms in long-term research 
collaborations. The contracts are rather seen as catalogue of mutual agreements and goals. In 
case these cannot be reached, problem analysis shall be carried out and options for adaptation 
discussed. Quality controls are therefore not seen as measures to circumvent moral hazard. 
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4.2.9 Assessment of the “model-clause idea” by users of genetic resources 
Users from public research institutions 
Users from this group are not trained lawyers and they only have limited access to legal 
assistance. Using their working capacities in lengthy administrative procedures and contract 
negotiations is therefore inefficient. Not all projects provide enough funding to employ 
external consultants. Accordingly, users from academics tend to assess measures that can 
simplify administrative procedures as an enhancement. Participants from this group stated 
they would very much appreciate a central contact for support in administrative and legal 
issues on ABS. Saving time, particularly reducing lead times for research activities is an 
important issue in this group since researchers and financing are often bound by certain 
projects with fixed time constraints. However, the discussion and interviews showed that 
utilisation of genetic resources in the academic sector is extremely heterogeneous. This would 
need to be reflected in the development of model clauses. 
Pharmacy and industrial biotechnology 
In this survey group model clauses for ABS contracts were viewed more controversially. The 
overall attitude was one of scepticism. The concept and the goals of the instrument, as 
introduced in the debate on an international ABS regime by the EU, are still unclear to survey 
participants (although these individuals try to stay current on the overall regime debate). 
Reluctance also seems to stem from a rejection of additional restrictions and a fear of 
interference with competencies to negotiate contracts. Confidentiality and competitive aspects 
are further reasons. An argument raised was the doubt that model clauses could appropriately 
reflect the heterogeneity of transactions (among others the needs of providers). However, after 
a lively discussion the participants of the focus group tended to find the idea of supportive 
checklists and guidelines for contracts feasible. 
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Plant breeding companies 
The International Seed Federation (ISF) calls for an extension of the scope of the ITPGRFA 
sMTA on all crops. The standard contract is supposed to be workable and could be applied for 
all ABS-relevant transactions of plant breeders with crops (ISF 2007; ISF 2008). However, in 
the interviews conducted with plant-breeding companies diverging opinions regarding the 
applicability and feasibility of model contracts were revealed. Based on their experiences with 
applying standard-contracts in transactions with gene banks and botanical gardens, some users 
find this a practical means to keep administrative efforts/costs low, particularly as most small 
and medium-sized plant breeding companies in Germany have no legal department. On the 
other hand, actors that are experienced with sourcing directly from provider countries more 
strongly stress the individuality of cases, for instance the specific needs of providers and the 
administrative systems and infrastructure in provider countries. In that case agreements would 
depend more on mutual trust and understanding, what could hardly be reflected in standard 
contracts like the sMTA. Here model cases would allow for more flexibility. 
Breeders in the field of ornamental horticulture did explicitly not favour the approach of 
applying the same ABS system as the seed industry. They feel as a very distinct industry in 
terms of the distribution of the value chain, lower monetary benefits created, and less support 
/ engagement of the public sector. The industry trends to be characterised by small or medium 
sized family driven enterprises, which usually do not have internal legal advisors or even 
departments who can deal with complex legal issues of ABS. Therefore, if they have to 
commit to negotiating ABS agreements, instruments that facilitate legal issues would likely be 
helpful
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5 Operationalisation of variables and specification of theory frameworks 
Findings from the exploratory survey on utilisation intention indicate a major difference 
between public research institutes and companies. The latter are motivated to engage in the 
acquisition of genetic resources for various commercial reasons. Public research institutes in 
contrast are primarily aiming to answer scientifically relevant research questions. They use 
genetic resources not necessarily with a commercial intention. Another important difference is 
the financial and organisational background of utilisation in both sectors. 
The utilisation intention and the organisational and economic framework of interaction, 
supposedly determine different behavior of the user in the acquisition process. Different lines 
of reasoning regarding “fair” benefit-sharing became evident in the exploratory pre-survey. 
Companies assess “fair” participation in the case of successful patent applications based on 
the contribution of the genetic resources to the process of developing a commercial product or 
a patent. Users in academia, however, indicated that the entire research process is considered. 
Since the contribution of each party is often difficult to assess, they would plead for equal 
shares for each party.  
Due to differences in the motivation patterns between the private and the public sector, 
different theories should be applied in the next step of a governance analysis. However, 
limited capacities in this research project required to select one user group. The private sector 
was chosen, since here the majority of controversies regarding the feasibility and applicability 
of a contract-standardisation instrument exist. Moreover, ABS-agreements with the private-
sector are more promising regarding monetary benefit-sharing. Also, the private sector has 
higher capacities for significant capacity building in provider countries. 
With the help of the exploratory empirical research and the findings from the topical 
literature, the theory on governance forms and transaction characteristics is adopted for this 
research. Empirically observable characteristics for the variables could be derived and a 
framework of assumptions and hypotheses is defined. These interim findings are presented in 
the following sections. 
The governance elements and transaction variables that were identified as being relevant to 
survey in a standardised online questionnaire are listed in Table 16. The survey questions are 
shown in Appendix II (p. 237-249). 
5 Operationalisation of variables and specification of theory frameworks  
 
 
112 
 
  
Table 16: Selection of variables for further governance analysis 
Governance elements for further 
investigation 
Explanatory variables for further 
investigation 
The type of contracting  Provider contribution 
Duration of contracts Strategic demand aspects 
Monetary benefit-sharing Asset specificity 
Non-monetary benefit-sharing Primary uncertainty 
Conflict resolution mechanisms Frequency of interaction 
 Indirect capacities of the user 
 
Transaction environment (national ABS-
institutions in the provider country) 
Source: Author. 
5.1 Operationalisation of the explanatory variables (transaction characteristics) 
(1) Demand, provider contribution and strategic aspects of capacity building 
When it comes to genetic resources, demand is heterogeneous and the factors determining the 
choice of a supply source are shifting as well. On the level of individual projects, the 
provider-contribution can take various forms. The range spans from the mere material 
provision to extensive scientific collaboration. 
Several demand-factors are not primarily motivated by transaction cost minimisation, but 
have rather other goals such as cost-saving through outsourcing and/or safeguarding long-
term access to genetic resources. Further “strategic demand factors” for establishing 
collaborations with local research-entities can be to use their locational advantage for 
facilitating administrative access-requirements and as door opener to new markets. These 
factors supposedly have influence on the governance choice, and are therefore included in the 
standardised survey through three questions. 
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In one question users were requested to assess from their companies‟ perspective the 
relevance of six supply characteristics in the process of choosing a source for genetic 
resources (not specifically in the reference case, but in general). Answer options were 
operationalised as seven-point ordinal response scale ranging from (1) “not important at all” 
to (7) “very important” (Figure 8 , p. 120). 
“Provider contribution” in the case-specific part of the survey was operationalised as a multi-
item, multi-response question. The participants could chose out of 10 items those best 
describing the type of “supply” in their reference project. Each item is later handled as a 
discrete variable with two possible characteristics: yes (1) and no (0) (Figure 8, p. 120). 
To evaluate the relevance of strategic demand aspects, survey participants were asked to 
evaluate six statements on “synergy effects of capacity building in the provider country”. On 
an ordinal seven-point response scale companies that previously indicated capacity building 
as part of the benefit-sharing package rated the level of confirmation for each statement 
(Figure 8, p. 120). 
(2) Asset Specificity 
The theory suggests treating asset specificity as an explanatory variable for governance 
decisions, because it exhibits a risk for opportunistic behavior and therefore requires 
governance safeguards. In the literature dealing with bioprospection and utilisation of genetic 
resources contrary statements on the relevance of asset specificity are found. RICHERZHAGEN 
(2007: 111) finds asset specificity not to be a relevant characteristic in her research on critical 
success factors of national ABS systems. However, the focus on ABS is different in this work. 
SAMPATH (2005) on the other hand describes asset specificity as highly relevant characteristic 
of bioprospecting projects in the field of pharmacy and botanical medicine in her analysis of 
ABS-contracts under the light of efficient property rights systems (p. 95f).  
The exploratory research in this dissertation indicated that relation specific investments 
characterise many projects with the acquisition of genetic resources directly from source-
countries. Forms of asset specificity that were identified are investments in physical capital, 
such as machines (e.g. laboratory equipment), as well as investments in human capital in form 
of education and training. In addition, SAMPATH (2005) refers to relation-specific investments 
in buildings (ibid. p. 95).  
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Seemingly, most relation-specific investments by user companies are made in the provider 
country, directly linked to capacity building with the aim of supporting the provider in 
adapting supply to the users‟ specific needs. 
Relation specific investments in form of capacity building can also be understood as a 
governance variable, as measure of integration and mechanism to safeguard interest 
harmonisation. 
In scientific literature various proxies for the measurement of asset specificity can be found. 
Often the variable is coded qualitatively, due to the lack of access to quantitative data 
(SHELANSKI 1995: 338), although hypothetically it could be measured continuously, e.g. in 
terms of currency or working hours. In this research a qualitative approach is chosen to keep 
inhibitions to answering as low as possible. Both aspects, (1) the occurrence of investments in 
their various forms and (2) the level of specificity, are surveyed and combined for the 
evaluation. Moreover, participants are requested to differ between investments in their 
company‟s home country as well as in the provider county. The level of specificity is 
operationalised through an ordinal scale with 7 categories spanning from “in case the project 
is called off before completion investments can be utilised otherwise only with high financial 
disadvantages” to the other extreme “… without financial disadvantages/ no investments are 
made” (Figure 8, p. 120).  
(3) Primary uncertainty 
The chain of utilisation spans the identification and evaluation of potentially interesting 
resources, research and product development, as well as market introduction and sales over 
the product life cycle. In all these stages primary uncertainty was identified.  
The different forms of uncertainty can be summarised to (1) an overall uncertainty regarding 
the economic outcome of the project, (2) uncertainty about the development of the R&D 
process, (3) market/demand uncertainty, and (4) technological uncertainty.  
Technological uncertainty, which in the theory is thought of as raising the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour, was not confirmed as a relevant issue in transactions with genetic resources in the 
exploratory survey. However, since this topic was not exhaustively discussed with users of all 
potential fields of utilisation, it should be included in the online survey to verify or falsify its 
relevance basing on a broader sample. 
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In the literature demand uncertainty is referred to as a rather “simple” form of disturbance, not 
requiring coordinated response of the transaction parties. For transactions with genetic 
resource, this assumption holds only partly true. If the resources are needed as raw material 
for production, a coordinated response to demand/market changes might be necessary. From 
the pre-survey and the topical literature one can deduce that users carry out capacity building 
activities - such as know-how transfer for sustainable use or cultivation of natural resources or 
other measures to safeguard the long-term supply of raw material - in order to enable the 
provider to carry out specific services. Such activities are likely to become necessary if 
demand rises after a product was released and the genetic resource is required as raw material 
for production. A coordinated response would be efficient in order to cope with demand 
uncertainty. 
In the survey four items are included to capture primary uncertainty. They cover the 
previously elaborated different aspects of uncertainty. Since the predictions for governance 
choice diverge all items shall be evaluated separately, not as one reflective construct-variable. 
Each item is operationalised through a statement with a respective seven-point ordinal 
response-scale spanning from (1) strong disaffirmation to (7) full confirmation (Figure 8, p. 
120). 
A further proxy for uncertainty is the duration of the utilisation process. The longer the 
timeframe from accessing genetic resources to possessing a commercial product (or 
intermediary product) or it being evident that such a product cannot be achieved, the higher is 
the uncertainty regarding outcomes of the project at the time of contract negotiation. The 
duration of the utilisation process was included in the survey as closed question with six 
response categories spanning 1 year up to more than eleven years (Figure 8, p. 120).  
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(4) Frequency 
Theory suggests that the frequency of interaction between two entities matters for the cost-
efficiency of “competing” governance forms. If a user procures genetic resources (and related 
services) over a longer period of time repeatedly from the same entity, investments for 
developing a more complex but participative kind of relationship might be paid off by 
reduced transaction costs in each single interaction. In the pre-survey, nonrecurring as well as 
frequently repeated transactions with genetic resources were found, depending on whether the 
user knows ex-ante which material is needed and whether it is needed only once or repeatedly 
in larger amounts. 
Frequency is operationalised in the survey as a discrete variable with only two answering 
categories (see Figure 8, p. 120). 
(5) Indirect capacities of user entities 
The resource based view suggests that the actors‟ level of experience handling complex 
transactions influences the relative transaction costs of different governance forms. 
Companies with higher indirect capacities are expected to face lower relative transaction costs 
of more integrated, complex governance forms. The literature (cf. HOLM-MUELLER ET AL. 
2005) and the pre-survey confirmed a very heterogeneous level of experience with ABS 
among users. Moreover, general experiences with projects in a different cultural 
environments, or research collaboration with partners from developing countries or countries 
in transition supposedly vary. To capture these aspects, verify heterogeneity and test whether 
they correlate in the expected way with governance elements, three question-items in the form 
of statements requiring confirmation or disaffirmation on a seven-point ordinal scale were 
included in the survey (see Figure 8, p. 120). 
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(6) The transaction environment 
Based on the literature and the results of the exploratory survey, 14 items reflecting different 
ABS-related aspects of institutional settings in provider countries were identified and 
operationalised for the online survey. The relevance of each item for users to choose a 
provider country is surveyed. The items are operationalized as 7-point ordinal response scale 
ranging from (1) not at all important to (7) very important. 
 Competent contact partners in the administration are designated and reachable *   
 Information about the national system for access and use of genetic resources (GRs) are 
available online * 
 Information (as defined above) is available in English * 
 When necessary, an official representative facilitates communication with local / 
indigenous groups 
 National regulations for the access and use of GRs are in place 
 Clear competencies of actors for access negotiations * 
 A reliable legal system * 
 Legal competency of participants in access negotiations * 
 Provider has a concept for resource evaluation * 
 Scientific competency of participants in negotiations *  
 Centrally managed access procedure for GRs * 
 Existence of potential local research partners * 
 Self-interest of the provider country‟s government to attract foreign companies for 
bioprospecting, etc. * 
Ten of these items are also assessed on a case-specific level (marked with *). Item two and 
three (both on information policy) are aggregated in one question. The response scale ranges 
in the case-specific questionnaire part from (1) very bad and (7) very good (Figure 8, p. 120) 
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5.2 Operationalisation of governance variables 
 The type of contract and the duration of contracts 
Two approaches to contracting were identified in the exploratory research: the fully-fledged 
contract right from the start and the phased-contract, which is developed during the course of 
a project. Both options are included in the questionnaire as options of one dichotomous 
variable (Figure 9). 
Contract duration has several dimensions: (1) the timeframe in which material or services are 
transferred from the provider to the user, (2) the timeframe in which the contract obligations 
remain valid, (3) and the timeframe in which benefit-sharing will be carried out. In the online-
questionnaire contract duration is defined as “the timeframe for which mutual requirements 
were made binding in the contract”. This definition was intended to include benefit-sharing 
obligations, which means the contract duration can span a much longer timeframe than the 
phase in which the provider actually delivers material or related services. 
In the literature and evaluated model agreements a range between short-term contracts (under 
a year) to long term-contracts over 13 years (covering approximately the timeframe indicated 
for R&D in pharmacy) were found. In the questionnaire this governance element was 
operationalised in eight categories (Figure 9). 
The monetary element of compensation for access to genetic resources and related services 
What is applied in ABS agreements as monetary compensation varies between fixed fees and 
success oriented payments. Not only does the reference for defining adequate payments vary, 
but also the timing of concretisation. Negotiated advance payments are found as well as 
arrangements to negotiate monetary benefit-sharing following the materialisation of the first 
commercial success. 
In the survey monetary compensation is coded as a multi-item question. The category 
“weight-related or hourly wage-related” payments are closest to market or standard prices. 
The answering categories presented in Figure 9 are in order of increasing participative risk-
sharing and flexibility. Since several measures can be applied in one project, monetary 
benefit-sharing is coded as a multi-response question. 
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Non-monetary compensation in transactions with genetic resources 
The particularity of ABS is that non-monetary compensation measures are explicitly 
recommended to supplement or possibly even to substitute monetary benefit-sharing. Under 
the term non-monetary benefit-sharing the Bonn Guidelines list a whole range of measures 
and activities users of genetic resources are suggested to carry out within the framework of 
ABS projects (CBD Bonn Guidelines 2002: Appendix II, p. 19). 
Literature and the exploratory pre-survey show that in practice non-monetary benefit-sharing 
finds broad application - for instance measures to support the conservation of biodiversity as 
well as measures specifically dedicated to enhancing scientific and technological capacities of 
provider entities. All these measures can be defined as some form of capacity building. Eight 
concrete measures with dichotomous answering options and “no measures” as well as 
“others” were provided as a multi-response question in the questionnaire (Figure 9). 
Conflict resolution 
Mechanisms to enforce mutual agreements or to resolve disputes can take various forms in 
ABS-contracts. The stipulation of external mechanisms such as courts is possible as well as 
measures for cooperative dispute or problem solving. Arbitration assisted by third parties is an 
intermediary option. All these options were mentioned in the pre-survey and are included as 
dichotomous items in a multi-response question in the survey (Figure 9). 
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5.4 Specification of theory framework for governance choice 
Governance analysis of transactions with genetic resources is a fairly new research field. The 
literature does not comprise quantitative analyses of ABS agreements. 
In this chapter hypotheses are developed 
for the construction of the specified 
theory-framework for evaluating the 
standardised company survey with regard 
to governance choice and transaction cost 
determinants. 
Figure 10 visualises the procedure of the 
evaluations. 
Two competing approaches for the 
governance-categorisation of ABS cases 
are evaluated: on the one hand the theory-
derived differentiation-system of demand 
characteristics, strategic factors and 
transaction attributes, and on the other 
hand the sectoral differentiation. 
First the survey questions are evaluated to 
verify the heterogeneity of transactions 
with genetic resources, and to identify the 
specific relevance of certain 
characteristics (see chapter 5.1 and 5.2)  
 
In the second step correlations between transaction cost determinants and transaction costs 
proxies are tested. Then hypotheses on associations between potential explanatory variables 
and governance elements are tested. Accordingly, cases are evaluated to determine if they are 
intra-sectorally homogeneous regarding the transaction characteristics and governance choice 
identified as relevant.  
Test of transaction cost determinants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test of overall heterogeneity of 
explanatory variables and 
governance elements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test of association of explanatory 
variables and governance variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selection of relevant explanatory 
variables 
Test of intersectoral homogeneity 
regarding explanatory variables 
Figure 10: Procedure of survey-evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author. 
Test of intersectoral homogeneity of 
governance elements 
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5.4.1 Specification of theory framework for transaction costs 
With the standardised online survey, data is collected to carry out testing for correlations 
between transaction costs variables (proxies) and factors that have been identified as potential 
transaction cost determinants. The assumptions and prediction regarding relationships that 
shall be tested are outlined in the following. 
As explained previously, transaction costs in amount of working hours or a specific currency 
are not surveyed in the framework of the standardised online-survey. The proxies developed 
cover (1) the initiation time for the project, (2) the users‟ assessment of tediousness and 
problems in the negotiation process, (3) transaction costs in relation to the value of the genetic 
resources, and (4) transaction costs in relation to other cost components of the utilisation. 
The “initiation time” and the “assessment of tediousness and difficulties in negotiations” shall 
be used as transaction cost proxies in combined evaluations with potential transaction cost 
determinants. Question three and four contribute to a more meaningful picture of transaction 
costs in the research context: Are transaction costs a hindrance for potential users to reach and 
implement ABS agreements? The one-dimensional evaluation of these questions is presented 
in chapter 6.1.   
Users were also asked to indicate what strategies they apply to keep transaction costs low. 
Testing for correlation of these statements with initiation time and transaction cost 
assessments is not possible, though. The reason is that the question on acquisition strategy is 
not related to the specific reference case but rather to general procedures. This means the 
strategy has not necessarily been applied in the reference project. 
A whole range of factors including user characteristics, provider characteristics and 
transaction attributes have been raised as potential transaction cost determinants.  
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User characteristics in combination with transaction costs 
Theory and the exploratory survey indicate that the company size is likely to matter for (the 
assessment of) transaction costs in bioprospecting projects, since larger companies tend to 
have a better international network for seeking information and initiating contacts with “the 
right people”. They also have easier access to experienced lawyers, legal consultancy (in-
house or external), and management capacities. Therefore, a negative association of company 
size with initiation time and negotiation problems is predicted. 
Strategic management theory states that indirect capacities reduce transaction costs in 
complex projects. The prediction is therefore that users with a higher level of indirect 
capacities indicate fewer problems and a lower initiation time for reaching an agreement  
Provider characteristics in combination with transaction costs 
Many different types of institutions can act as providers, depending on the property rights 
system for genetic resources in the provider country and whom the government has assigned 
responsibility and rights to negotiate ABS agreements. It is assumed that the provider type 
influences transaction costs, especially in the negotiation phase and in the initiation time of a 
project. More specifically: In the literature and the pre-survey it was indicated that the 
requirement of involving local and indigenous communities can complicate negotiations. 
Another prediction is that users chose other providers than governmental authorities, 
particularly local research institutes, in order to keep initiation times and transaction costs 
low.  
As was elaborated in depth in chapter 3.2.2 and in the problem evaluation of the exploratory 
pre-survey, the transaction environment in the provider country is a highly relevant factor for 
transaction costs. With the data from the online survey it shall be determined whether the 
prediction of a correlation between a well-designed transaction environment with low 
initiation times and negotiation problems can be statistically verified. 
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Transaction characteristics in combination with transaction costs 
The provider contribution is one complexity-factor in ABS agreements. Access to genetic 
resources can be sought in different ways (ex-situ versus in-situ), and it might be 
accompanied by certain types of rights, information or services related to the resources, e.g. 
collecting material, cleaning of samples, etc. Transaction costs for reaching agreement for 
more complex provider contributions can assumed to be higher. It has to be kept in mind 
though that the value of transactions with more advanced types of provider contribution 
assumingly is higher, and also overall R&D costs might be higher. Therefore, higher 
transaction costs cannot automatically be assumed a problem or inappropriate. 
In combination with asset specificity, primary uncertainty of the utilisation process 
(uncertainty of R&D, uncertainty of the commercial outcome of utilisation, technological 
uncertainty and market/demand uncertainty) is expected to increase transaction costs because 
safeguards for investments have to be established in the form of more flexible, complex 
governance forms. It shall be tested whether, under the condition of asset specificity, primary 
uncertainty is positively associated with transaction cost proxies.  
Uncertainty relating to the nature of information on genetic resources and the utilisation 
thereof was elaborated in the theoretical chapter. Lack of information regarding where to find 
interesting resources and how to find proper contacts and networks induce higher search 
costs. This aspect of uncertainty was not surveyed in the questionnaire, since it was 
sufficiently analysed based on the literature and the exploratory pre-survey. 
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5.4.2 Hypotheses on the choice of contract type and contract duration 
In the group discussion with companies from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries, it appeared that the internal organisational structure within the company is a factor 
determining the choice of the contracting approach. The statements supported the assumption 
that, particularly in large companies with many branches, internal transaction costs are 
minimised by applying phased decision procedures: low impact and low-cost projects can be 
decided on a low management level. Only when a higher level of probability for commercial 
success is reached and costs for R&D increase higher management levels get involved. In 
comparably smaller companies with flatter hierarchies and a higher degree of specialisation, 
management is likely to be involved right from the start. Larger companies might also have 
more legal capacities and power to deal with renegotiations at later stages. 
Theory suggests that several transaction and utilisation factors influence the choice of contract 
type, such as the complexity of interaction, primary uncertainty and asset specificity. The high 
level of complexity of the transaction subject, long interaction timeframe and high primary 
uncertainty make it difficult and thereby costly to draft complete contracts right from the start. 
The user requires flexibility to adapt the project (extend or cease R&D) according to the 
development of scientific and commercial prospects. Moreover, the definition of an 
appropriate compensation scheme might be impossible or very costly ex ante. R&D proceeds 
during the project, so uncertainty decreases and both parties can adapt their efforts. The 
contracts can be completed at a higher level of information, hence at lower contracting-costs. 
High demand uncertainty means that the company faces risks regarding the amount of raw 
material required for production. This affects the user-provider relation if the biological 
material source to the genetic resource is needed as raw material in production. In that case 
the governance structures in the project need to support adjustments, e.g. regarding the 
amount and timing of raw material delivery and material preparation. 
In projects with high technological uncertainty (meaning that the company might be required 
to make major unanticipated investments during the project) and high relation-specific 
investments, strong safeguards are required to minimise the risk of strategic hold-ups. The 
complete contract would be the basis for external enforcement, which is the strongest 
enforcement mechanism, if full integration is not possible due to the nature of the user and 
provider. 
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The pre-survey indicated that in several projects “complete” contracts are used as a reference 
to monitor and adjust the project, and not how theory suggests primarily as a basis for external 
enforcement. 
A1 An association of company structure and choice of contract approach is assumed. 
Companies‟ decision structures are operationalised by company size (number of 
employees and turnover).  
A2 Long timeframes of research increase the uncertainty of outcomes and are assumed to 
be positively associated with a phased contract approach. 
A3 The same holds for a general high uncertainty of R&D outcomes and general 
commercial uncertainty. 
A4 Under the precondition that the resource is used as raw material for production, demand 
uncertainty is assumed to be positively associated with the phased contract approach. 
A5 Asset specificity is likely to be positively associated with a complete contract approach. 
A6 It is predicted that for projects with repeated transactions that are carried out over a long 
period of time (frequency) tiered contracts are applied most commonly 
A7 A high level of experience, especially with projects in developing or newly 
industrialising countries, gives the user the knowledge to handle uncertainty of 
incomplete and evolving contracts. Therefore, it is predicted that indirect capacities are 
positively associated with a tiered contract approach. 
In the theory, contract duration is assumed to depend on asset specificity. Several empirical 
studies support this hypothesis (cf. SHELANSKI AND KLEIN 1995: 346, referring to JOSKOW 
1985, 1987,1988b, 1990; MASTEN AND SAUSSIER 2000: 222f referring to SAUSSIER 1998 and 
1999). In bioprospecting projects this is likely to hold for projects with a long R&D-process, 
in which result-based payments are used as safeguard for relation-specific investments. 
Empirical evidence further indicates that demand or market uncertainty is negatively 
correlated with contract duration (cf. MASTEN AND SAUSSIER 2000: 222 referring to CROCKER 
AND MASTEN 1988). This prediction might, however, not necessarily apply to transactions 
with genetic resources. If the utilisation process requires a coordinated response, demand 
uncertainty could also influence contract duration in the exact opposite way. 
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The synergy effects of capacity building, which were identified as potential characteristics of 
user-provider relations, are assumed to occur more prevalently in long-term projects. The 
costs of implementing such measures can then be outweighed by a per-transaction cost 
reduction or cost reduction due to outsourcing.  
B1 Contract duration is predicted to be positively associated with several types of capacity 
building, such as technology transfer and transfer of knowledge and skills in the 
scientific field. 
B2 Strategic aspects of capacity building are predicted being positively associated with 
contract duration. 
B3 Contract duration is assumed to be positively associated with asset specificity 
B4 Demand/market uncertainty is positively associated with contract duration, under the 
precondition that the biological material is needed for production. 
5.4.3 Hypotheses on monetary benefit-sharing 
The pre-survey indicates that differences in monetary benefit-sharing are strongly related to 
the heterogeneity of demand as well as the variation of provider contributions. The higher the 
provider contribution to the success-probability (e.g. through information or the contribution 
to advanced research), the higher participation in commercial benefits will be (cf. also LAIRD 
1993: 111f.). 
Theory suggests that the choice of pricing-mechanisms is influenced by several transaction 
characteristics. SAMPATH (2005) interprets monetary benefit-sharing in the context of 
bioprospecting projects the same way (p. 153). 
The risk of opportunistic behaviour is assumed to vary with the level of asset specificity, 
while the costs of defining adequate compensation varies with the complexity of interaction 
(provider contribution) and the primary uncertainty. Empirical evidence indicates that flexible 
pricing mechanisms and adjustment mechanisms are applied in relation to long performance 
horizons and high technological uncertainty
31
 (MASTEN AND SAUSSIER 2000: 229; CROCKER 
AND MASTEN 1991).  
                                                 
31
 This is found to support the assumption of increasing specification costs and rigidities associated with detailed 
performance obligations in uncertain or complex transactions. 
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In the case of transactions with genetic resources, not only technological uncertainty, but also 
the general uncertainty about the development of R&D makes the ex-ante definition of rent 
sharing more difficult. 
C1 The type of monetary benefit-sharing is expected to be associated with the type of 
provider contribution. Provider-contribution types for which the effort level and value 
are easily identifiable are assumed to be compensated with standard, market-oriented 
payments. While services with a more complex nature, which are not easily measurable 
and ex-ante unpredictable impacts are, predicted to be governed with more flexible, 
output-related compensation measures. 
C2 Asset specificity is assumed to be associated with result-based compensation. 
C3 Demand uncertainty is predicted to be positively associated with flexible, result-based 
payment mechanisms. 
C4 The type of benefit-sharing is predicted to be associated with the anticipated duration of 
the utilisation process. 
C5 Uncertainty about the development of the research and development process is 
predicted to be positively associated with output-oriented monetary benefit-sharing. 
C6 It is predicted that indirect capacities are positively associated with flexible payment 
mechanisms. 
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5.4.4 Hypotheses on non-monetary compensation 
Findings from the pre-survey indicate that capacity building can exhibit high relation specific 
investments from the users‟ side. However, capacity building is often employed to enable the 
provider to adjust the supply to the specific demand in a transaction. Bilateral 
interdependency might arise out of this, which can function as a safeguard against 
opportunistic behaviour. 
Apart from the dependency aspect, capacity building can create an atmosphere of 
participation, interest harmonisation, cooperation and trust. All of this helps to prevent 
opportunism and strategic hold-ups. Moreover, integrative hierarchical governance elements 
simplify monitoring and internal controls and facilitate internal dispute settlement while 
maintaining the relationship. Hence, capacity building clearly has more dimensions than 
merely compensation; it can be a governance element. 
The exploratory pre-survey and the literature indicate that in bioprospecting projects, 
companies often achieve positive effects from capacity building they carry out in the provider 
country. Such synergy effects can be safeguarding utilisation proceedings (material supply in 
desired quantity, quality, timing etc.), and the reduction of transaction costs. Synergy effects 
can assumed to be a motivation for capacity building. Also outsourcing of labour-intensive 
steps in the utilisation process can be a strategic motivation and require capacity building. 
Theory suggests that under the presence of asset specificity, primary uncertainty induces a 
shift from spot-market transaction with classical contracts to hybrid or integrated solutions. 
Capacity building would be one element of integrated governance, since full hierarchical 
integration is not possible. 
The following hypothesis shall be tested with empirical data: 
D1 It is assumed that non-monetary benefit-sharing measures are closely linked to the 
specific provider contribution, since this enables the user to most efficiently achieve 
synergy effects. To safeguard a competitive advantage the user might also require 
exclusive access or utilisation rights in conjunction with capacity building (cf. 
MULHOLLAND AND WILMAN 2003: 431-432; CBD 2008: 32). 
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D2 If realising synergy effects is a strategic motive for capacity building, the companies‟ 
assessments of potential synergy effects should be positively associated with the actual 
inclusion of certain non-monetary benefit-sharing measures.  
D3 Capacity building with a high integrative nature, such as technology transfer or transfer 
of expertise in the scientific field, is assumed to be employed as governance measure to 
reduce the risk of opportunism in projects with high relation specific investments.  
D4 The possibility of synergy effects is assumed to be higher in projects with repeated 
interaction over a longer timeframe, such that investments in internal governance and in 
enabling the provider to adjust supply pay off. Therefore, certain non-monetary benefit-
sharing measures are assumed to be positively associated with frequency. 
D5 It is assumed that capacity building is applied more often in projects in which the user 
has high indirect capacities. 
 
Non-monetary benefit-sharing can be viewed from two different perspectives in conjunction 
with the transaction environment: 
 
D6 On the one hand capacity building can function as an integrative governance mechanism 
and therewith substitute external (official) institutions for safeguarding property rights 
and contract enforcement. Following this interpretation a positive association of 
capacity building and insufficient national ABS institutions would be predicted 
D7 On the other hand, capacity building measures are relation-specific investments. The 
risk of losing such investments is higher, if the transaction environment exhibits 
uncertainty. Hence, a negative association of capacity building with insufficient national 
ABS institutions of certain kinds would be assumed. 
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5.4.5 Hypotheses on conflict resolution 
Theory suggests that especially in transactions with high relation-specific investments, 
conflict resolution and contract enforcement plays an important role due to the risk of 
opportunism. Empirical results in other fields than bioprospecting show that with increasing 
specific investments formal contracting becomes more likely compared to informal 
agreements
32
 (MASTEN AND SAUSSIER 2000: 221 referring to LYONS 1994 and CROCKER AND 
MASTEN 1988). 
In transactions with genetic resources, primary uncertainty, frequency of interaction and the 
type of exchange supposedly also contribute to determining the stipulation of external and/or 
internal enforcement mechanisms. As elaborated previously, the pre-survey indicated that 
bioprospection contracts sometimes contain an extensive specification of the services and 
compensation to guide monitoring and adaptation during the course of the project, rather than 
as a basis for external enforcement. Therefore, the specification of mutual claims in the 
contract is not assumed to be contradictory to the stipulation of internal dispute resolution and 
interest harmonisation. 
The more concrete mutual contribution in a transaction can be formulated and stipulated ex-
ante in contractual form, the lower the costs of classical external conflict resolution. If, 
however, the exchange is highly complex and judicial authorities are not able to assess 
whether parties fulfill their commitments, external conflict resolution is problematic, or at 
least very cost intensive. Moreover, the type of interaction in itself requires trust building and 
information exchange, which is the foundation for cooperative dispute resolution. For such 
cases, theory suggests relational or internal conflict resolution and interest harmonisation. The 
more complex the nature of the relation, the more difficult or costly the assessment of 
fulfillment of agreements by external parties becomes. 
The type of relation implicated by the provider contribution and synergy effects of capacity 
building are likely to influence relative costs of implementing internal dispute resolution and 
enforcement mechanisms. 
                                                 
32
 This result was understood as providing evidence of an increasing need for safeguards against opportunism as 
specificity rises. Increasing ex ante transaction costs of drafting a formal contract are accepted to circumvent ex 
post transaction costs or total failure due to opportunistic behaviour. 
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Demand uncertainty has several dimensions in transactions with genetic resources. Demand 
uncertainty requiring a coordinated response between user and provider can be assumed to be 
governed by contracts including internal dispute resolution mechanisms and measures of 
interest harmonisation. 
Technological uncertainty requires adaptability in the R&D process, which speaks for internal 
conflict resolution mechanisms and measures of interest harmonisation. However, 
unanticipated investments also exhibit a high risk of hold-ups, which calls for the stipulation 
of judicial authorities as the enforcement option of last resort. 
If economic interaction takes place repeatedly over a long time period between the same 
actors, investments in the development and implementation of more complex governance 
forms including internal dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms can be outweighed 
by reduced transaction costs for each subsequent interaction. 
E1 Complexity of interaction is assumed to be positively associated with internal dispute 
resolution mechanisms and interest harmonisation. 
E2 Projects, in which user companies can realise synergy effects from capacity building, 
are predicted to include internal dispute resolution and interest harmonisation measures. 
E3 Under the presence of asset specificity, it is predicted that demand uncertainty is 
positively associated with relational arrangements that facilitate the adaptation of 
supply. A positive association with internal dispute resolution mechanisms and interest 
harmonisation is therefore predicted. 
E4 Positive correlations of technological uncertainty with the stipulation of judicial 
authorities as well as internal dispute resolution mechanisms are assumed. 
E5 Frequency is predicted to be positively associated with internal dispute resolution and 
interest harmonisation. 
E6 Users‟ indirect capacities are predicted to be positively associated with arbitration and 
with internal conflict resolution/interest harmonisation. 
E7 If the transaction environment is highly uncertain, external safeguards for contract 
enforcement are insufficient. Hence, a positive association of environmental uncertainty 
with “arbitration” and “internal conflict resolution” is predicted. 
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5.5 Predictions on intra-sectoral homogeneity 
Several authors differentiate demand for genetic resources, bioprospecting agreements and the 
utilisation of genetic resources in accordance with industrial branches, so-called user sectors. 
They define common practices within these groups (cf. ten KATE AND LAIRD 1999; LAIRD 
2000). 
In the political negotiations and debates about ABS instruments, the “sectoral approach” has 
been recognised and is referred to in official documents. However, from an economic 
governance-analysis point of view, this approach only makes sense if the sector categorisation 
is a good proxy for those factors actually underlying variation in governance choice. 
A closer look at the findings presented in the literature indicates, however, that bioprospecting 
projects vary in their characteristics and governance forms even within user sectors (cf. CBD 
2008). The pre-survey in this research supports this finding. If variation within sectors is 
significant and cases affiliated with the same sector are not more homogeneous than 
compared with cases from different sectors, the sector differentiation seems rather 
inappropriate as a basis for developing a contract-standardisation instrument. 
The extent to which sectors can be used as proxies, and therewith as a much simpler starting 
point for defining menus of model-clauses for ABS contracts, shall be investigated by testing 
associations between sector affiliation and all relevant explanatory variables. Associations 
between sector affiliation and governance variables shall also be tested. The following 
hypotheses are evaluated: 
F1 Cases affiliated with different user sectors are significantly different with respect to the 
characterisation of transaction variables. 
F2 Cases affiliated with different user sectors are significantly different with respect to the 
characterisation of governance variables. 
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6 Empirical part II - evaluation quantitative company survey  
Chapter 6 is separated in four subchapters. Chapter 6.1 presents the evaluation of all survey-
questions found to be relevant for the governance analysis and the problem analysis. 
Bioprospecting projects are characterized on a very detailed level. These variables are then 
used in bivariate association tests for transaction costs hypotheses (6.2) and the framework of 
hypotheses on governance choice (6.3). In the fourth subchapter homogeneity of user sectors 
with respect to transaction characteristics and governance forms is tested. 
As explained in the chapter on methods, the sample size varies among the individual 
questions and sometimes even among items of one question. This is because not all 
participants answered each question (item). 
6.1 Characterising bioprospecting projects 
For a differentiation of bioprospecting projects with respect to potential transaction cost 
factors and governance choice the user and the provider characteristics are relevant, as well as 
transaction characteristics, such as primary uncertainty, asset specificity, frequency, etc. The 
survey results on these questions and user statements on transaction costs as well as 
governance variables are presented in the following. 
6.1.1 User characteristics 
77 companies that used the link and took a look at the opening page of the survey identified 
themselves as users of genetic resources in the sense of the survey. For the question “In which 
fields does or did your company use genetic resources” six answering options were given 
(multi response possible); additionally, participants could fill in other fields of utilisation.  
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Table 17 displays the frequency counts including multiple entries.  
Table 17: Frequency counts for field of utilisation for genetic resources in the online survey 
 
 
 
 
  
  
The different fields of utilisation – often called user sectors – are represented with a varying 
number of companies in the survey. By far most survey respondents selected utilisation for 
plant breeding purposes. Biotechnology in other fields than pharmacy and plant breeding 
follows on the second place, and pharmacy on the third place. The relation between number of 
entries (107) and participating user companies (77) indicates that several companies use 
genetic resources in more than one field. 
Table 18 displays how often combinations of certain utilisation areas were selected by one 
company. The multiple entries cause difficulties for the evaluation of the survey: in combined 
evaluations of sector affiliation with other variables of interest each case has to be assigned to 
one sector or one utilisation group exclusively. Therefore, responses for
33
 were re-coded. How 
this was done is explained in the following. 
                                                 
33
 As the survey participants were requested to choose a particular project based on their experiences for 
answering the questions in part two of the questionnaire, we asked them to specify the field(s) of utilisation for 
genetic resources acquired within the framework of the project. The operationalisation of responses is analog to 
the present question.  
Frequency of sectors chosen by respondents 77 
Pharmacy 14 
Botanical Medicine 11 
Personal Care and Cosmetics 6 
Plant Breeding - Seed 27 
Plant Breeding - Horticulture 21 
Biotechnology, other fields than Pharmacy and Plant Breeding 15 
Others 13 
Total number of entries 107 
Source: Author. 
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Table 18: Crosstabulation: Combinations of utilisation-fields of genetic resources 
 Botanical 
Medicine 
Personal 
Care & 
Cosmetics 
Plant 
Breeding 
(PB) - Seed 
PB 
Horti-
culture 
Biotechnology, 
other than 
Pharmacy / PB 
Pharmacy 8 3 1 0 4 
Botanical Medicine 
 
4 2 1 1 
Personal Care & 
Cosmetics 
 
1 0 0 
Plant Breeding(PB) - Seed 
 
9 1 
PB - Horticulture  2 
Source: Author‟s.  
The highest frequency of overlap is between plant breeding in the fields of agricultural 
crops/seed and plant breeding in the fields of horticulture (nine companies) (Table 18). An 
aggregation of both types of plant breeding in one sector category would only make sense, 
though, if not relevant information gets lost by the aggregation. Statistical tests
34
 comparing 
the answering distributions of companies that selected only horticulture versus only seed for 
each variable of interest were conducted to check this. The test results varied indicating that 
the two groups should not generally be merged into one category. Instead, two 
operationalisations of the sector variable were constructed:  
(1) Both utilisation groups were kept and a third category was added for companies active in 
both fields (sector_aggr2).  
(2) Aggregation of all plant breeding in one group (sector_aggr5). 
Sector_aggr2 was used for bivariate analysis with variables for which the initial tests 
indicated a significant difference between seed and horticulture. For all other evaluations 
(majority) sector_aggr5 was used. 
A strong overlap was also found between pharmaceutical R&D and botanical medicine: eight 
companies selected both fields of utilisation. Therefore the category pharmacy was extended 
to pharmacy and more than one field of application including pharmacy. 
                                                 
34
 For elaborations on the two applied tests, i.e. the Mann-Whitney U test and the Kruskal-Wallis test, see 
foregoing section. If the distributions do not significantly differ the two utilisation categories can be aggregated. 
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Only six participants selected personal care and cosmetics, and thereof four indicated that 
their companies also use genetic resources in the fields of botanical medicine. Hence, both 
fields were aggregated in the category: Botanical medicine, cosmetics and personal care. 
It follows that in further analysis companies‟ sector affiliation is operationalised as either five 
or seven categories variable depending on the handling of plant breeding. 
The same procedure was applied to the variable “field of utilisation” in the case specific part 
of the questionnaire: sector_aggr3 has five categories (all plant breeding aggregated) and 
sector_aggr4 seven categories (three categories for plant breeding). 
As proxies for company size (a) the number of employees, (b) the turnover in the year 2008, 
(c) as well as the average R&D budget in the years 2004 to 2008 were used. Answering 
categories were defined after conferring with an expert from the German Association of 
Research-based Pharmaceutical Companies. 
The lowest category for number of employees (less than 10) and the third lowest (between 50 
and 250) have been selected most often, while only one company selected the highest 
category (more than 10,000) (see Table A 2). Responses for companies using genetic 
resources in the field of pharmacy span the smallest as well as the second highest category, 
whereas plant breeders are concentrated on the lower categories. 
Responses on company turnover are concentrated on the three lower categories (up to 74 
million US$). Only two companies, both affiliated with the group biotechnology in other 
fields than pharmacy and plant breeding, selected the highest respectively the second highest 
turnover category (see Table A 3). 
About half of the respondents indicated that the average R&D budget for the years 2004 to 
2008 was lower than 1.5 million $ (equal to 1million €), and the accumulated frequency for 
the lowest two categories (up to 10 million €) is 80% (23 companies) (Table A 4). 
 
Variation of company size is existent in the sample, but higher categories have been 
selected significantly less often for each of the proxies. 
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In addition to direct measures of company size the users‟ so called “indirect capacities” were 
surveyed. As explained in the theory chapter, indirect capacities shall reflect the level of 
experience a company possesses regarding the implementation of complex long-term projects, 
especially with partners in developing or newly industrialising countries. 
Table 19: Frequency table: Respondents’ perception of companies “indirect capacities” 
 
1= not correct at all … 7= completely correct Cum. 
freq. cat. 
5-7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 all Median 
(1) Our company has a high capacity to 
execute long-term, complex projects.  
4 3 6 3 3 4 11 34 5 53% 
(2) Our company already has 
experience in the past of executing 
complex long-term projects.  
2 6 5 3 2 5 11 34 5 53% 
(3) Our company is experienced in 
projects with partners from developing or 
newly industrializing countries. 
5 7 5 4 3 5 4 33 3 36% 
Source:  Author. 
As Table 19 shows, about half of the respondents stated that their company has experience in 
executing long-term complex projects (1). About the same percentage evaluates their 
companies‟ indirect capacities as rather high or high (2). Only 12 out of 33 respondents 
indicated, however, being experienced in projects with partners from developing or newly 
industrialising countries (3). The variation was expected. 
6.1.2 Provider characteristics 
The provider type is a further factor presumably influencing transaction costs. As explained 
before (chapter 2), survey participants were asked to choose a reference project, in which “the 
genetic resources were/are acquired directly from their country of origin” and in which 
“officially authorised actors from the provider country were/ are involved in the negotiations 
(even if intermediaries are or were involved for support)”. However, several types of entities 
can be authorised from the government to negotiate ABS agreements, and depending on the 
property rights structure Prior Informed Consent has potentially to be achieved with different 
stakeholder groups. 
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In the questionnaire companies were supposed to select from a range of options the provider 
type(s), with which they negotiated ABS in order to reach an agreement in their specific 
reference project. Multiple entries were possible.  
Table 20: Frequency table: Provider types in bioprospecting projects  
Number of entries= 62; Number of cases= 43;  frequency 
% of 
entries 
% of 
valid 
cases 
1: National or regional authority in the provider country, such as 
environmental agency or ministry 
10 16% 23% 
2: Local authority in the provider country  8 13% 19% 
3: A local group / indigenous community in the provider country 4 7% 9% 
4: National biodiversity institute or equivalent institution that is 
authorised by the government to manage resources and grant access 
8 13% 19% 
5: Research institutes in the provider country (such as universities)   25 40% 58% 
6: Others 7 11% 16% 
Source:  Author. 
Table 20 shows that the overall number of valid entries (62) exceeds the number of cases 
(43); twelve respondents made multiple entries indicating that several provider types were 
involved in negotiations. Only 15 users (35%) selected a national or regional authority, and/or 
a local authority in the provider country
35
. In almost 60% of the cases a “local” research 
institute was involved as provider entity. 15 users indicated that only a research institute 
represented the provider country in the negotiations. These figures yield an important result: 
research institutes in provider countries are key actors for implementing ABS. 
The literature and the exploratory survey indicate that users relate a great deal of transaction 
costs and general implementation problems to the provider countries‟ institutional framework. 
14 items covering relevant identified institutional aspects were included in the survey to 
validate and specify previous findings, and to assess the relative relevance of different 
institutional factor. The items span ABS-related information management and measures to 
guide potential users in complying with ABS requirements. Factors dealing with the 
organisation of ABS negotiations and the legal capacities of providers, as well as items 
describing the providers‟ scientific capacities respectively capacities in the context of 
biodiversity / genetic resources are included. Finally, the provider countries‟ self-interest to 
attract users and implement ABS agreements is tackled in one item. 
                                                 
35
 Multiple entries are not counted double; therefore, the sum is not 18 as the table would suggest. 
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The survey participants were asked to assess the relevance of each item for determining the 
selection of a provider country on a one to seven point ordinal scale. Table 21 shows the 
results. Among 47 to 50 companies answered the question items. 
 Three items related to the provider countries‟ ABS information management and 
measures to guide potential users in complying with ABS requirements reached over 70% 
affirmation. These factors are most likely important to keep transaction costs down during 
the initiation phase of a project. 
 Two items related to the provider countries‟ organisation of ABS negotiations and 
legal capacities received affirmation by more than 80% of the respondents. Both items 
certainly affect transaction costs in the negotiation phase. 
 Items tackling the providers‟ scientific capacities and knowledge in the field of 
biodiversity / genetic resources relate to the users‟ information search ex ante, as well as 
potential information asymmetries. It can be assumed that if the provider has a scientific 
understanding of the users‟ utilisation propositions and a concept to evaluate the economic 
potential of genetic resources, information asymmetries are easier to overcome and 
transaction costs in negotiations can be reduced. Users‟ assessments of these institutional 
aspects are also affirmative on average, but less distinct.  
 The two items related to the provider countries‟ own incentives to attract users and 
implement ABS agreements (self-incentives) reached the lowest rates of affirmation. About 
40% of the participants evaluated the “Self-interest of the government of the provider 
country to attract foreign companies for bioprospecting, etc.” as rather up to very important. 
28 respondents stated that the existence of potential research partners is a relevant factor. 
Heterogeneity of responses for these two items underpins the variation of procedures and 
strategies of user companies for acquiring genetic resources. 
In the framework of a gap analysis of national ABS institutions, the results can be helpful, 
among others to prioritise measures to be taken in order to attract user companies. 
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Table 21: Companies’ assessment of the relevance of ABS-related institutional factors of national ABS 
systems  
How relevant are the following 
characteristics of institutional frameworks 
of provider countries for your company in 
determining the selection of a provider 
country for genetic resources? 
1= not important at all … 
7= very important 
Cum. Freq. 
Category           
5 to 7 (%) Median 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1: Competent contact partners in the 
administration are designated and 
reachable    
3 2 3 5 5 12 20 74% 6 
2: Information about the national system for 
access and use of genetic resources 
(GRs) are available online   
5 2 3 7 8 8 16 65% 5 
3: Information (as defined above) is available 
in English   
2 2 3 7 5 8 23 72% 6 
4: When necessary, an official representative 
facilitates communication with local / 
indigenous groups  
2 4 3 5 11 8 16 71% 5 
5: National regulations for the access and 
use of GRs are in place    
4 3 4 6 7 10 14 65% 6 
6: Clear competencies of actors for access 
negotiations 
2 3 1 3 3 11 25 81% 7 
7: Legal competency of participants in access 
negotiations  
3 3 3 4 8 10 17 73% 6 
8: Centrally managed access procedure for 
GRs 
5 4 1 12 5 9 11 53% 5 
9: A reliable legal system  2 3 3 1 2 7 31 82% 7 
10: Provider country can provide information 
about biodiversity  
4 9 0 6 9 7 17 63% 5 
11: Provider has a concept for resource 
evaluation   
2 6 3 6 4 10 14 62% 6 
12: Scientific competency of participants in 
negotiations 
1 6 6 3 10 15 9 68% 5 
13: Existence of potential local research 
partners 
2 4 7 7 10 10 8 58% 5 
14: Self-interest of the government of the 
provider country to attract foreign 
companies for bioprospecting, etc.    
9 10 1 8 4 7 7 39% 4 
Source:  Author. 
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In the case-specific part of the survey, users were requested to assess the transaction 
environment in the provider country of their reference project. Ten out of the 14 institutional 
items should be evaluated on a 7-point ordinal scale: 1 indicating very bad up to seven 
indicating very good. 
As assumed, the results show strong variation of the transactional environment among cases. 
More than half of the participants rated the clarity of competence assignment and the legal 
competency of provider entities as “rather bad to very bad”; whereas the scientific 
competency, the existence of potential research partners and the existence of a resource 
evaluation concept were on average assessed significantly more positive (Table A 5). 
The positive assessment of research infrastructure might be induced by some kind of sampling 
bias: provider countries might have been chosen elaborately for the availability of research 
partners, and projects with involvement of local research partners might be above-average 
“successful” and therefore be selected by the majority of survey participants as reference case. 
Hence, the result does not indicate that in the majority of provider countries a good research 
infrastructure is established.  
The items capture different institutional aspects, which do not necessarily have to be 
correlated, e.g. a country might have a highly reliable legal system, but no research 
infrastructure in the fields of genetic resources. An aggregation of all items to one single 
index is therefore not logically appropriate. Nevertheless, some items cover aspects of the 
same institutional area, and might therefore be correlated: negotiators with scientific 
competence about utilisation options for genetic resources are, for example, more likely to 
have a concept for the assessment of the value of genetic resources as well. If this association 
is statistically verified aggregation of the two items makes sense. 
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With a factor analysis (and logical considerations) it was evaluated, if and which items should 
be aggregated
36
. Applying the Kaiser criterion (eigenvalue bigger than one), and logical 
considerations leads to five components (see Figure A1). 
Three aggregated variables and two single items (five factors) are received with this 
procedure. The components or factors explain together about 93% of the sample variance for 
transactional environment defined through originally 10 items (see table Table A 6). 
Table 22 shows the correlation between each item and the five components, according to 
which the aggregated variables are composed. Except for item “centrally managed access 
procedure for genetic resources” all can be relatively clearly assigned to one component. The 
five components shall be used in bivariate evaluations: 
Table 22: Factor Analysis: Factor loadings for transaction environment items 
Rotated Component Matrix(a) Rescaled Component 
Items 1 2 3  4 5 
A reliable legal system  ,874 ,159   ,301 ,152 
Scientific competency of participants in access negotiations ,833 ,124 ,373   ,301 
Clear competencies of actors for access negotiations ,805 ,110 ,245     
Provider has a concept for resource evaluation   ,789     ,540 ,139 
Self-interest of the government of the provider country for 
accomplishing ABS agreements  
  ,895 ,331 ,120 ,215 
Availability of information about the national system for access 
and use of genetic resources.   
,570 ,721 ,116 -,287   
Legal competency of actors involved in negotiations  ,180 ,270 ,921 ,101 ,104 
Centrally managed access procedure for genetic resources ,244 ,530 ,579   ,336 
Competent contact partner in the administration is designated 
and reachable  
,224     ,933   
Existence of potential research partners in the provider country ,388 ,418 ,255   ,773 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; .  Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
Source: Author. 
                                                 
36
 With a Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test it was tested whether the data of the “transaction environment” variables is 
normally distributed, which is a prerequisite to apply factor analysis. 
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6.1.3 Transaction characteristics 
In the debate on potential ABS instruments it was stressed that measures should be adapted to 
“different ways of utilisation”. A concrete concept for the operationalisation of “ways of 
utilisation” was not provided or developed in the discussions, though. In this work such a 
concept based on transaction costs economics and strategic management is developed. The 
survey-results provide evidence for the heterogeneity of cases regarding the proxies 
developed for “ways of utilisation”. 
Demand heterogeneity 
Supposedly, transaction costs are higher for access to in-situ material in source countries 
compared to acquisitions from international gene-banks, culture collections and botanical 
gardens. So why would users choose to procure in-situ material directly from a source 
country? The reason is that demand for genetic resources is often specific, e.g. combined with 
demand for additional services, information, rights, or even specific ways of access. The 
survey verifies the heterogeneity of demand as it was conceptualised based on the literature 
and the exploratory pre-survey. 
Table 23: Frequency table: Differentiation of demand in ABS agreements 
Please complete the following sentences and assess                          
how important each aspect is for the selection of a supply 
source for genetic resources. 
1= not important at all ... 
7= very important 
 
Cumulated frequency 
category 5-7 
(confirmation) For some projects in our company was or is... 
1: ... access to undiscovered genetic resources (GRs) as a potential source of 
innovative products very important. 
67% 
2: ... access to properties of wild species of certain plants or animals very important.    66% 
3: ... it very important to be able to study GRs in the context of their natural habitat. 36% 
4: ... traditional knowledge about effectiveness of natural resources very important    40% 
5: ... exclusive access or exclusive usage rights for genetic resources very important. 45% 
6: ... it very important that the provider could deliver the GR(s) as raw material on an 
intermediate or long term basis in larger quantities. 
43% 
Source: Author. 
6 Empirical part II - evaluation quantitative company survey 
 
 
146 
 
  
Table 23 (and Table A 7) shows that the majority of companies represented in the sample 
conducts projects in which access to undiscovered genetic resources (item 1). Access to 
properties of wild species (item 2) is rated rather or very important. As assumed, responses on 
more specific demand aspects (items three to six) are more dispersed; less than half of the 
participants confirm the relevance of these demand characteristics. 
Looking at the providers‟ contribution on a case level, demand heterogeneity and potential 
complexity of ABS cases becomes even more obvious. Table 24 indicates that several 
respondents made multiple entries (the number of entries exceeds the number of cases). Most 
participants (45%) made three or more entries (see Table A 8). This supports the assumption 
that acquisition of genetic resources directly from source countries is often linked with the 
transfer of certain rights, services, or information. 
Table 24: frequency table: Providers contribution for the project with genetic resources 
Number of valid cases= 43, All entries= 105               
(Multiple entries were possible) 
frequency 
Percent of 
valid cases 
Access to previously inventoried resources in national collections  18 42% 
Collection permission    15 35% 
Provider executes collection activities  11 21% 
Information (e.g. traditional knowledge) about usage possibilities 12 28% 
Preparation of the material  12 28% 
Evaluation of samples    13 30% 
Participation in advanced research   9 21% 
Some kind of exclusivity rights 
Exclusive access to genetic resources    
Exclusive usage rights for certain information   
Exclusive research rights in certain application areas 
9 
6 
5 
4 
21% 
15% 
13% 
10% 
Source: Author.  
The individuality of cases regarding demand characteristics is also supported by the result that 
only very few provider-contribution items are significantly associated. Moreover, the 
significant results are mostly negative correlations indicating that neither of the options was 
selected (see Table A 8 ). 
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Synergy effects of capacity building build one group of factors in the theoretical framework 
for explaining governance choice in this research. Table 25 and Table A 10 show that more 
than half of the users carrying out capacity building (limited sample) confirm positive (side) 
effects of non-monetary benefit sharing (capacity building). 
The results verify that capacity building safeguards supply in required quality and amount, as 
well as the long term availability of resources. Also economising of costs for material 
evaluation (outsourcing) was confirmed as an effect of capacity building. Strategic aspects 
shall therefore be included in further evaluations combined with governance elements. 
Table 25: Frequency table on synergy effects of non-monetary benefit-sharing 
What synergy effects (can) result for your company from non-monetary 
benefit transfers in the project?  
1= Not correct at all   ......   7= Completely correct 
all 
Cumulated. 
frequency 
category 5 - 7 
1: Providers will be better positioned to provide the desired activity, for 
example, quality / continuity of material supply. 
19 53% 
2: Local scientists will be able to conduct initial on-site evaluations of 
genetic resources, which will reduce costs for us in the long run. 
19 53% 
3: Capacity building ensures the conservation and the long-term 
availability of genetic resources.  
18 56% 
4: Capacity building is the prerequisite so that scientific cooperation is 
possible.    
19 37% 
5: Capacity building increases trust and facilitates communication with the 
providers.  
18 78% 
6: Capacity building is a fundamental requirement of the provider.  18 17% 
Source: Author. 
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Asset specificity 
In transaction cost economics asset specificity is seen as one of the most relevant factors for 
the choice of efficient governance forms. The pre-survey indicated the relevance of relation 
specific investments, both as transaction characteristic and determinant for governance 
choice, and as governance element itself. Table A 11 displays the results on the occurrence of 
asset specificity in transactions with genetic resources differentiated by type of investment 
and location. In total 28 companies (68%) confirmed to make or have made investments for 
the utilisation of genetic resources within their reference project. Thereof 26 indicated 
investments in buildings, laboratory equipment, other physical assets, as well as investments 
in employees in their “home countries”, and 18 companies made investments in the provider 
country. 
An influence of investments on the advantageousness of governance forms, however, is only 
assumed if investments are relation-specific. Therefore, the survey participants were asked to 
assess in how far the investments could be reused without financial loss in case the project is 
called off before completion. Table 26 and Table A 12 display the answers differentiated by 
investment in the home country and investments in the provider country. 
Table 26: Degree of asset specificity for R&D-projects with genetic resources 
1= only with high financial disadvantages ...  7= without financial disadvantages 
          Cumulated frequency of category 1-4 (relation-specificity confirmed)  
Can your companies‟ investments in the home country be otherwise utilised if the project 
is called off before completion? (all: 25 *) 
64% 
Can your companies‟ investments in the provider country be otherwise utilised if the 
project is called off before completion? (all: 16 *) 
56% 
*These questions were filtered, and only answered by participants that beforehand indicated their company 
invested/ invests in the framework of the project. 
Source: Author. 
16 companies stated that the investments in their home countries are relation specific, and 
nine companies described investments in provider countries as specific. In total 18 projects in 
the sample are characteriesd by relation specific investments (7 respondents indicated asset 
specificity in both categories) (Table A 12). 
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The results are not fully in line with findings from the pre-survey. They indicate that not only 
investments in the provider country are relation-specific, but also investments in the 
company‟s home countries. 
For bivariate evaluations of asset specificity with governance variables asset specificity was 
re-operationalised. Responses indicating “no investments at all” are aggregated with the 
answering category “investments can be reused without financial loss”. Moreover, to simplify 
interpretation the response scale is inversed: 1 becomes the lowest level of confirmation of 
asset specificity and 7 the highest (Table A 13). 
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Primary Uncertainty 
The results displayed in Table 27 verify heterogeneity of primary uncertainty in the utilisation 
of genetic resources. For each of the four uncertainty variables responses are distributed over 
the full range of answering categories. 16 out of 39 respondents confirmed or rather 
confirmed that “the utilisation process for genetic resources is completely unpredictable at the 
beginning of the project.” Technological change, which was not found to be a relevant issue 
in the pre-survey, is affirmed by about 40% of the respondents. 60% of the users rather to 
fully agree with the statement: “at the beginning of the utilisation process, we are not able to 
anticipate commercial output at all.” 62% of the projects are dedicated to R&D for products 
for new and / or uncertain markets. 
Table 27: Frequency table: Companies’ assessment of primary uncertainty 
N: number of valid entries 
1= not correct at all ...                           
7 = completely correct 
Cum. 
freq. cat. 
5-7 
N 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1: The utilisation process for genetic 
resources is completely unpredictable at 
the beginning of the project.   
1 6 7 5 5 10 5 46% 39 
2: At the beginning of the utilisation 
process, we are not able to anticipate 
commercial output at all.    
2 11 7 6 2 6 6 60% 40 
3: The technology in our field of use 
changes quickly.  
6 7 4 9 0 6 5 43% 37 
4: The genetic resources from the project 
will be used for research and development 
of products for new / uncertain markets 
4 8 6 1 3 6 9 62% 37 
Source:  Author. 
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A further transaction characteristic interrelated with uncertainty is the duration of the 
utilisation process, here understood as the timeframe from access to the resources until a 
commercial product is received or it is clear that this will not be the case. 
Figure 11 shows that all answering categories are represented in the sample, whereby “three 
up to five years” and “more than eleven years” have been selected most often. 
 
*The sum of percentages diverges from 100 due to rounding error. 
Figure 11: Anticipated duration of the utilisation process of genetic resources 
Source: Author. 
Frequency 
Table 28 shows that approximately half of the 
projects in the sample are characterised by 
frequently, over a longer period of time 
repeated transactions with genetic resources. It 
is important to note that not always acquisition 
of genetic resources from source countries is 
characterised by recurring transactions. 
 
Table 28: Repetition of Interaction between 
User company and Provider 
Did or will the services of the provider 
occur once or repeatedly?  
(n: 41) 
Once: 20 (49%) Repeatedly: 21 (51%) 
Source: Author. 
6 Empirical part II - evaluation quantitative company survey 
 
 
152 
 
  
6.1.4 Governance forms in bioprospecting projects 
To characterise and distinguish governance forms for bioprospecting projects respondents 
were asked to indicate the approach of contracting and the duration of the contract. 
Subsequently, details on monetary and non-monetary benefit-sharing mechanisms, and 
measures for conflict resolution, respectively contract enforcement were surveyed. To verify 
that the sample is heterogeneous and covers all possible options for these governance 
elements, the questions are evaluated in the following.  
Types of agreements and contract duration 
The online survey sample is split on the contracting-approach variable: in half of the projects 
a phasing, tiered approach is applied, in the other half comprehensive contracts are established 
right from the start of a project (Table A 14).  
As timeframes for research and development on the basis of genetic resources vary, contract 
duration is assumed to vary as well. Standards and recommendations in model agreements or 
guidelines span five years up to ten years. In practice variation of contract duration is larger. 
Responses in the online survey span less than one year (9 entries) and more than 13 years (4 
entries). The highest frequency occurred for the category “one up to three years” (13 entries) 
(Table A 15). 
Benefit-sharing 
Users were requested to select items characterising best the compensation mechanisms 
applied in their reference project. In a first evaluation step the item batteries for monetary and 
non-monetary benefit sharing were aggregated to receive an overview on frequencies of the 
number of monetary and non-monetary measures (Table A 37). In 10 cases no benefit sharing 
at all is stipulated. Monetary compensation is agreed in 70%, and non-monetary benefit 
sharing in approximately half of the cases. In about 45% of the projects a combination of 
monetary and non-monetary measures is appointed. 
On a disaggregated level it can be seen that the sample covers the full variety of monetary and 
non-monetary benefit sharing that was previously identified (Table 29 and Table 30).  
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Table 29: Frequency table: Monetary benefit-sharing 
Which form of monetary compensation does the provider 
receive from your company in the framework of the project? 
yes No 
Affirmation in 
% of cases a 
Weight-related, or hourly-wage compensation  8 30 21% 
Negotiated advance payments (lump sum)   8 30 21% 
Negotiated payments that are made after reaching certain steps in 
the usage process (milestone payments) 
8 30 21% 
Payments tied to commercial output (e.g. royalties)  10 28 26% 
Output-related payments, that are negotiated over the course of the 
project, for example, when certain operational steps are reached 
5 33 13% 
The contract contains clauses for ex post negotiation of 
compensation in the case that the framework changes. 
5 33 13% 
a number of projects in which this measure is applied divided by the total number of valid cases (N 38)  
Source: Author. 
Among all items “payments tied to the commercial output” was chosen most often (ten out of 
38 projects). The options “Output related payments that are negotiated during the course of 
the project” and “contract clauses for ex-post renegotiations” have been selected by five 
respondents only. 
It was elaborated that non-monetary benefit sharing can have a range of positive effects for 
the user company. Measures that supposedly have strong synergy effects are “know-how 
transfer” and “technology transfer”. This might explain (at least partly) why these two 
measures were most often appointed in the sample (Table 30). 
Joint intellectual property rights theoretically have positive governance effects (incentive and 
risk sharing); while at the same time they increase the risk for hold-up situations. Therefore, 
the application of such a governance instrument requires a high level of trust and mutual 
understanding. At the same time patent laws restrict joint ownership of IPRs to cases in which 
the provider contributes to the invention. Together this might explain the low frequency of 
joint IPRs as benefit-sharing instrument in the sample (Table 30). 
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Table 30: Frequency table: Non-monetary benefit-sharing measures 
Which form of non-monetary compensation does the provider 
receive from your company in the framework of the project? 
yes no 
Affirmation in         
% of cases a 
Joint intellectual property rights to usage results 4 34 11% 
Joint publication in scientific journals    13 25 34% 
Support of inventory / taxonomy of Biodiversity 8 30 21% 
Technology transfer 12 26 32% 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific field    14 24 37% 
Support of infrastructure measures  5 33 13% 
Transfer of know-how in the field of sustainable use / cultivation of 
genetic resources 
9 29 
24% 
Support of other measures to preserve biodiversity  7 31 18% 
a number of projects for which this measure is indicated divided by number of valid cases (N 38).  
Source: Author. 
Conflict resolution and enforcement of agreements 
Companies were asked to select from a list of dispute-resolution and contract-enforcement 
mechanisms those appointed in their reference project. The aggregation of response shows 
that in over 40% of the cases more than one mechanism per case was selected (Table A 16). 
Table 31 shows that “Judicial authorities” is stipulated in only seven out of 38 projects, 
whereas “internal conflict resolution and the harmonisation of interests” was selected by 45% 
of the respondents, and “arbitration with third party assistance” by one third. 
In contract theory the specification of mutual agreements in contractual form is understood as 
prerequisite for the employment of external, judicial dispute resolution. In five out of seven 
cases from the sample, judicial dispute resolution is stipulated and the contract contains 
precise stipulation of mutual obligations. However, of all possible combinations, 
concretisation of mutual activities was most often selected in combination with internal 
conflict resolution measures and interest harmonisation (Table A 9). This supports a finding 
from the pre-survey, according to which the stipulation of mutual obligations in the contract 
serves as a guideline for monitoring the project and adapting the collaboration when needed, 
not necessarily or only for external enforcement. 
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Table 31: Frequency table: Conflict resolution and enforcement measures 
Which conflict resolution mechanisms are appointed for 
the project? N: 38 
yes no 
Affirmation in % 
of valid entries 
Exact description of the mutual activities (e.g. schedule, 
delivery quantities, prices, height of compensation payments) in 
the contract  
18 20 47% 
Judicial authority   7 31 18% 
Arbitration with the assistance of an independent third party    12 26 32% 
Internal conflict resolution mechanism, interest harmonisation 17 21 45% 
Source: Author. 
6.1.5 Transaction costs 
Three questions were used to survey information about the users‟ experiences and assessment 
of transaction costs in bioprospecting projects.  
(1) One question evaluates the overall relevance of transaction costs for the choice of a 
material source (general part of the survey). (2) A second question evaluates the initiation 
time of bioprospecting projects (case-specific part of the questionnaire). (3) In a third question 
users were asked to assess transaction-cost aspects in their reference project. The results are 
evaluated in the following. 
Table 32 shows that the majority of survey participants rated “short lead and start times” for a 
project and “no negotiations about the terms of trade” as rather important (median 5), whereas 
“standardised processes for material acquisition” has a median of 4, which is the neutral 
middle category. However, for each item the answers are quit dispersed covering all 
answering categories from “not important at all” to “very important”. 
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Table 32: Frequency table: Transaction cost aspects of supply sources for genetic resources 
Factors for the Selection of Supply Sources for Genetic Resources 
(If possible consider the activities of your company over the past 10 years.)  
How important are the 
following aspects? 
1= not important at al  ... 7= very important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 all median 
Cum. freq. 
cat 5-7 in % 
(a) short lead and start 
times   
8 3 5 10 6 11 13 56 5 54% 
(b) no negotiations about 
the terms of trade with 
the provider   
4 6 5 10 8 8 11 52 5 52% 
(c) standardised processes 
for material acquisition   
8 7 4 12 7 4 11 53 4 42% 
Source:  Author. 
As initiation time for a project the questionnaire defined the period from the initial contact to 
the first “providing” activity of the provider. The question was posed as open question and 
responses were afterwards aggregated to four categories (see Table 33). 
Answer categories (1) “less than six 
months”, (2) “between half a year and 
one year”, and (3) “between one and two 
years” have each been selected each by 
between 7 and 10 participants. Only two 
respondents indicated an initiation time 
longer than two years. The range is quite 
large and indicates variation of 
transaction costs in commercial 
bioprospecting projects.  
 
 
Table 33: Frequency table: Initiation time of 
bioprospecting projects 
Initiation time for the project to commence 
< 6 
months 
6 - 12 
months 
> 12 - 24 
months 
> 24 
months 
all 
8 10 7 2 27 
Source:  Author. 
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Table 34 shows the companies‟ assessment of transaction costs in the reference projects. 
About a third confirmed that “negotiations are/were tedious and difficult”. However, three 
quarter answered that the effort level was rather up to fully acceptable in comparison to the 
value of the resources and related services. “Not at all correct” was not chosen by a single 
respondent. Responses on the item “the effort level is low in comparison to other cost 
components of the project” cover the whole scale of answer categories. 
Table 34: Frequency table: Respondents’ assessment of transaction costs1  
 1= not correct at all ...... 7 = completely correct 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 all median 
Cum. freq. 
cat. 5-7  
1: Negotiations are / were 
tedious and difficult. 
5 9 0 5 2 4 3 28 3 32% 
2: The effort level is 
acceptable in comparison to 
the value of the resources and 
related services acquired in 
the framework 
0 4 2 2 9 10 4 31 5 74% 
3: The effort level is low in 
comparison to other cost 
components of the project.   
1 7 4 4 7 5 3 31 4 48% 
1 
Transaction costs are defined as: effort for the initiation of the agreement, on-going 
communication with the provider, renegotiations, as well as monitoring measures in the project. 
Source:  Author. 
Together the results shape the following picture: the sample covers projects in which 
transaction costs make a significant part of the total costs, but also projects with negligible 
transaction costs. In the majority of projects transaction costs are, even though they are 
possibly high, assessed as acceptable. 
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Users’ strategies to minimise transaction costs 
In the literature and the exploratory pre-survey several strategies of user companies for 
keeping transaction costs low were identified. Survey participants confirming experiences 
with procuring genetic resources from provider countries were asked to indicate which of the 
four strategies listed in Table 35 they apply. 60% (31 companies) stated that they rely on 
previously established relationships as means to keep transaction costs low. Almost as many 
companies confirmed to work with local research partners partly for this purpose. The two 
other items have been selected significantly less often. 
Table 35: Frequency table: Companies’ strategies to minimise transaction costs 
Company‟s strategies to minimise transaction costs resulting from the acquisition of genetic 
resources from provider countries (Multiple entries possible) 
Number of respondents: 52; 
Number of valid entries: 92 
Frequency 
%- of 
respondents 
%- of valid 
entries 
We involve intermediaries.   14 37% 21% 
We rely on previously established relationships. 31 60% 34% 
We work with local research partners.    28 54% 30% 
We select provider countries with solid institutional 
frameworks.    
19 27% 15% 
Source:  Author. 
In some respects these results are surprising. They do not confirm the high relevance of 
commercial intermediaries indicated in the literature. Provider countries can learn that 
strengthening local research capacities and supporting local actors in building contacts with 
user industries are important measures to increase attractiveness for potential users. 
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6.2 Transaction costs in combination with potential determinants (problem analysis) 
In this chapter bivariate evaluations of variables presumably contributing to the variation of 
transaction costs in bioprospecting projects with transaction cost proxies in reference projects 
are presented. The results contribute to the problem analysis. The structure of this chapter 
reflects the three types of transaction-cost factors identified previously: (1) user 
characteristics, (2) provider characteristics, and (3) transaction attributes. 
6.2.1 User characteristics in combination with transaction costs 
Statistical tests did not as expected verify a correlation between company size and the 
initiation time for bioprospecting projects (see Table A 17). The assumption that larger 
companies due to better networks and higher influence face shorter initiation times for 
bioprospecting projects was not confirmed.  
Association tests between company size and the assessment of problems and tediousness of 
negotiations yielded three significant results (Table A 18). But they are rather 
counterintuitive. Table 36 shows that Kendall‟s Tau-b is positive and significant for the 
combination of “turnover” as well as “R&D budget” with respondents‟ assessment of 
“tediousness and difficulty of the negotiation process”. Companies with a higher turnover 
and/or higher R&D budget indicated on average higher negotiation efforts. 
This is contradictory to the hypotheses. It is likely, though that larger companies rather 
engage in more complex projects. This is supported by the positive correlation of R&D 
budget with the transaction cost variable. Moreover, Mann-Whitney U tests indicate that 
companies with higher R&D budget and/or higher turnover more often indicated complex 
provider contribution in reference projects (Table A 19).  
The size of R&D budget is negatively associated with the participants‟ assessment of 
transaction costs in relation to other cost components in the reference project. This result is in 
line with the original predictions. 
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Table 36: Measures of association:  Transaction costs in combination with company size 
(variables are aggregated to five category scales) Kendall‟ s Tau-b Approx. Sig. N 
Turnover * Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult.   0.31 .035 27 
 R&D Budget * Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult.   .369 .015 27 
R&D Budget * The effort level is low in comparison to other 
cost components of the project.   
-0.4 .004 30 
Source:  Author. 
The prediction that users with a higher level of indirect capacities would indicate lower 
transaction costs was not supported by association tests, the results are not significant (see 
Table A 20 and Table A 21). 
6.2.2 Provider characteristics in combination with transaction costs 
To test correlations between provider type and negotiation problems respectively initiation 
time the variable “provider type” was re-operationalised in two ways:  
1: Differentiation of the sample in cases in which (a) national regional or local governmental 
administration entities are/were involved as provider entities and (b) projects in which no such 
entity was directly involved. 
2: Differentiation of the sample in projects in which (a) a local research institute is involved 
as provider entity and (b) no local research institute is involved. 
With the first operationalisation a significant correlation with the transaction cost variable is 
derived. In cases involving national, regional, or local governmental administration users 
assessed negotiations as more tedious and difficult (Table 37). This result supports the 
hypothesis. The differentiation with regard to involvement of local research entities as 
providers did not yield a significant test result (see Table A 22).  
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Table 37: Crosstabulation: Transaction costs differentiated by provider type  
National, regional and / or local 
governmental administration 
entity was involved… 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult. 
1= not correct at all ...... 7 = completely correct 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 all 
Yes 0 3 0 2 2 4 0 11 
No 5 6 0 3 0 0 3 17 
Source:  Author. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicates also that “initiation time” is significantly longer in 
projects with involvement of national regional or local governmental administration entities 
(see Table A 23). This result is also in line with the prediction. 
It would be interesting to test whether negotiation problems and initiation time differ, if the 
sample is split in projects in which (a) no local group/indigenous community is involved in 
negotiations and (b) projects including this provider type. However, the number of cases 
involving local groups or indigenous communities is too low for calculating the test. 
The transactional environment in the provider country was also evaluated in combination with 
the users‟ assessment of negotiations and the initiation time for their reference case. The 
correlation tests were conducted for the aggregated transaction environment variable 
(aggregated through factor analysis), but also for all transactional items individually. 
None of the aggregated factors is significantly correlated with transaction costs or initiation 
time (see Table A 24 and Table A 25), but two individual items are: (1) “availability of local 
research partners in the provider country”, and (2) “centrally managed ABS negotiations” are 
both significantly, negatively correlated with the assessment of tediousness and difficulties of 
negotiations (see Table A 26). Both results are in line with the predictions. 
Initiation time is also negatively associated with the availability of local research partners in 
the provider country (Table A 27), which underpins the relevance of this institutional aspect 
to attract users. None of the other items is significantly correlated with initiation time, though. 
6 Empirical part II - evaluation quantitative company survey 
 
 
162 
 
  
6.2.3 Transaction characteristics in combination with transaction costs 
The provider contribution can be simple, such as access to previously inventoried genetic 
resources or it can be complex and include, e.g. advanced research. It was tested whether 
tediousness and difficulties of negotiations are assessed higher in cases including more 
complex types of provider contribution. Tests with the items “collection activities” and 
“preparation of material” yielded significant results supporting the hypothesis (Table 38).  
Table 38: Crosstabulation and Mann-Whitney U test: Transaction costs differentiated by provider 
contribution  
 1= not correct at all ...... 7 = completely correct 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 all 
  Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult. 
Provider carries out collection 
activities 
Yes 0 2 0 1 2 2 1 8 
No 5 7 0 4 0 2 2 20 
Mann-Whitney U: 44 Asymp. Sig: .061 N: 28 
Preparation of material Yes 0 1 0 3 1 1 2 8 
No 5 8 0 2 1 3 1 20 
Mann-Whitney U: 37 Asymp. Sig: .025 N: 28 
Source:  Author. 
It was also assumed that in projects with more complex provider contribution the initiation 
time would be higher. Only the variable “preparation of material” is significantly correlated 
with initiation time, though (Table 39). Again the result supports the stated assumption.  
Table 39: Crosstabulation and Mann-Whitney U test: Initiation time differentiated by provider 
contribution 
 Initiation time 
< 6 month 
6 up to 12 
months  
> 12 up to 
24 months 
> 24 
months 
all 
Preparation of material Yes 0 2 4 1 7 
No 8 8 3 1 20 
Mann-Whitney U: 26.5 Asymp. Sig: .011 N: 27 
Source:  Author. 
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Summary transaction costs in combination with potential explanatory variables 
Table 40: Overview test results on transaction cost  
 Users‟ perception of transaction costs in 
bioprospecting projects 
Explanatory Variables 
Initiation time of 
projects  
Transaction costs 
assessment 
Heterogeneity of users   
Company size Not sig.  
Partly sig.,                                
partly oppose prediction 
Indirect capacities Not sig. Not sig. 
Heterogeneity of providers   
Provider types 
Partly sig.,                                
support prediction 
Partly sig.,                                
support prediction 
Institutional environment in 
provider countries 
One sig. combination, 
supports prediction 
Two sig. combinations, 
support prediction. 
Type of provider contribution 
(complexity) 
Partly sig.,                                
support prediction 
Partly sig.,                                
support prediction 
Primary uncertainty of 
utilisation 
Not sig. Not sig. 
Source: Author. 
 It can be noted that the survey results support the relevance of previously identified 
factors as transaction cost determinants less distinct than expected (Table 40). This 
should not be interpreted as indication of irrelevance of these factors, however. It rather 
underpins the individuality of projects. In cross-sectional surveys like the one applied 
here too many transaction-costs relevant factors are shifting, first and foremost the 
transaction object. As explained earlier, this is one reason why transaction-cost 
measurement with the aim of hypotheses testing is very rare in the literature, especially 
in the form of cross-sectional surveys. 
 
Uncertainty was expected to be a transaction cost determinant, particularly under the presence 
of asset specificity. This overall assumption is not supported by the survey data (see Table A 
28). Initiation time of bioprospecting projects is not significantly correlated with uncertainty 
either (Table A 29). 
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None of the reference projects in the sample has been ceased because of prohibitive 
transaction costs, although in several cases negotiations were assessed as difficult and 
initiation times long. This verifies individuality of the acceptance level of transaction 
costs. 
The relevance of company size and indirect capacities for transaction costs cannot be 
generalised basing on the survey results. From the other two categories of explanatory 
variables, provider characteristics/transaction environment and transaction characteristics, 
at least several items are significantly associated with negotiation problems and initiation 
time. These results support the stated predictions. A particular relevance of local research 
partners could be identified. 
Primary uncertainty could not be supported as transaction cost factor; although, which we 
will see in the governance analysis, it is significantly correlated with several governance 
elements. 
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6.3 Governance elements in combination with explanatory variables 
The aim of the governance analysis is to test hypotheses on governance choice in empirical 
transactions with genetic resources. This shall be achieved by testing correlations of 
governance elements with transaction characteristics, user and demand characteristics as well 
as the transaction environment. 
6.3.1 Contract type and contract duration combined with explanatory variables 
The variable “duration of the utilisation process” was aggregated from originally seven to four 
categories and is in this form significantly associated with governance variable contract type. 
However, against the prediction [A2], projects with longer utilisation duration are governed 
more often by complete comprehensive contracts right from the start, whereas a phased 
contracting approach is rather applied in projects with relatively shorter utilisation timeframes 
(Table 41). 
Table 41: Crosstabulation: Contract type combined with duration of utilisation process 
How large is the estimated 
utilisation timeframe?                 
(From access till 
commercialisation / being evident 
that no comm. possible) 
The contract is largely 
negotiated and close to a 
final version before the 
start of the project 
A tiered contract that is 
further developed and 
modified or replaced by 
additional contracts during 
the course of the project 
Total 
1 up to 3years 1 1 2 
3 up to 7 years 4 8 12 
7 up to 11 years 3 3 6 
More than 11 years 7 2 9 
N: 29 Mann-Whitney U: 70.5 Asymp. Sig.: .079  
Source: Author. 
 33 % 
66 % 
64% 
36% 
 15  14 
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The prediction of commercial uncertainty being positively correlated with a tiered contract 
approach [A3] is not supported by the survey results either. The majority of company 
representatives referring to projects with high commercial uncertainty chose the “complete 
contract approach” (Table 42 and Table A 30).  
Table 42: Crosstabulation: Contract type combined with primary uncertainty 
Answering categories:  
1= not correct at all ... 7 = completely correct 
Cum. Freq. cat. 5 to 7 
(affirmation) 
 
At the beginning of the utilisation process, we are not able to                     
anticipate commercial output at all.  
Comprehensive contracts right from the start of the project  71% 
A tiered contract that is further developed, modified, or 
replaced during the course of the project 
 47% 
Mann-Whitney U: 84.5 Asymp. Sig.:  .036 N: 34 
Source: Author. 
It was assumed that a tired contract approach is positively correlated with demand 
uncertainty, if the production requires genetic resources as raw material in larger quantities 
[A4]. The questionnaire includes a question that tackles this matter
37
, and the sample was 
filtered according. Only cases in which material for production is (likely to be) acquired from 
the user country were included in this evaluation. However, the test results are not significant 
(Table A 30).  
The prediction of asset specificity being positively associated with a complete contract 
approach [A5] was not verified either. The test did not yield significant results (Table A 31). 
                                                 
37
 Do you (plan to) acquire raw material for production from the original provider country? 
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As expected, frequency is positively associated with a tired contract approach [A6]. For single 
transactions most often complete contracts right from the start are applied, while projects with 
repeated interaction are mostly governed by phased contracts. The significance level is only 
8.4%, though (Table 43). 
Table 43: Crosstabulation: Contract type combined with frequency of interaction 
 Repetition of Interaction 
Contract type Once Repeated 
Comprehensive contracts right from the start of the project 11 6 
A tiered contract approach 5 11 
Fisher‟s Exact test Exact significance (2 sided):  .084 N: 33 
Source: Author. 
Users‟ ”indirect capacities” are predicted to be positively associated with a tiered contract 
approach [A7]. However, only the test with “experiences related to projects in developing or 
newly industrialising countries” is statistically significant (Table 44 and Table A 32). As 
expected, a higher level of experiences is positively correlated with a tired contract approach. 
Table 44: Crosstabulation: Contract type combined with users’ indirect capacities 
 
Our company is experienced in projects with partners from 
developing or newly industrializing countries. 
1= Not correct at all …. 7= completely correct 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 all 
Cum. freq. 
cat. 5 – 7 
Comprehensive contracts right 
from the start of the project 
4 3 3 1 2 2 0 15 27% 
A tiered contract 0 3 2 3 1 2 4 15 47% 
Mann-Whitney U: 60 Asymp. Sig.: .028 
Source: Author. 
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Company size was also tested in combination with the contracting approach. Based on 
findings from the exploratory pre-study, a positive correlation with a phased contracting 
approach was predicted [A1]. The test results, however, are not significant (Table A 33). 
Table 45: Crosstabulation: Contract duration combined with capacity-building measures 
Capacity building  
Contract duration (years) 
< 1 > 1-3 >3 - 5 <5 - 7 <7 - 9 < 9 - 11 < 11- 13 > 13 All 
Technology transfer 
No 9 10 0 2 1 0 1 3 26 
Yes 0 3 5 2 0 1 0 1 12 
Mann-Whitney U: 88.5 Asymp. Sig:  .029 
Know-how transfer in 
the scientific field 
No 9 9 0 1 1 0 1 3 24 
Yes 0 4 5 3 0 1 0 1 14 
Mann-Whitney U: 94 Asymp. Sig:  .021 
Support of other 
measures to preserve 
biodiversity 
No 9 12 3 1 1 1 1 3 31 
Yes 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 1 7 
Mann-Whitney U: 54 Asymp. Sig:  .035 
Know-how transfer in 
the field of sustainable 
use / cultivation of 
genetic resources 
No 9 11 1 2 1 1 1 3 29 
Yes 0 2 4 2 0 0 0 1 9 
Mann-Whitney U: 78.5 Asymp. Sig:  .066 
Source: Author. 
Contract duration was predicted to be positively associated with several types of capacity 
building, such as technology transfer and transfer of know-how in the scientific field [B1]. 
Table 45 shows some interesting results. As expected, several capacity-building measures are 
significantly positively associated with contract duration. Most obvious, no capacity-building 
measure is applied in projects shorter than one year. 
Two items of the variable synergy effects of capacity building are highly significantly 
correlated with contract duration: “Providers will be better positioned to provide the desired 
activity (e.g. quality / continuity of material supply)” and “facilitation of communication and 
an increase in trust”. As predicted, the level of confirmation of synergy effects is higher for 
projects with longer contract duration [B2] (Table A 34). 
The association tests for contract duration in combination with asset specificity [B3] and 
demand uncertainty [B4] did not yield significant results (Table A 35 and Table A 36). 
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Summary on contract type & contract duration in combination with explanatory 
variables 
Table 46: Overview test results on contract type and contract duration 
 Contracting approach Contract duration 
Company size (structure) Not significant  
Timeframe of utilisation process 
Significant, but result 
object prediction 
Capacity building 
 
Significant, result support 
hypothesis 
Synergy effects 
Significant, result support 
hypothesis 
Uncertainty on R&D outcomes Not significant 
 
Uncertainty on commercial 
outcome 
Significant, but result 
object prediction 
Demand uncertainty Not significant Not significant 
Technological uncertainty   
Asset specificity Not significant Not significant 
Frequency 
Significant, result support 
hypothesis 
 
Indirect capacities 
Significant, result support 
hypothesis 
Note: Cells with grey shade indicate that not hypotheses were formulated and tested.  
Source: Author. 
It is notable that several significant test results on the contracting type object the 
formulated assumptions basing on governance theory. Some of these are in line with 
the understanding of contracts developed through the pre-survey, however. Highly 
specified contracts right from the start of a project were classified as monitoring 
instrument, as guideline and tool for coordinated adaptation in the pre-survey. In the 
theory this governance form is rather seen as prerequisite for employing external 
enforcement in the case of disputes.  
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6.3.2 Monetary benefit-sharing in combination with explanatory variables 
Many projects involving transactions with genetic resources include several forms of 
monetary benefit-sharing (Table A 37). Therefore, monetary compensation cannot be 
operationalised as one variable with ordinal categories reflecting increasing flexibility of the 
pricing mechanism. Instead, each monetary benefit-sharing measure is evaluated separately in 
combination with potential explanatory variables. 
The survey results support the prediction that types of provider contribution that are easier 
assessable ex ante (e.g. amount of samples, working hours) are more often compensated with 
standardised, market oriented benefit-sharing forms. In projects with more complex provider 
contribution, more flexible, output- or even success-related compensation forms are agreed 
[C1]:  
 Weight-related or hourly-wage compensation is often agreed in projects in which 
providers carry out preparation of material. 
 Negotiated advance payments are significantly correlated with collection permissions 
and the provider carrying out sample evaluation. 
 Exclusivity rights are a highly complex type of provider contribution. They imply a 
strong constraint to the providers‟ property rights over the resources and possibly 
related information. The opportunity costs for the provider are not easily measurable or 
definable ex ante. The three forms of exclusivity rights from the questionnaire
38
 were 
aggregated and evaluated as one variable in combination with result-based monetary 
benefit-sharing measures. The correlation is highly significant. In eight out of nine 
projects, in which the provider grants some kind of exclusivity, negotiated payments 
that are made after reaching certain steps in the usage process (milestone payments) 
and/or payments tied to commercial output are agreed (Table A 38).  
                                                 
38
 (1) Usage rights for certain information, (2) access to genetic resources and (3) research rights in certain 
application fields 
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Figure 12 summarises the identified relation between complexity of provider contribution and 
adaptability of monetary benefit-sharing deduced from the survey results. 
 
 Source: Author. 
Figure 12: Association between provider contribution and monetary benefit-sharing 
If companies make relation specific investments in the context of a transaction, it is assumed 
that they employ output-related benefit-sharing as countermeasure against opportunistic 
behaviour from the provider, e.g. strategic motivated project cut off or hold-ups just before 
patent application or commercialisation [C2]. 
An aggregated variable was composed indicating whether a survey participant selected 
milestone payments and/or royalties as benefit-sharing measure. The correlation of this 
variable with asset specificity is statistically significant. Table 47 shows result-based benefit-
sharing is significantly more often appointed in projects with higher asset specificity. 
Table 47: Crosstabulation: Result-oriented monetary benefit-sharing combined with asset specificity 
In case the project is called off before completion, investments can be utilised otherwise… 
1: … without financial disadvantages  …         7: … only with high financial disadvantages 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 All 
Milestone payments and/or 
royalties  
No 15 0 0 0 2 2 3 22 
Yes 4 1 0 3 1 2 4 15 
Mann-Whitney U: 106 Asymp. Sig.:  .049 N: 37 
Source: Author. 
Complexity of 
provider 
contribution 
Flexibility of monetary 
benefit-sharing 
Standard payments * 
material preparation 
Negotiated advance payments * evaluation 
of samples; grant of collection permission 
Result-based payments * 
exclusivity rights 
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Table 48 shows that weight-related payments or hourly-wage compensation are negatively 
associated with market/demand uncertainty. This supports the assumption about adaptability 
requirements for compensation mechanisms in the context of this type of uncertainty [C3]. 
Table 48: Crosstabulation: Monetary benefit-sharing combined with demand uncertainty 
 1= not correct at all ...... 7 = completely correct  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Cum. freq.  cat. 5-7 
The genetic resources will be used for research and development of 
products for new / uncertain markets 
Weight-related / hourly-
wage compensation  
No 3 0 2 3 8 8 5 72% 
Yes 1 1 1 3 1 0 0 14% 
Mann-Whitney U: 40 Asymp. Sig.: .012 N: 36 
Source: Author. 
Tests for the combination of “duration of the utilisation process” with flexible payment 
mechanisms did not yield statistically significant results [C4] (Table A 39). 
The majority of projects in which negotiated advance payments are appointed are 
characterised by a rather or totally unpredictable utilisation process (Table 49). This result is 
not in line with the hypothesis of flexibility requirements under high overall uncertainty [C5]. 
However, it might be interpreted as a providers‟ requirements for income certainty 
(participation constraint), as it is stated in MULHOLLAND AND WILMANS‟ principal-agent 
model of bioprospecting contracts, which assumes “risk-averse” providers (2003: 419). 
Table 49: Crosstabulation: Monetary benefit-sharing combined with overall uncertainty in the R&D 
process 
 1= not correct at all ...... 7 = completely correct  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Cum. freq.  cat. 5-7 
The utilisation process for genetic resources is completely unpredictable 
at the beginning of the project. 
Negotiated advance 
payments (lump sum) 
No 1 5 5 7 3 4 4 38% 
Yes 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 63% 
Mann-Whitney U: 69 Asymp. Sig.: .078 N: 37 
Source: Author. 
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As expected, proxies for users‟ indirect capacities are positively correlated with more flexible 
benefit-sharing mechanisms [C6]. Almost only respondents confirming a high level of 
indirect capacities indicated that “output-related payments that are negotiated over the course 
of the project […]” have been agreed in their reference case (Table 50). 
Table 50: Crosstabulation: monetary benefit-sharing combined with indirect capacities 
 
1= Not correct at all …. 7= completely correct 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 all 
Cum. freq. 
cat. 5 – 7 
Our company has a high capacity to execute long-term, complex projects. * 
Output-related payments that are 
negotiated over the course of the 
project, for example, when certain 
operational steps are reached 
No 4 3 6 2 3 4 7 29 48% 
Yes 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 5 80% 
Mann-Whitney U:  29 Asymp. Sig:  .031 N: 34 
Our company already has experience in the past of executing complex long-term projects. * 
Output-related payments that are 
negotiated over the course of the 
project… 
No 2 6 5 3 2 4 7 29 45% 
Yes 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 5 100% 
Mann-Whitney U:  23 Asymp. Sig:  .014 N: 33 
….is experienced in projects with partners from developing or newly industrializing countries. * 
Output-related payments that are 
negotiated over the course of the 
project… 
No 5 7 5 3 3 3 2 28 29% 
Yes 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 5 80% 
Mann-Whitney U: 18.5  Asymp. Sig:  .009 N: 33 
… is experienced in projects with partners from developing or newly industrializing countries. * 
Payments tied to commercial output, and/or 
Output-related payments, that are negotiated 
over the course of the project, e.g. when 
certain operational steps are reached 
No 4 6 4 2 1 1 1 19 16% 
Yes 1 1 1 2 2 4 3 14 64% 
Mann-Whitney U: 56.5  Asymp. Sig:  .005 N: 33 
Source: Author. 
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Summary monetary benefit-sharing in combination with explanatory variables  
Table 51: Overview test results on monetary benefit-sharing 
Explanatory variables Test results 
Type of provider contribution Significant association, result support hypothesis 
Asset specificity Significant association, result support hypothesis 
Uncertainty on R&D outcomes 
Significant associations, result partly objects theory-
based predictions 
Demand uncertainty Partly significant, support the hypothesis 
Timeframe of utilisation process Not significant 
Indirect capacities Partly significant, support the hypothesis 
Source: Author. 
Some findings are particularly notable:  
The test results indicate that the type of provider contribution plays a role for the 
choice of pricing mechanisms in contracts for ABS agreements. This result is in 
line with the suggestions found in existing model agreements and guidelines. The 
findings allow going one step further, however, by indicating how this relation can 
be characterised. 
The correlation between asset specificity and output-oriented pricing mechanisms 
supports the interpretation of monetary benefit-sharing as safeguard against 
opportunism. 
Users with higher indirect capacities, particularly with projects in developing 
and/or newly industrialising countries, were shown to apply output-oriented 
benefit-sharing measures more often. This can be interpreted as indication for lower 
relative transaction costs of complex governance forms for actors with a high level 
of previous experiences. 
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6.3.3 Non-monetary benefit-sharing in combination with explanatory variables 
Non-monetary benefit-sharing functions as (1) compensation for access to genetic resources, 
related services and rights, but also as (2) governance measure against opportunism, and 
(3) as tool to enable the provider to deliver the demanded material and services. The 
evaluations in this chapter tackle all three aspects by testing associations of non-monetary 
benefit-sharing measures with several demand characteristics and transaction characteristics. 
As predicted, test results indicate that in many cases capacity building measures are directly 
related to the type of provider contribution [D1]:  
 The majority of projects in which providers contribute to advanced research include the 
stipulation of joint publications in scientific journals, technology transfer, and the 
transfer of know-how in the scientific field (Table A 40). 
 Projects in which providers carry out collection activities for the user include 
significantly more often measures to support the inventory and taxonomy of 
biodiversity, as well as transfer of know-how in the scientific field (Table A 40). 
 In all projects, in which joint intellectual property rights are stipulated, some kind of 
exclusivity right is granted (Table A 40). 
The assumption of synergy effects as motive for capacity building [D2] was tested by 
interrelating companies‟ assessments of synergy effects with the actual appointment of certain 
non-monetary benefit-sharing measures in reference projects. The results show a significant 
association for several combinations (Table 52 and Table A 41). 
 Know-how transfer in the field of sustainable use and/or cultivation of genetic resources 
is positively associated with users‟ affirmation of capacity building contributing to 
safeguarding a long-term availability of genetic resources. 
 Technology transfer is positively associated with the users‟ assessment of synergy effects 
of capacity building for enabling providers to carry out the demanded activity […], as 
well as the positive effect on trust and a facilitated communication. 
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 Transfer of know-how in the scientific field is positively associated with several capacity 
building measures: (a) enabling provider entities to better provide the desired activity, (b) 
as prerequisite for scientific cooperation, and (3) as measure to safeguard long-term 
availability of genetic resources. 
 All companies confirming the positive effect of capacity building on trust and 
communication carry out know-how transfer in the scientific field in their reference 
project. 
These tests cannot verify cause-consequence relations. However, the significant correlation 
indicates that companies carrying out capacity building realise highly positive synergy effects: 
whether intended as such (ex-ante) or as experience (ex post), the assessments made within 
the survey may indicate the companies‟ attitude towards non-monetary benefit-sharing in 
future negotiations for similar projects. Positive experiences are likely leading to repetition. 
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Table 52: Crosstabulation: Capacity building in combination with the assessment of synergy effects 
Answering categories:  
1= not correct at all ... 7 = completely correct 
Cum. Freq. cat.             
5 to 7 (affirmation) 
 Capacity building ensures the conservation and the long-term availability of GRs. 
Transfer of know-how in the field of sustainable use / cultivation of GRs 
No 30% 
Yes 88% 
Mann-Whitney U: 10 Asymp. Sig.:  .006 N: 18 
 
Providers will be better positioned to provide the desired activity, for example, 
quality / continuity of material supply. 
Technology transfer 
No 25% 
Yes 73% 
Mann-Whitney U: 16 Asymp. Sig.:  .017 N: 18 
 Capacity building increases trust & facilitates communication with providers 
Technology transfer 
No 57% 
Yes 91% 
Mann-Whitney U: 12 Asymp. Sig.:  .013 N: 18 
 
Providers will be better positioned to provide the desired activity, for example, 
quality / continuity of material supply. 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific field 
No 17% 
Yes 69% 
Mann-Whitney U: 16.5 Asymp. Sig.:  .041 N: 19 
 Capacity building is the prerequisite so that scientific cooperation is possible. 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific field 
No 0% 
Yes 54% 
Mann-Whitney U: 16 Asymp. Sig.:  .041 N: 18 
 Capacity building ensures the conservation and the long-term availability of GRs. 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific field 
No 17% 
Yes 75% 
Mann-Whitney U: 6 Asymp. Sig.:  .004 N: 18 
 Capacity building increases trust and facilitates communication with the providers. 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific field 
No 33% 
Yes 100% 
Mann-Whitney U: 4.5 Asymp. Sig.:  .002 N: 18 
Source: Author. 
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Neither relation specific investments in the provider country nor overall asset specificity did 
yield significant associations with integrative capacity building measures, as was predicted 
[D3]. 
It is likely that most capacity-building measures can enfold synergy effects for user entities 
rather in long-term relations with repeated interaction. Hence, a positive correlation between 
capacity building and frequency was predicted [D4]. Table 53 shows the two capacity-
building measures with significant associations. Both results confirm the hypothesis. 
However, for several other measures a positive correlation would have been as logical. 
Table 53: Crosstabulation: Non-monetary benefit-sharing combined with frequency 
 Frequency of interaction Once Repeated 
Support of inventory / taxonomy of Biodiversity 
No 17 12 
Yes 0 8 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact significance (2 sided): .004 N: 37 
Technology transfer 
No 15 11 
Yes 2 9 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact significance (2 sided): .036 N: 37 
Source: Author. 
To carry out capacity building in a provider country organisational skills are required. 
Therefore, a positive association between indirect capacities and capacity building was 
predicted [D5]. Table 54 shows that this assumption holds for several capacity-building 
measures. A high level of experiences with partners in developing or newly industrialising 
countries seems particularly relevant.  
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Table 54: Crosstabulation and correlations: Non-monetary benefit-sharing combined with users’ indirect 
capacities 
Our company ... 
1= Not correct at all …. 7= completely correct 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 All Cum. freq. cat. 5 - 7 
… is experienced in projects with partners from developing or newly industrializing countries. 
Yes, joint intellectual property rights to 
usage results 
No 5 7 5 3 3 4 2 29 31% 
Yes 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 4 75% 
Mann-Whitney U: 16.5 Asymp. Sig.: .021 
… is experienced in projects with partners from developing or newly industrializing countries. 
Yes, joint publication in scientific 
journals 
No 5 5 4 3 2 2 0 21 19% 
Yes 0 2 1 1 1 3 4 12 67% 
Mann-Whitney U: 47.5 Asymp. Sig.: .003 
… is experienced in projects with partners from developing or newly industrializing countries. 
Yes, support of inventory / taxonomy of 
Biodiversity 
No 5 7 3 3 2 3 2 25 28% 
Yes 0 0 2 1 1 2 2 8 63% 
Mann-Whitney U: 46.5 Asymp. Sig.: .023 
… has a high capacity to execute long-term, complex projects. 
Yes, technology transfer 
No 4 3 3 3 3 1 5 22 41% 
Yes 0 0 3 0 0 3 6 12 75% 
Mann-Whitney U: 72 Asymp. Sig.: .027 
… has experience in the past of executing complex long-term projects. 
Yes, technology transfer 
No 2 5 4 2 1 3 5 22 41% 
Yes 0 1 1 1 1 2 6 12 75% 
Mann-Whitney U: 77 Asymp. Sig.: .042 
… is experienced in projects with partners from developing or newly industrializing countries. 
Yes, technology transfer 
No 5 7 4 2 1 2 0 21 14% 
Yes 0 0 1 2 2 3 4 12 75% 
Mann-Whitney U: 23 Asymp. Sig.: .000 
… is experienced in projects with partners from developing or newly industrializing countries. 
Yes, transfer of know-how in the 
scientific field    
No 5 6 3 2 1 3 0 20 20% 
Yes 0 1 2 2 2 2 4 13 62% 
Mann-Whitney U: 77 Asymp. Sig.: .002 
… is experienced in projects with partners from developing or newly industrializing countries. 
Transfer of know-how in the field of 
sustainable use / cultivation of GRs 
No 5 6 4 4 2 4 3 28 32% 
Yes 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 5 60% 
Mann-Whitney U: 50.5 Asymp. Sig.: .019 
… is experienced in projects with partners from developing or newly industrializing countries. 
Support of other measures to preserve 
biodiversity 
No 5 6 3 4 2 3 1 24 25% 
Yes 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 9 67% 
Mann-Whitney U: 43.5 Asymp. Sig.: .034 
Source: Author. 
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Only three combinations of transaction environment with capacity building yield significant 
results (Table A 42). Since the absolute majority of tests did not yield significant results, none 
of the two hypotheses [D6] and [D7] on transaction environment and non-monetary benefit-
sharing can be falsified.  
The significant results indicate a positive correlation between a well-established transaction 
environment and the appointment of a certain non-monetary benefit-sharing measures (Table 
55). The assumption of capacity building as integrative governance instrument for substituting 
insufficient external institutions is not at all supported by the results. 
Table 55: Non-monetary benefit-sharing combined with transaction environment 
Non-monetary benefit-sharing Transaction environment 
Joint intellectual property rights to usage results Factor 2 
Mann-Whitney U: 2 Asymp. Sig.: .053 
Joint intellectual property rights to usage results Factor 3 
Mann-Whitney U: 2 Asymp. Sig.: .053 
Support of other measures to preserve biodiversity Factor 3 
Mann-Whitney U: 0 Asymp. Sig.: .025 
Source: Author. 
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Summary on non-monetary benefit-sharing in combination with explanatory 
variables  
Table 56: Overview test results on monetary non-benefit-sharing 
Explanatory variables Test results 
Type of provider contribution Significant association, results support hypothesis 
Synergy effects of capacity-building Significant association, results support hypothesis 
Asset specificity Not significant 
Frequency Significant association, results support hypothesis 
Indirect capacities Significant association, results support hypothesis 
Transaction environment Partly significant 
Source: Author. 
The significant correlations of (1) provider contribution, and (2) users‟ assessments 
of synergy effects with non-monetary benefit-sharing support the assumption that 
other cost and utility components than transaction costs play a role in the choice of 
governance forms. Both results indicate that capacity building exhibits synergy-
effects for the user, which makes it an efficient compensation form compared to 
monetary compensation. 
The relevance of non-monetary benefit-sharing as countermeasure against 
opportunism is supported by the significant association of highly integrative 
measures (e.g. joint IPRs, technology transfer) with asset specificity. 
The positive association of users‟ indirect capacities with non-monetary benefit-
sharing measures indicates that users with higher level of experience are more 
likely to engage in complex projects. This supports the relevance of transaction-
costs as decision factor for governance choice, even though the variable comes 
from the resource based-view (strategic management). 
Several hypotheses involving classical variables from transaction cost economics 
did not yield significant results, whereas strategic variables did. This indicates 
clearly the necessity and value of a triangulation of theories in this research field.  
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6.3.4 Conflict resolution in combination with explanatory variables 
Theory suggests that particularly in transactions with relation-specific investments conflict 
resolution and contract enforcement plays an important role. However, which type of 
instruments (external or internal) is more efficient depends on a range of factors. The type of 
uncertainty is thought to be relevant, and whether the parties interact repeatedly or only once. 
Several demand characteristics as well as user characteristics and the transaction environment 
are also considered being relevant factors. 
The more concrete mutual contributions can be formulated and specified ex ante in 
contractual form, the lower are costs of classical external conflict resolution and contract 
enforcement. If, however, exchange is highly complex and judicial authorities are not (or only 
at high costs) able to assess whether parties fulfill to their commitments, external conflict 
resolution is problematic. Here theory suggests relational or internal conflict resolution and 
mechanisms, which bring forward interest harmonisation. The type of provider contribution is 
a complexity factor in this context. Access to previously inventoried material is a standard 
procedure and can easily be specified in a contract. Contribution to advanced research on the 
other hand can involve complex interaction between the transaction partners. The effort level 
is more difficult to determine for external actors. 
The evaluations show that most projects in which providers contribute to advanced research 
stipulate arbitration as conflict resolution mechanism (see Table 57), which is not a classical 
external enforcement mechanism. This result is in line with the prediction [E1]. 
Table 57: Arbitration in combination with provider contribution “participation of advanced research” 
  
Participation in advanced research 
No Yes 
Arbitration with the assistance of an 
independent third party (N: 38) 
No 23 3 
Yes 6 6 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance(2 sided): .016 
Source: Author. 
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Table 58: Crosstabulation: Judicial authorities in 
combination with provider contribution 
Access to previously inventoried resources in a 
national collection  
  No Yes 
Judicial authority (N: 38) 
No 20 11 
Yes 1 6 
All 21 17 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance(2 sided): .031 
Provider executes collection activities  
  No Yes 
Judicial authority (N: 38) 
No 25 6 
Yes 2 5 
All 27 11 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance(2 sided): .014 
Provider grants some kind of exclusivity in connection 
with genetic resources 
  No Yes 
Judicial authority (N: 31) 
No 27 2 
Yes 4 5 
All 31 7 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance(2 sided): .004 
Source: Author. 
A transaction relation in which the user can realise synergy effects of capacity building is 
supposedly more complex and intended to sustain, even if problems in the R&D process or 
with material delivery, etc. should occur. Conflict resolution mechanisms that support the 
continuation of the relation are appropriate in that case. The prediction of a positive 
association between synergy effects of capacity building and internal conflict resolution 
mechanisms and interest harmonization [E2] is verified by the survey results (see Table 59 
and Table A 43). 
 
In total, only few tests of conflict-
resolution mechanisms in combination 
with provider contribution yield 
significant results. They indicate, 
however, that projects in which access 
to previously inventoried genetic 
resources is sought the stipulation of a 
judicial authority is significantly 
higher. The same holds for projects in 
which the provider carries out 
collection activities. Exclusivity 
rights, on the other hand, are 
negatively associated with the 
stipulation of judicial authorities (see 
Table 58).  
All three results support the 
hypothesis [E1]. While the first two 
types of services can be defined rather 
well ex ante it is hard for external 
entities to validate compliance with 
exclusivity agreements. 
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Primary uncertainty is assumed to influence the choice of enforcement mechanisms only 
under the presence of asset specificity. Therefore, only cases characterised by relation-specific 
investments (category 4 to 7) were included in the evaluations on primary uncertainty in 
combination with dispute resolution. 
Under the presence of asset specificity, a positive association of demand uncertainty with 
relational, integrated enforcement measures was predicted [E3]. Table 60 indicates quite the 
reverse. For higher levels of demand uncertainty relatively less often internal conflict 
resolution and harmonisation of interests was selected. 
Table 59: Crosstabulation: Internal conflict resolution in 
combination with synergy effects of capacity building 
1= Not correct at all  ...  7= Completely correct 
Cum. frequency cat. 5 to 7 (affirmation)  
Providers will be better positioned to provide the 
desired activity 
Internal conflict resolution (N: 19) 
No 36% 
Yes 75% 
Mann-Whitney U: 19.5 Asymp. Sig.:  .036 
… increases trust and facilitates communication 
Internal conflict resolution (N: 19) 
No 60% 
Yes 100% 
Mann-Whitney U: 10.5 Asymp. Sig.:  .006 
… prerequisite so that scientific cooperation is possible 
Internal conflict resolution (N: 19) 
No 9% 
Yes 75% 
Mann-Whitney U: 16 Asymp. Sig.:  .019 
… secures the conservation and the long-term 
availability of genetic resources. 
Internal conflict resolution (N: 18) 
No 40% 
Yes 75% 
Mann-Whitney U: 19.5 Asymp. Sig.:  .063 
Source: Author. 
Internal conflict resolution 
mechanisms and measures of 
interest harmonisation are applied 
in 75% of the projects for which 
users confirmed that “capacity 
building enables providers to better 
provide the desired activity”. This 
applies also to all projects for 
which respondents agree that 
capacity building increases trust 
and facilitates communication. 
Six out of seven respondents 
confirming the statement “capacity 
building is a prerequisite for 
scientific cooperation”, and six out 
of ten confirming that “capacity 
building secures the conservation 
and the long-term availability of 
genetic resources” selected internal 
conflict resolution and interest 
harmonisation 
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Table 60: Crosstabulation: Internal conflict resolution combined with demand uncertainty 
 1= not correct at all ...... 7 = completely correct  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 all 
The genetic resources from the project will be used for R&D 
for products for new / uncertain markets 
Internal conflict resolution 
mechanism, harmonisation 
of interests 
No 0 0 1 1 1 4 2 9 
Yes 2 0 1 0 4 1 0 8 
Mann Whitney U: 15.5 Asymp. Sig.: .043 N: 17 
Source: Author. 
Different types of dispute resolution mechanisms are not mutually exclusive in contracts for 
transactions with genetic resources. Therefore, it is predicted that under the presence of asset 
specificity technological uncertainty is positively associated with internal conflict resolution 
and interest harmonisation, as well as with the stipulation of judicial authorities [E4]. The test 
results object the first part of the hypothesis, but they support the second part. In cases 
characterised by asset specificity and technological uncertainty internal conflict resolution is 
applied seldom (Table 61), whereas judicial authorities are often stipulated. 
Table 61: Crosstabulation: Conflict resolution mechanisms combined with technological uncertainty 
 1= not correct at all .... 7 = completely correct  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 All 
The technology in our field of use changes quickly 
Internal conflict resolution mechanism, 
harmonisation of interests 
No 0 1 0 2 2 2 1 8 
Yes 2 4 0 1 0 1 0 8 
Mann-Whitney U: 10 Asymp. Sig.:  .018 N: 16 
Judicial authority   
No 2 4 0 3 2 1 0 12 
Yes 0 1 0 0 0 6 1 4 
Mann-Whitney U: 9 Asymp. Sig.:  .063 N: 16 
Source: Author. 
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For the same reason as in the foregoing 
section, only projects characterised by 
asset specificity are included in the 
evaluations of conflict resolution with 
frequency of interaction. 
If transactions take place repeatedly over 
a longer period of time, efforts for 
developing and implementing complex 
governance mechanisms can be 
outweighed by reduced transactional 
cost for each subsequent interaction. 
This should enfold conflict resolution 
mechanisms as well [E5]. 
The survey results support this prediction to a certain extent: In the filtered sample, internal 
conflict resolution and interest harmonisation is almost only selected for projects with 
repeated interaction (Table 62). The significance level of the correlation between frequency 
and internal conflict resolution is much higher in the filtered sample (12%) compared to the 
unfiltered sample (51%).  However, none of the results is significant at the required 5% level. 
The Mann-Whitney U test did not verify a correlation between conflict resolution measures 
and users‟ indirect capacities (Table A 44). The same holds for conflict resolution in 
combination with the transaction environment (Table A 45). Hypotheses about associations of 
these two variables with conflict resolution [E6 and E7] could therefore not be verified. 
Table 62: Crosstabulation: Internal conflict 
resolution in combination with frequency 
Filtered for 
Asset specificity 
(N:16)  
Repetition of the interaction 
 Once Repeated 
Internal conflict 
resolution mechanism, 
interest harmonisation 
No 5 4 
Yes 1 6 
Fisher‟s Exact test Exact Sig. (2 sided): .121 
Without filter  
(N: 37)  
Repetition of the interaction 
 Once Repeated 
Internal conflict 
resolution … 
No 11 10 
Yes 6 10 
Fisher‟s Exact test Exact Sig. (2 sided): .508 
Source: Author. 
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Summary conflict resolution and enforcement mechanisms in combination with 
explanatory variables  
Table 63: Overview test results on conflict resolution measures 
Explanatory variables Test results 
Type of provider contribution 
(complexity) 
Only few significant association, but those results 
support hypothesis 
Synergy effects of capacity-
building 
Significant associations, results support hypothesis 
Demand uncertainty (under the 
presence of asset specificity) 
Significant associations, result objects prediction 
Technological uncertainty Significant associations, partly support hypothesis  
Duration of utilisation Not significant 
Frequency Significant associations, results support hypothesis 
Indirect capacities Not significant  
Transaction environment Not significant 
Source: Author. 
Some findings are particularly notable:  
The results support the assumption that the complexity of provider contribution is a 
relevant factor for the choice of conflict resolution measures. 
The positive association of synergy-effect items with internal conflict resolution 
underpins the relevance of sustaining transaction relations, if relation specific 
investments in form of capacity building are made. 
Under the presence of asset specificity, the choice of conflict resolution measures is 
associated with several aspects of primary uncertainty. However, in contrast to the 
prediction neither demand uncertainty nor technological uncertainty are positively 
associated with internal conflict resolution mechanisms and interest harmonisation. 
In accordance with the prediction, internal conflict-resolution mechanisms are more 
often applied in repeated transactions, if asset specificity is present. 
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6.4 Intra-sectoral homogeneity of transactions with genetic resources 
Part of the research question is a revision of the sectoral approach for contract standardisation 
for access and benefit-sharing. For that purpose it shall be tested whether the users‟ sector 
affiliation (which on the case level refers to the field of utilisation of genetic resources) is 
significantly associated with transaction variables, as well as with the governance variables. 
Not all transaction variables shall be included in the analyses, only those found to be 
significantly associated with the governance elements in the previous subchapter. 
If variation regarding relevant transaction characteristics among sectors is significant, it can 
be maintained that sector affiliation is a good proxy for differentiating bioprospecting cases, 
since it would indicate that cases within a certain field of utilisation are more similar in 
variables supposedly relevant for governance choice. 
A sectoral differentiation for model clauses might be a good option if intra-sectoral 
homogeneity is strong for all explanatory variables. Otherwise it is deduced that the sectoral 
approach is not feasible for a “model-clause instrument”. 
The evaluation of governance variables differentiated by sector affiliation shall serve as 
double-check for intra-sectoral homogeneity. Moreover, the results can give information on 
how good the operationalisation of transaction variables was achieved. Inadequateness of the 
operationalisation is indicated, if sector affiliation is significantly associated with the 
governance variables but not with the transaction variables. 
Two different general operationalisations of the sector variable were applied: 
(1) Including all fields of utilisation39, and differentiated in 4 respectively 6 utilisation 
categories (see chapter 2.2.5). For each transaction variable it was evaluated beforehand, 
which of the two sector variables should to be applied. 
(2) Only cases that could be affiliated with category “pharmacy” or the category “plant 
breeding” were included. These are the two largest survey groups, and literature indicates 
strong differences regarding transaction variables between bioprospecting cases of these two 
groups. 
                                                 
39
 The category biocontrol was excluded in evaluations with “case-specific” variables, because of the low 
number of entries. 
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6.4.1 Homogeneity within sectors regarding transaction characteristics 
In Table A 46 all significant results from the combined evaluation of transaction variables 
with governance variables are summarised. Transaction variables that are significantly 
associated with at least one governance variable are evaluated in combination with sector 
affiliation. Table 64 provides an overview on these variables. 
Table 64: Transaction variables for evaluation in combination with sector affiliation 
Provider contribution  
 Only access to previously inventoried GRs  
 Collection permission 
 Collection activities 
 Preparation of material 
 Evaluation of material  
 Contribution to advanced research  
 Exclusivity rights 
Asset Specificity 
Primary uncertainty 
 Uncertainty resulting from technological 
change  
 Demand uncertainty 
 Unpredictability of commercial output at the 
beginning of the utilisation process 
 Duration of the utilisation process 
Synergy effects of capacity building 
 Capacity building enables providers to 
better carry out the desired service 
 Capacity building increases trust  and 
facilitates communication 
 Capacity building safeguards long-term 
availability of GRs 
 Capacity building is the prerequisite that 
scientific cooperation is possible 
Frequency of economic interaction between 
user and provider 
Indirect capacities of user companies 
 Experiences in projects with partners from 
developing or newly industrializing countries 
 High capacity to execute long-term, complex 
projects 
 Experience in the past of executing complex 
long-term projects 
Source: Author. 
All results are compiled in Table 65; most of the tests did not yield significant results, though. 
The general hypothesis that sector affiliation is a good overall proxy for transaction variables 
is therewith not supported [F1]. A closer look at the individual significant results shall 
indicate whether sector affiliation can be used as proxy for individual transaction variables, 
e.g. provider contribution. 
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Table 65: Association tests: transaction characteristics combined with field of utilisation 
Transaction characteristics Sector aggr. 4 * Two user sectors ** 
Provider contribution:  
Contingency coefficient Fisher‟s Exact test 
Value Approx. Sig. Exact Sig. (2 sided) 
 Access to previously inventoried GRs .236 .492 .364 
 Collection permission .325 .183 .146 
 Collection activities .334 .162 .137 
 Preparation of material .485 .006 .137 
 Evaluation of samples .257 .406 1 
 Participation in advanced research .378 .078 1 
 Some kind of exclusivity rights .376 .080 .216 
Frequency of economic interaction .328 .240 58 .326 
Synergy effects of capacity building 
Kruskal-Wallis test Mann-Whitney U test 
Chi
2
 Asymp. Sig Value Asymp. Sig 
 …enables providers to better carry out the desired service 8.976 .030 12.5 .159 
 …increases trust  and facilitates communication 2.541 .468 15 .448 
 …safeguards long-term availability of GRs 1.926 .588 20.5 .787 
 …prerequisite that scientific cooperation is possible 2.227 .527 19 .880 
Indirect capacities     
 Experiences in projects with partners from developing or 
newly industrializing countries 
6.201 .102 22 .023 
 
 High capacity to execute long-term, complex projects 
4.541 .209 46.5 .403 
 High experience of executing complex long-term projects 
3.831 .280 37.5 .163 
Asset Specificity 6.617 .085 29 .011 
Uncertainty     
 Uncertainty resulting from technological change*** 
5.877 5.575 56 .927 
 Uncertainty about the development of the R&D process 
3.424 .331 64.5 .692 
 Demand uncertainty 
1.138 .768 64 .909 
 Unpredictability of commercial output at the beginning of 
the utilisation process 
4.039 .257 65.5 .626 
 Duration of the utilisation process 
5.110 .164 49.5 .784 
* Sector_aggr. 4: four groups: (1) pharmacy and pharmacy & botanical medicine; (2) botanical medicine and 
personal care; (3) all plant breeding; (4) biotech in other fields than pharmacy and plant breeding. 
** Only projects with utilisation in (a) pharmacy and (b) plant breeding are compared 
*** For these variables sector variable sector_aggr3 was applied, with three categories for plant breeding.  
Source: Author. 
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As Table 65 shows, three provider-contribution items are significantly associated with the 
sector-affiliation variable (sector_aggr4). All three items characterise projects of a more 
complex nature (Table 66). 
Table 66: Crosstabulation: Provider contribution in combination with sector affiliation 
 var_sector_aggr4 Total 
Pharmacy; 
Pharmacy & 
botanical medicine 
Botanical 
medicine, care 
& cosmetics 
Plant 
Breeders Biotech 
Provider grants 
some kind of 
exclusivity rights 
No 4 2 24 2 32 
Yes 2 1 3 3 9 
Total (yes: 33%) 6 ( yes: 33%) 3 (yes: 11%) 27 (yes: 60%) 5 41 
Preparation of 
the material 
No 3 0 22 5 30 
Yes 3 3 5 0 11 
Total (yes: 50%) 6 (yes: 100%) 3 (yes: 19%) 27 (yes: 0%) 5 41 
Participation in 
advanced 
research 
No 5 2 24 2 33 
Yes 1 1 3 3 8 
Total (yes: 17%) 6 (yes: 33%) 3 (yes: 11%) 27 (yes: 60%) 5 41 
Source: Author‟s. 
Exclusivity rights are least often applied in transactions with genetic resources dedicated to 
plant breeding. This was expectable considering the property rights system for plant breeding 
(breeders‟ exemption, elaboration see chapter 4.2.6) (Table 66). The heterogeneity of answers 
in the three other groups seems logical from what the literature and the pre-survey indicate: 
access to genetic resources varies including “random sampling” and acquisition of specific 
resources with related information about utilisation options. 
The provider contribution “preparation of material” would be expected in field of utilisations, 
in which natural resources are (also) used as “raw material”. Preparatory work, such as 
cleaning and extraction are applied to a large amount of material/samples, and outsourcing to 
providers can therefore reduce costs. This is presumable for the first two user groups, not for 
plant breeding, though. 
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The distribution of results on the item “participation in advanced research” is interesting, but 
unexpected. Basing on the literature and the pre-survey, the involvement of local research 
partners and the participation in “advanced” research was expected in projects with 
pharmaceutical application. This is not supported by the survey results, though.    
In a direct comparison of projects in the field of pharmacy versus plant breeding, no 
significant differences regarding answers on provider contribution were identified (Table 66). 
The survey participants were asked to assess in general (not on the case level) a list of supply 
characteristics for the choice of a provider. Significant differences among user groups were 
only found for two of six supply aspects: “access to properties of wild species of certain 
plants or animals” and “access to traditional knowledge” (see Table 67).  
Table 67: Crosstabulation: Sector affiliation in combination with two aspects of supply characteristics 
Please complete the following sentences and 
assess how important each aspect is for the 
selection of a supply source for genetic 
resources. 
1= not at all important    …  7= very important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total Cat. 5-
7 in % 
of total 
var_sector_aggr4 Access to properties of wild species of certain plants or animals is … 
(1) Pharmacy and Pharmacy & botanical 
medicine 
1 1 1 0 0 2 3 8 63% 
(2) Only botanical medicine, care and cosmetics  0 0 1 0 0 1 2 4 75% 
(3) Plant Breeders 1 2 1 4 5 8 11 32 75% 
(4) Biotech 3 1 1 1 0 1 0 7 14% 
(5) Biocontrole Agents 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 80% 
Total 6 4 4 5 5 13 19 56 66% 
var_sector_aggr4 Access to traditional knowledge about application possibilities of GRs is … 
(1) Pharmacy and Pharmacy & botanical 
medicine 
4 0 0 0 2 3 1 10 60% 
(2) Only botanical medicine, care and cosmetics  0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 100% 
(3) Plant Breeders 4 6 5 6 1 5 5 32 34% 
(4) Biotech 5 1 0 0 0 0 1 7 14% 
(5) Biocontrole Agents 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 20% 
Total 17 7 5 6 3 10 10 58 40% 
Source: Author.  
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Access to properties of wild species of certain plants or animals was rated as important by the 
majority of companies in the field of biocontrole agents, plant breeding, as well as botanical 
medicine, care and cosmetics. Most biotech companies, on the other hand, did not find this 
aspect particularly important (Table 67).  
As indicated in the literature (cf. LAIRD 2000: 92), “access to traditional knowledge about 
application possibilities of genetic resources” is an important demand characteristic in the 
field of botanical medicines, cosmetics and care. However, over half of the pharmaceutical 
companies and eleven out of 32 plant breeders rated this aspect as well as important. Clear 
disaffirmation was only given by users from biotech and biocontrole agents (Table 67). 
In summary it can be stated that “sector affiliation” should not be used as proxy for provider 
contribution or demand for specific supply. The distribution of answers shown in the 
crosstabulations (Table 66 and Table 67) cannot be fully explained theoretically, and some 
results are controversial to what would be expected basing on previous findings. First and 
foremost, though, because the majority of variables are not significantly associated with 
sector affiliation and for several significant results the significance level is rather low. 
Evaluations in chapter 6.3 indicate that “synergy effects of capacity building” are related to 
the type of provider contribution
40
. Since for most items of provider contribution no 
significant association with sector affiliation was identified, the assessment of synergy effects 
is expected to be heterogeneous within sectors as well. Table 65 shows that this holds for all 
synergy-effect items except “capacity building enables providers to better carry out the 
desired service”. Therefore, sector affiliation is not supported as proxy for synergy effects of 
non-monetary benefit-sharing. However, the one significant result is in line with the findings 
previously presented on provider contribution in combination with sector affiliation. Only 
plant breeders in majority disaffirmed the statement “capacity building enables providers to 
better carry out the desired service” (Table 68). Such a synergy effect is expected to arise, if 
the provider receives capacity building to carry out labour or technology-intensive services 
adapted to the specific demand. In relation, this applies rather seldom to transactions with 
genetic resources dedicated for plant breeding (see Table 66). 
                                                 
40
 Survey evaluations in chapter 6.3.3 show that capacity building is on the one hand associated with the 
assessment of synergy effects, and on the other hand with provider contribution. 
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Table 68: Crosstabulation: Sector affiliation combined with synergy effect of capacity building 
var_sector_aggr4 
Pharmacy; 
Pharmacy & 
botanical medicine 
Botanical 
medicine, care 
& cosmetics 
Plant 
Breeders 
Biotech Total 
“Capacity building 
enables providers to 
better carry out the 
desired service” 
1: not at all correct… 
7: Completely correct 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 2 0 2 
3 0 0 2 0 2 
4 2 0 2 0 4 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
6 3 1 3 1 7 
7 0 1 0 2 3 
Total  5 1 9 3 
Source: Author.  
None of the proxies for “users’ indirect capacities” is significantly associated with the sector 
variable operationalised in with four categories. As Table 69 shows, a comparison of only 
projects in the field of pharmacy (a) versus plant breeding (b) indicates significant differences 
between the these two user groups, though. Survey participants referring to cases in pharmacy 
and pharmacy including botanical medicine assess their companies‟ indirect capacities related 
to projects in developing and newly industrialising countries on average significantly higher 
than users in the field of plant breeding. 
Table 69: Crosstabulation: Sector affiliation combined with indirect capacities 
 
Pharmacy and Pharmacy & 
botanical medicine Plant Breeders 
Our company is experienced in 
projects with partners from 
developing or newly 
industrializing countries  
1: not at all correct… 
7: Completely correct 
1 0 4 
2 0 7 
3 1 3 
4 1 1 
5 1 1 
6 2 0 
7 1 3 
Total (category 5-7 in % of total: 67%) 6 (cat. 5-7 in % of total: 21%) 9 
Source: Author. 
This single result is, however, not sufficient to maintain the assumption of intersectoral 
homogeneity regarding users‟ indirect capacities. 
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A comparison of answer distributions on asset specificity for cases affiliated with pharmacy 
and pharmacy including botanical medicine versus cases affiliated with plant breeding shows 
a significant difference (p= .011) (Table 65). Table 70 shows that the percentage of projects in 
the field of pharmacy characterised by asset specificity is far higher than in the field of plant 
breeding. However, even in the latter group projects with high relation specific investments 
exist, hence, using sector affiliation as proxy for asset specificity is problematic. 
Table 70: Crosstabulation: Sector affiliation combined with asset specificity 
 
var_sector_aggr4  
Pharmacy; 
Pharmacy & 
botanical medicine 
Botanical 
medicine, care 
& cosmetics 
Plant 
Breeders 
Biotech Total 
In case the project is 
called off before 
completion, 
investments can be 
utilised otherwise… 
1: no investments 
/investments can be 
reused without financial 
disadvantages   …   
7: only with high 
financial disadvantages 
1 1 1 16 3 21 
2 0 0 1 0 1 
3 0 1 0 0 1 
4 1 1 0 1 3 
5 0 0 2 0 2 
6 0 0 4 0 4 
7 4 0 2 1 7 
Total 6 3 25 5 39 
Cumulated cat. 4-7 (asset 
specificity confirmed) in % of 
total 
83% 33% 32% 40% 
41
% 
Source: Author. 
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Summary on intra-sectoral homogeneity for transaction variables 
In the introduction to this chapter a decision criterion was defined, under which the 
hypothesis of sector affiliation as appropriate proxy for variation of transaction 
characteristics for a governance element should be maintained. This is, if all 
explanatory variables significantly associated with a governance element are 
significantly associated with sector affiliation as well. This criterion is obviously not 
fulfilled for a single governance element, as a comparison of Table A 46: Detailed 
interrelation of explanatory variables with governance elements) with Table 65: 
Association tests: transaction characteristics combined with field of utilisation) shows. 
Some significant associations of sector affiliation with transaction variables, 
respectively items thereof were found. However, the overall result is that a 
differentiation according to user sectors is not feasible for the design of model clauses 
or model agreements for access and benefit-sharing.  
 
 
 
6.4.2 Intra-sectoral homogeneity regarding governance forms 
To double-check the findings from chapter 6.4.1 associations between governance elements 
and field of utilisation (sector affiliation) were evaluated. Table 71 shows the test results. 
Only one result is significant at a 5% level, three further on a 10% level. Hence, in general it 
can be stated that governance choice does not statistically significantly vary with respect to 
the field of utilisation, as a “sectoral model-clause instrument” would imply. This result 
confirms the findings from the previous section. Inadequateness of the operationalisation of 
transaction variables can therefore not be deduced based on the evaluation of sectoral-
heterogeneity. 
Anyhow we shall take a closer look at the significant results from Table 71.  
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Table 71: Association tests: Governance variables combined with field of utilisation 
Governance Elements 
Sector aggr. 4 * Pharmacy vs 
Plant breeding ** 
 
Kruskal-Wallis test Mann-Whitney U test 
Chi
2
 Asymp. Sig Value Asymp. Sig 
Contract duration 1.841 .606 62 .585 
 
Contingency 
coefficient 
Fisher‟s Exact test 
Value Approx. Sig. Exact Sig. (2 sided) 
Contract type .329 .274 1.00 
Monetary benefit-sharing 
 
 
 Weight-related, or hourly-wage compensation .215 .617 .571 
 Negotiated advance payments (lump sum) .298 .307 .254 
 Negotiated payments that are made after reaching 
certain steps in the usage process .166 .788 1.00 
 Payments tied to commercial output (e.g. royalties) .472 ***.059 .300 
 Output-related payments, that are negotiated over the 
course of the project .343 .177 .366 
Non-monetary benefit-sharing 
  
 Joint IPRs to usage results .373 .113 .366 
 Joint publication in scientific journals .119 .912 1.00 
 Support of inventory / taxonomy of Biodiversity .345 .173 .075 
 Technology transfer .366 .126 .120 
 Transfer of know-how in the scientific field .243 .510 .372 
 Support of infrastructure measures .279 .372 1.00 
 Transfer of know-how in the field of sustainable use / 
cultivation of genetic resources .177 .755 .603 
 Measures for biodiversity conservation .395 .077 .075 
Dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms 
  
 Exact description of the mutual activities in contract  .414 .054 .156 
 Judicial authority .353 .153 .169 
 Third party assisted arbitration .253 .469 .329 
 Internal conflict resolution, interest harmonisation .340 .185 .358 
* Sector_aggr. 4: four groups: (1) pharmacy and pharmacy & botanical medicine; (2) botanical medicine and 
personal care; (3) all plant breeding; (4) biotech others than pharmacy and plant breeding. 
** Only projects with utilisation in (a) pharmacy and (b) plant breeding are compared 
*** For this variable the sector variable sector_aggr3 was applied, with three categories for plant breeding.  
Source: Author. 
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Laird (2000) writes that in the pharmaceutical industry a “fairly standard package of benefits 
is employed” (p. 92) is employed. The results of the present research cannot support this 
statement. Only two out of five monetary benefit-sharing items and one out of eight non-
monetary benefit-sharing items are significantly associated with the field of utilisation of 
genetic resources. The error probability is in all three cases higher than 5%. The respective 
crosstabulations (Table 72) indicate that some measures are more common in certain fields of 
utilisation. However, in summary the results rather indicate intra-sectoral heterogeneity of 
non-monetary benefit-sharing in bioprospecting projects. 
Table 72: Crosstabulation: Benefit-sharing items significantly associated with field of utilisation 
 Payments tied to commercial output (e.g. royalties) 
(1) Pharmacy and Pharmacy & botanical 
medicine No Yes 
Total Yes in % of Total 
(2) Only botanical medicine, care and 
cosmetics  3 3 6 50% 
(3) Plant Breeders 2 0 2 100% 
(4) Biotech 19 5 24 21% 
Total 3 2 5 40% 
 Support of inventory / taxonomy of biodiversity  
 No No No No 
(1) Pharmacy and Pharmacy & botanical 
medicine 3 3 3 3 
(2) Only botanical medicine, care and 
cosmetics  21 21 21 21 
 Payments tied to commercial output (e.g. royalties)  
 No No No No 
(1) Pharmacy and Pharmacy & botanical 
medicine 3 3 3 3 
(2) Only botanical medicine, care and 
cosmetics  1 1 1 1 
(3) Plant Breeders 21 21 21 21 
(4) Biotech 5 5 5 5 
Total 30 30 30 30 
Source: Author. 
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The stipulation of exact description of mutual activities in the contract is associated with 
sector affiliation at a 1.7% significance level (Table 71). Table 73 shows that this dispute-
resolution item is applied in the majority of projects in the field of pharmacy, which was also 
reported in the exploratory pre-survey. However, this type of dispute resolution end contract 
enforcement strategy is as well stipulated in projects affiliated with other fields of utilisation 
(Table 73). 
Table 73: Exact description of the mutual activities differentiated by field of utilisation 
 Exact description of the mutual activities in contract 
 No Yes Total Yes in % of Total 
(1) Pharmacy and Pharmacy & botanical 
medicine 
1 5 6 83% 
(2) Only botanical medicine, care and cosmetics  1 1 2 50% 
(3) Plant Breeders 12 12 24 50% 
(4) Biotech 5 0 5 0% 
Total 19 18 37  
Source: Author.‟ 
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7 Discussion problem analysis 
Research on the issue of transaction costs in user-provider relations in the context of genetic 
resources was conducted in several subsequent steps in this dissertation. The approach was to 
first deepen the understanding of problems by creating a solid foundation of information and 
by letting economic theory guide the problem identification and analysis. In the exploratory 
user survey the identification of problems (transaction costs) and potential explanatory factors 
provided the focal point. In the next step, findings were translated into a set of variables 
presumably determining transaction costs and transaction-costs proxies. The standardised 
online survey was then used to verify the heterogeneity of users‟ transaction-costs perceptions 
and the variation of transaction characteristics. Hypotheses about associations between 
transaction variables and transaction cost assessments were tested. 
In the following sections the results of the “problem analysis” are evaluated (1) and 
comprehended to an overview of the transaction process and transaction costs occurring in 
projects for the acquisition of genetic resources from source countries. (2) Identified sources 
and factors of transaction costs are summarised and the contribution of the theory to the 
problem analysis is discussed. Finally (3) the results are discussed with respect to the 
feasibility of a model clause instrument to support ABS implementation. 
7.1 The transaction process and transaction costs 
The process of acquiring genetic resource from source countries differs to some extent 
between private companies and users from the public research sector, particularly if the latter 
includes external research funding. Even within both groups projects are individualised. The 
level of ex-ante information (does the user know what he/she wants and where to get it?) 
varies. Further factors influencing the transaction process include the possibility of using pre-
existing contacts in the initiation phase, and the type of “provider contribution”. If the user 
merely demands access to land or ex-situ material, no technical adjustment or delivery phase 
occurs in the transaction, while these are essential steps in projects with long-term multiple 
deliveries of material which the provider pre-processes particularly for the user. 
All transactional steps and transaction costs identified in bioprospecting projects are 
summarised in Table 74. Which of the steps take place, and in which chronological order, 
varies. The same applies for the type and amount of transaction costs. 
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Table 74: The ABS-chain from a transaction cost-perspective (user perspective) 
Transaction 
phase 
Users‟ activities Transaction costs 
Search and 
initiation 
 Identification of potential provider 
 Assessment of the offer / supply (what 
exactly does the provider offer, how 
does it respond to the demand) 
 Screening of the provider for reliability 
 Identification of authorities for ABS 
negotiations 
 Identification of the national 
regulations concerning access to 
genetic resources 
- Labour for information search (with 
scientific understanding of demand) 
- Labour with knowledge of the 
language of the provider country 
(information about ABS procedures, 
contact persons, laws and 
regulations might not be available in 
English)  
- Travelling expenses for meeting 
provider & pot. research partners 
Negotiations 
 Obtaining Prior Informed Consent 
 Negotiating contents of the matter of 
exchange (providers contribution, 
benefit-sharing, IPRs) => reaching 
Mutually Agreed Terms 
 Drafting the of the contract 
- Labour with legal capacities or 
external law consults 
- Labour with management capacities 
or external consults 
- Travelling expenses 
Internal 
coordination/ 
decisions 
Contract 
drafting 
Technical 
adjustment / 
capacity 
building 
 Communication and support 
(scientific, technical, infrastructure..) 
for adjustments to demand on the 
provider side 
- Travelling expenses 
- Labour with scientific and technical 
capacities 
Monitoring and 
control  
 Legal verification of the contract 
 Monitoring / verification of 
misconduction of the other contracting 
party (quality, exclusivity of supply) 
- Travelling expenses 
- Labour with scientific &technical 
capacities 
- Labour with legal capacities or 
external law consults 
Contract 
adjustment 
Renegotiation of the contract 
- Labour with legal capacities… 
- Travelling expenses 
Enforcement 
 Dispute settlement (external, 
arbitration, or internally) 
 Sanctioning / Remedies 
- Labour with legal capacities… 
- Costs for lawyers and courts 
- Costs for arbitration 
- Costs for internal dispute resolution 
(travelling, communication) 
Source: Author, based on Authors‟ survey and literature (GEHL SAMPATH 2005: 69ff; KLEINALTENKAMP 
1993: 85; NORTH 1992: 32; RICHTER and FURUBOTN 2003: 59-61; VISSER ET AL.2000: 8).  
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The online survey supported the assumption that bioprospecting projects can be characterised 
by high transaction costs. Some participants indicated that negotiations were very difficult and 
tedious. Initiation times from over two years were reported, and in some projects transaction 
costs are assessed as rather inacceptable in comparison to the value of the genetic resources. 
However, this negative picture does not hold for the majority of cases described in the 
framework of either ofthe empirical surveys carried out in this research. Several participants 
stated the exact opposite and affirmed, for example, that “the effort level is low in comparison 
to other cost components of the project”. 
Together the results shape the following picture: the sample covers projects in which 
transaction costs make up a significant part of the total costs as well as projects with 
negligible transaction costs. In the majority of projects transaction costs are assessed as 
acceptable, even if they are high. However, one has to bear in mind that in the online survey, 
participants were required to describe projects that have reached the contracting phase 
(initiation is concluded), have not been revoked, and there is also no foreseeable revoking of 
the agreement. This should secure that the sample projects are successfully implemented, 
which was an important requirement for the governance analysis. For the problem analysis, 
however, it might lead to an underestimation of transaction costs and implementation 
problems in the overall population. 
Due to limited capacities in this project, users from public institutions were not considered in 
the online survey. Findings from the exploratory surveys indicate, however, that in this user 
group transaction costs matter significantly because of constrained legal and organisational 
capacities of the researchers, as well as limited access to external legal and management 
capacities. 
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7.2 Factors for transaction costs 
Sources or factors of transaction costs can be divided into (1) internal and (2) external factors, 
and (3) factors related to characteristics of the user. 
(1) “Internal” in this context means factors induced by the nature of the transaction subject 
and the utilisation intention. 
The online survey demonstrated how heterogeneous bioprospecting projects are with respect 
to the actual object of transaction. The governance analysis verified the prediction that 
complexity of governance arrangements is correlated with the type of provider contribution. 
Hence, it was assumed that transaction costs would be associated with types of provider 
contribution. For two types of more complex activities (provider carries out material 
collection and material preparation for the user) a significant, positive association with 
transaction costs was found. 
The information and uncertainty characteristics of genetic resources and their utilisation can 
lead to various information problems causing search costs (filling information gaps ex-ante) 
and higher transaction costs for designing, implementing and running complex governance 
mechanisms. This is especially true compared to homogeneous, easily identifiable objects of 
transactions that can be transferred under standard contracts.  
Different types of primary uncertainty were verified for transactions with genetic resources. 
Transactions characterised by primary uncertainty require complex governance solutions that 
account for adjustments under various types of potential disturbances, such as unanticipated 
developments in research and development, technical changes in the utilisation process 
(requiring new investments), and/or the specification of benefit-sharing with respect to the 
commercial development and the contribution of the provider during the course of the project. 
Complex governance forms are more transaction-cost intensive than standard contracts. 
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The information characteristics of genetic resources and utilisation also bear risk for (two-
sided) asymmetric information. Balancing information asymmetry of this sort through control 
and information search is only possible to a limited extent, besides it causes transaction costs. 
According to the theory, prevention against opportunism related to asymmetrical information 
could also be implemented through certain (more complex) governance forms. 
The pre-survey shows that providers see a significant risk of hidden information and hidden 
action (about the utilisation intention, the value of the resource, benefits from utilisation, etc.) 
from the users‟ side. This has often slowed down negotiations significantly and has even led 
to the termination of negotiations, irrespective of the users‟ actual intension to act 
opportunistically. This does not constitute a typical principal-agent problem, though, since the 
provider is the agent.  
Hidden information and hidden action on the providers‟ side have not been named as relevant 
implementation problems by users
41
. Monitoring and control mechanisms were rather seen as 
tools to guide and support providers in making necessary adjustments during the course of a 
project, e.g. regarding the quality and amount of samples. 
The conclusions drawn from theory, literature and the exploratory survey could not be 
supported through the hypotheses testing based on the standardised company survey, though. 
None of the proxies for primary uncertainty used in the online survey is significantly 
associated with the transaction cost proxies. 
                                                 
41
 In the literature, principal-agent theory has been employed to analyse bioprospecting and ABS (cf. GEHL 
SAMPATH 2005: 83-86; OECD 2003: 15f, MULHOLLAND AND WILMAN 2003: 418), but the purpose of analysis 
was different. MULHOLLAND UND WILMAN analyse ABS agreements as PAP, and interpret outcome-oriented 
compensation. They assume private information by the provider regarding the effort-level for biodiversity 
conservation. These efforts are considered relevant for the utilisation results of genetic resources (2003: 420). In 
the present work, lack of information regarding a genetic resource‟s potential in a commercial utilisation is rather 
viewed as both-sided. Possibly the principal (the user) has an information advantage, since he knows the 
technologies and the state of R&D in his/her field. 
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(2) “External” factors include the institutional transaction environment in the provider 
country, and ABS institutions on the CBD level. 
Uncertainty resulting from ABS institutions on the CBD level was not the focus of this 
research, but three factors were named repeatedly in the interviews and focus groups. They 
shall be mentioned here, but not further discussed: (1) insufficient specification of the scope 
of the ABS provisions in the convention (what kind of resources and what kind of utilisation 
is affected, the regulation of derivatives), (2) insufficient specification of the term “fair and 
equitable”; the CBD has not managed to establish a common understanding on this issue, and 
(3) the variation of implementation of ABS-systems on the national level. 
Insufficiencies of the transaction environment created by the CBD increase search and 
information costs and increase insecurity and therewith impede decision-making procedures. 
The third criticism relates to the institutional transaction environment that was in the focus of 
this work as transaction cost determinant. A whole range of factors of the provider countries‟ 
institutional framework were identified in the exploratory pre-survey and from the literature: 
the organisation of responsibilities in ABS negotiations (number and type of entities involved, 
hierarchy in decision-making procedures), the providers‟ legal and scientific capacities, legal 
security and political stability and the “political will” to attract users. 
With the help of theory (mostly property rights and agency theory), 14 institutional factors 
were defined and operationalised as variables for “transaction environment” to be included in 
the online survey. Except for one factor (self-interest of the government in the provider 
country to attract foreign companies for bioprospecting), all were on average rated as relevant 
in the search for a provider country. This supports the developed definition of the transaction 
environment. Evaluated in combination with the transaction cost proxies, only two items, 
namely the “availability of local research partners in the provider country” and “centrally 
managed ABS negotiations” yield significant results, however. 
In the literature it has been stated that users select or avoid specific types of provider entities 
to keep transaction costs low. The survey results support this statement, and in particular the 
relevance of the involvement of local research partners. 
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(3) In the exploratory pre-survey several user characteristics were identified that seem to be 
correlated to problems of initiating and implementing bioprospecting projects. 
The lack of access to legal resources is a clearly recognisable problem since the process of 
creating an ABS agreement includes identifying and understanding relevant legal frameworks 
as well as negotiating and drafting contracts. Small companies often do not have in-house 
lawyers, and legal departments at research institutes are often not familiar with ABS and not 
capable of supporting research projects in this field. In larger, publicly financed research 
projects, costs for external project management and legal consultancy can be included in 
financial project planning; in smaller projects this is rather unlikely. Larger companies tend to 
have capable in-house lawyers or financial resources to consult external experts. 
The biggest issues of transaction costs related to legal and management capacities seem 
therefore to occur for small-scale public research projects and small companies without 
adequate legal resources. 
A user characteristic that was found to supposedly simplify the initiation of a project is an 
international network and political influence, which larger internationally active companies 
are more likely to have. Also experiences from previous, similar projects were identified as 
relevant factors. 
Depending on the decision-making structures within a user entity, more than one actor can be 
involved in an ABS project. In many companies and research institutes the decision-making 
process involves several departments and hierarchical levels. In this case internal 
communication costs have to be considered as transaction costs. Particularly at public 
research institutions, unawareness and uncertainty in administrative and legal departments 
about the implications of ABS and how to handle it can cause problems, ex ante and ex post. 
With data from the online survey a set of different variables representing user characteristics 
was tested in combination with transaction costs. None of the results can support the 
hypotheses, however, mostly because of statistical insignificance. 
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In Table 75 the factors of transaction costs identified based on the literature and the 
pre-survey are assigned to the transaction steps carried out by the user in ABS 
projects. As elaborated above, the standardised online survey for user companies 
supports these findings only to a very limited extent. This should, however, not be 
interpreted as indication for irrelevance of the theory developed on transaction 
problems and not as rejection of the previous results either. It rather underpins the 
limitation of quantitative methods considering the individuality of transactions with 
genetic resources and the large amount of factors contributing to transaction costs. 
Also it might indicate a limited quality of the data that was available for the 
evaluations. Cross-sectional analyses of transaction cost determinants are extremely 
rare in the literature; data availability and difficulties of data generation are certainly 
reasons for that. 
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Table 75: Transaction phase and transaction cost sources in bioprospecting projects 
Transaction Phase Factors leading to problems 
Search and initiation 
 If property rights system in provider country is not well-defined  
 If the information policy of the provider country is insufficient (no 
information in English, no website, lack of contact person) 
 If user lacks network, language and cultural knowledge, lack of 
experiences in international transactions 
Negotiations  Lack of information about the value of genetic resources, due to primary 
uncertainty of the research subject, the development of R&D (both sided 
limited information) 
 Providers lack of scientific capacities to assess the value of genetic 
resources in the intended utilisation 
 Intended asymmetric information, the user hides information about the 
utilization intention or the value of the resource in the utilization intention 
 Decision competencies on the providers‟ side are unclear 
 Either or both parties lack management skills for complex transactions 
 Lack of legal capacities 
Internal coordination/ 
decisions 
Contract drafting 
Technical adjustment 
(and capacity 
building) 
 Demand is very specific, and requires significant communication and 
education, technology-transfer… 
 Technological and demand/market uncertainty are high, requiring 
adjustment of the delivery during the course of the project 
Monitoring and 
control  
 Strong asymmetric information, and activity of provider is not observable 
 Environment change, especially in long term-projects; particularly, if 
political and/or legal frameworks are likely to change in the meantime 
Contract adjustment 
 If ex-ante primary uncertainty (utilisation, commercial output, demand…) 
is high and requires incomplete contracts, which have to be specified ex 
post (holds for specification of benefit-sharing and for adjustments of the 
provider contribution 
Enforcement 
 If contract mutual claims are difficult to verify by external entities, e.g. 
because  
Source: Author. 
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7.3 How can a model-clause instrument tackle the problems 
We learned that transaction costs can pose a problem for the implementation of an ABS 
agreement. This includes the breakdown after contact initiation or when negotiations have 
already started. The anticipation of excessive transaction costs can even obviate the initiation 
from starting. However, the empirical research in this work indicates that transaction costs are 
not necessarily a problem; they might as well be high but acceptable in relation to the 
transaction value or they might simply not be very high. 
Whether the effort level rises, or becomes prohibitively high is supposedly influenced by a 
whole range of factors including the characteristics of the users, the institutional transaction 
environment in the provider country and the characteristics of the transaction object itself. 
This poses the question, whether the considered instrument addresses these factors. 
Which features the instrument has depends largely on its design, predominantly on the types 
of guidelines that would accompany the menus of model clauses. Accompanying guidelines 
that would broaden and increase the effectiveness beyond substituting abilities for formulating 
a legal contract in correct language are:  
(a) Guidelines for designing the contract framework 
=> Help the stakeholders defining what has to be specified in the contract and which 
contractual elements should be included. 
(b) Guidelines for the choice of adequate options from the menu for each contractual element 
=> Guide the stakeholders in deciding which of the many model-clause options fit their 
specific case, e.g. which type of monetary benefit-sharing is adequate considering the type of 
provider contribution, the level of primary uncertainty, etc. 
(c) Guidelines for defining compensation that is fair and adequate  
=> What is the value of a genetic resource and how can non-monetary benefit-sharing 
measures be translated into compensation? 
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Obviously a model-clause instrument does not standardise the object of the transaction, which 
is neither the intention nor possible. Transaction costs related to the users‟ lack of information 
regarding the market of genetic resources (where to find what), as well as two-sided ex-ante 
information deficiencies about the value and the “usability” of the supply are due to the nature 
of genetic resources and the utilisation process. Neither of these transaction-cost factors can 
directly be tackled with a model-clause instrument, not even if it is accompanied by the 
suggested guidelines. 
What was defined as the principal-agent problem of actual or suspected hidden information 
from the user can be addressed if model clauses are supplemented with guidelines for 
specifying adequate compensation. Such an instrument would create a “neutral” starting point 
and guidance for both parties in benefit-sharing negotiations. The problem of mistrust from 
the providers‟ side due to suspected hidden information regarding the value of genetic 
resources could thereby be reduced.   
Menus of model clauses can be a remedy to users‟ and providers‟ lack of legal capacities 
related to ABS negotiations. The effect would be much more significant, though, if the 
instrument were to include the supplementary guidelines (a) and (b), since they give 
information on how to characterise the individual case with respect to what has to be specified 
in legal form.  
Internal coordination and the development of negotiation positions (user and provider) could 
also be supported if model clauses were accompanied by all three types of guidelines. They 
can help to create a better information base regarding the case and what has to be regulated in 
the agreement, as well as what would be appropriate in the individual case. This could 
simplify internal decision making.  
Most of the institutional factors in provider countries - such as a well-established property-
rights system for genetic resources, clear and centrally managed competences for negotiations 
and a user-friendly information system - cannot be substituted by a model-clause instrument. 
The same applies to the scientific infrastructure (mostly the existence of local research 
partners), which was evaluated as highly relevant by users. 
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In conclusion, it can be stated that a model-clause instrument alone would not resolve many 
of the problems identified. If it were to be supplemented with the suggested guidelines, the 
chances would be improved significantly. While options for the first and second guideline are 
subject to this research, a guideline for specifying adequate amounts of benefit-sharing was 
not dealt with.  
The overall impact of a model-clause instrument can be assumed to be rather low, especially 
for larger companies with previous experience. For users and providers with less legal 
capacity and experience in translating the characteristics of a bioprospecting project into a 
governance arrangement the chances are likely to be higher. Still a significant part of the 
identified problems cannot be addressed with the instrument. 
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8 Discussion governance analysis 
The context of this study is the debate over contract standardisation as an instrument to 
support the implementation of access and benefit-sharing for genetic resources. Submissions 
of CBD‟ member parties (e.g. the EU) suggest a sectoral approach for such an instrument 
referring to different “ways of utilisation”. However, a concept for the differentiation of 
sectors and their ways of utilisation was lacking. 
One of the main goals of this dissertation was to develop and test a theory-based concept for 
characterising bilateral transactions of genetic resources with respect to efficient governance 
solutions. This goal was achieved in an iterative research process including a triangulation of 
methods as well as theories.  
Guided by transaction cost economics and strategic management, literature concerning 
governance aspects of transactions with genetic resources was reviewed. The findings were 
supplemented by individual exploratory interviews and a content analysis of existing contract-
standardisation models. In focus groups the interim findings were discussed and again 
supplemented. Based upon these findings, a framework of hypotheses on governance choice 
could be developed and tested with data from a standardised cross-sectional company survey. 
The results shall be discussed to assess the theoretical concept as a basis for future governance 
research in the field of transactions with genetic resources. Furthermore, the findings shall be 
evaluated as a starting point for developing a model clause instrument including a revision of 
the “sectoral” approach to contract standardisation. A reflection of the methods applied and a 
critical assessment of the contribution of the study to the literature conclude this chapter. 
8.1 Discussion of the governance-theory framework 
The theory was helpful to identify functional elements of ABS contracts, such as the duration 
of the contract, compensation mechanisms as well as dispute-resolution and enforcement 
mechanisms. Moreover, it helped to identify and characterise design options of contractual 
elements (adaptability, contract law, incentives) for ABS agreements. Thereby this work 
could go one step further than the topical literature, and add a characterisation of governance 
forms with respect to functionality rather than simply listing observations on governance 
forms. 
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The evaluation of online survey questions on transaction variables and governance elements 
verified that the operationalisation of variables was correct in that no categories without 
practical relevance were included. With very few exceptions, all response categories of the 
variable were used by survey participants.  
Two proxies for company size had zero entries in the second and third highest categories. An 
aggregation of higher classes in future surveys should be considered. 
Some items of the variable transaction environment (answered with respect to reference 
cases) and one transaction-costs proxy (the effort level is acceptable in relation to the value) 
have zero entries for the lowest response category (very bad). Since participants were 
requested to choose “successful” cases it is likely that the overall picture of the transaction 
environment and transaction costs is positively skewed. From the distribution of answers it 
should not be deduced that any of the institutional aspects could not be characterised as “very 
poorly implemented” or that transaction costs could not be assessed as too high in relation to 
the transaction value. Therefore, a change of the scale for these variables is not considered 
necessary. 
For two further variables (“technological change” and “negotiations were difficult and 
tedious”), one intermediate response category of a seven-point ordinal scale has zero entries. 
An aggregation of categories could be discussed for future surveys with small samples, but it 
is not considered necessary. 
Several hypotheses of the governance-theory framework were supported by the survey data 
(see all significant results in Table A 46). Due to the nature of evaluation methods the results 
do not verify causal relationships, though. Non-significance of associations would, however, 
indicate that causal relationships are very unlikely. The results therefore indicate that further 
research based on the developed theory construct is promising.  
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In bioprospecting agreements, it was found that contractual elements are combined in a way 
that no “pure” governance types (such as those suggested by the theory) could be identified. 
Often several options of one governance element are combined in one contract (e.g., market 
price and result-based compensation). This seemed somewhat contradictory and difficult to 
interpret with the transaction-costs economics approach. It is here understood as an indication 
of multiple motives related to governance. Transaction cost minimisation is found to be 
neither the only nor the superior motive for governance choice. This is strongly supported by 
the result that the variables “synergy effects of capacity building” and “provider contribution” 
(both characterising demand heterogeneity) are significantly associated with several 
governance elements. Neither of the two variables belongs to WILLIAMSON‟S “explanatory” 
variables of classical transaction cost economics, which stresses the requirement of a 
triangulation of theories in this research field.  
Not all predictions are supported by the survey results, as some are not statistically significant 
and some reject the hypotheses. To some extent inadequacies of the theoretical framework 
and its practical application in this research are likely to contribute. 
Imperfections in the specification of the theory can be assumed since the application of the 
governance approach of transaction cost economics to this research subject is fairly new and 
has not been advanced to include quantitative empirical analyses. Moreover, strategic 
management theory has not been applied in this research field before, not explicitly anyhow. 
The results indicate that significant adoptions of transaction cost economic theory and a 
triangulation with other governance theories is required to better reflect the reality of 
bioprospecting projects. Several hypotheses reflecting also findings from the literature could 
not be supported. This indicates that some generalisations found in previous publications 
based either on “expert knowledge” or case studies, might have been drawn to easily and 
oversimplify reality. 
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The possibility of measurement errors has to be accepted when methods are applied for the 
first time in a research field. Since no similar standardised, quantitative survey has been 
carried out for bioprospecting project, all variables had to be operationalised “from scratch”. 
A pre-test was conducted to ensure that the questions are understandable and the 
questionnaire answerable in a reasonable time. However, during the survey several addressees 
initiated contact to indicate problems in responding to the questions. It is then very likely that 
some survey participants did not interpret the questions and response options in the intended 
way, leading to distorted responses. The operationalisation of variables could be improved in 
future research. The findings of this work should be discussed with stakeholders (users and 
providers) and with researchers who have applied the theories in similar contexts. 
8.2 Discussion with respect to design of a model-clause instrument 
The governance analysis responds to the call of ABS negotiators for research on practical 
transactions with genetic resources and the utilisation of such resources. The main 
contribution to the debate on ABS instruments is an economic theory-based concept for 
characterising bioprospecting projects in terms of the object of transaction, utilisation forms 
as well as user and provider characteristics. Based thereupon, the study provides concrete 
starting points for the development of menus of model clauses and supplementary guidelines 
that support the application of the instrument. 
Several forms of contract standardisation are theoretically considerable for ABS. As 
elaborated in chapter 1.2, section three, the official debate shifted from fully standardised 
contracts
42
 to voluntary menus of sectoral model clauses for ABS contracts. Clearly there is a 
trade-off between scope and detail as well as the degree of freedom for stakeholders to adapt 
the contractual form to the particularities of the individual case. A high level of 
standardisation best achieves the reduction of transaction costs and an improvement of legal 
certainty. However, it does not reflect the significant heterogeneity of the transaction object 
traded under the term “ABS agreement”, nor does it take into account the particular capacities 
of users and providers. 
                                                 
42
 Suggested were standardised Material Transfer Agreements, comparable to the instrument developed under the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic resources for Food and Agriculture. 
8 Discussion governance analysis  
 
 
216 
 
  
The governance analysis in this research has given a strong indication that transaction 
characteristics are associated with the choice of contract design in practice. As the case 
characteristics vary among bioprospecting projects, the governance form will vary to. A high 
level of contract standardisation for ABS is therefore not feasible; the similarity of 
requirements regarding transaction object and transaction context (as elaborated in the theory 
chapter) are not sufficiently fulfilled. Standard contracts might reduce transaction costs 
significantly for some cases, but they supposedly impede the initiation of a significant number 
of potential projects. Therefore, if contract standardisation should be implemented as an ABS 
instrument, menus of voluntary model clauses should be preferred.   
As elaborated in the discussion of the problem analysis (chapter 7), a model-clause instrument 
is likely to support the implementation of ABS agreements to some extent. It was also 
explained that model clauses should be accompanied by guidelines that (1) instruct the 
framework setting of contracts and (2) guide stakeholder parties in characterising their case 
and, based on this, select appropriate model clauses for each contractual element. The results 
of the governance analysis regarding these instruments shall be discussed in this chapter. 
A whole set of framing contract clauses have to be considered in bioprospecting agreements, 
e.g., the specification of the contracting parties, liability, secrecy, etc. The CBD Bonn 
guidelines and the Swiss ABS Management Tool provide a solid overview of such clauses. 
The development of standard formulations for these framing clauses is presumably possible, 
since they do not significantly vary with the nature of the exchange relationship. One could 
employ the models that were identified and elaborated in chapter 4.1 of this study. 
The “transaction object”, which has to be clearly specified in a contract, was identified as an 
important transaction variable with a high level of variation in practice. The types of 
“provider contributions” pointed out in the operationalisation of the variable for the online 
survey can be used as a basis for the compilation of a list of options from which stakeholder 
parties can select and specify for their individual case. 
With the help of theory and exploratory research, the overall contracting approach (phasing 
agreement or a complete contract from the start) and four contractual elements were identified 
as functional units defining the governance nature of an ABS agreement. 
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- The duration of the contract 
- The type of monetary compensation 
- Non-monetary forms of benefit-sharing 
- The types of conflict-resolution and enforcement mechanisms. 
The basic options of each contractual element identified in this research were presented in 
chapter 5 (Figure 9). The differences regarding the governance function are elaborated in the 
basic theory chapter (chapter 3) and in the specification of the governance theory framework 
in chapter 5. 
A set of model clauses (one for each “functional” option) should be formulated for each 
contractual element. However, the model clauses still need to leave room for specification 
according to the individual case, including, for example, the setting of 
wages/payments/royalties or the appointment of an arbitration committee/court.  
The research results partly support the developed hypotheses on associations between 
variables defined as governance-choice determinants (transaction attributes, user 
characteristics, etc.) and governance forms. These results can be used as a starting point for 
guidelines for the characterisation of cases and the choice of appropriate model clauses. 
Table 76 gives an overview of significantly associated transaction variables and governance 
elements. It indicates which of the explanatory variables should be considered for choosing 
model clauses for which governance element. The table could instruct the development of 
guidelines for assisting the stakeholders in choosing model clauses.  
Table 76: Summary of associations of transaction variables combined with governance elements 
 Governance variables 
Explanatory variables 
Contracting 
approach 
Contract 
duration 
Monetary 
benefit-
sharing * 
Non-monetary 
benefit-sharing 
* 
Conflict 
resolution 
* 
Synergy effects of capacity 
building * 
 X  X X 
Provider contribution *   X X X 
Asset specificity   X   
Primary uncertainty* X
 
 X  X** 
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Frequency of interaction X   X X 
Users‟ indirect capacities X  X X  
Transaction environment in 
the provider country 
   X  
* This is a multi-item variable/element; not all items are necessarily significantly associated with the 
respective element/variable. 
** Several results object the stated hypotheses, several are not significant 
Grey shade indicates that association was expected, but not found to be significant 
Source: Author. 
A guideline for choosing model clauses for the governance element “monetary benefit-
sharing” should instruct the applicant to characterise his/her case with respect to (1) the type 
of contribution by the provider, (2) asset specificity, (3) primary uncertainty, and finally (4) 
the users‟ indirect capacities. These characteristics could demarcate “decision nodes”, along 
which stakeholders can specify their case. Working through the decision tree would consider 
all relevant transaction variables and thereby lead to adapted model clauses. 
Because no overall governance forms comprising all contractual elements can be identified, 
this procedure would have to be repeated for each governance element individually. However, 
information on the case characteristics inserted in the first decision tree could be transferred 
(as far as required) to the decision trees of remaining governance elements. 
Table A 46 in Appendix IV provides an overview of significant results on the item-level of 
transaction variables and governance elements. It shows the direction of associations and 
therewith indicates which model clause is suggested (based on the survey results). 
The aim of the governance analysis in this research was to develop and test a theoretical 
framework for governance decisions in bioprospecting projects. This goal was achieved. As 
previously indicated, however, not all hypotheses could be maintained. Suggestions for the 
design of guidelines to complement menus of the model clauses should therefore be 
understood as a preliminary starting point. Further research for advancing the theory is 
required. 
The transfer of findings from this research into a concrete instrument should be done with the 
help of lawyers experienced in the field of ABS contracts. Users representing the different 
possible characteristics of utilisation and demand should be involved. Regarding the 
applicability of the instrument and its acceptance it is absolutely vital to involve also lawyers 
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and “resource” experts from the provider side in this process. This procedural requirement is 
stressed for two reasons: contracts for transactions with genetic resources (should) reflect the 
interests of both contracting parties, even if the user survey method was appropriate in this 
research. And secondly, if terminology for model clauses is developed solely based on user 
perceptions the underlying information is biased. Such an instrument bears the risk of not 
being applicable and acceptable for providers in practice. Provider entities would rather trust 
in the fairness of model clauses if “their representatives” contributed to designing the 
instrument. Mutual trust in bilateral negotiations could be supported by such an instrument. 
Since mistrust was identified as a central issue in contract negotiations, this aspect has to be 
considered. 
The sectoral approach for contract standardisation was suggested to consider heterogeneity of 
utilisation among users and therewith safeguard the development of applicable and 
sufficiently flexible models. One major result of the governance analysis is, however, that 
intra-sectoral homogeneity for transactions with genetic resources is weak. Bioprospecting 
projects affiliated with the same sector are not significantly more homogeneous compared to 
cases affiliated with different sectors. This holds for the majority of transaction variables as 
well as governance variables. The sectoral approach is therefore not feasible for the 
development of standards or models for ABS contracts or contract elements. If model clauses 
would be developed for specific sectors, one would end up with menus of clauses for each 
sector containing the full range of options. Most menus would be identical for several sectors. 
The same applies to the characterisation of cases into complementary guidelines for the 
selection of model clauses. 
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If one were to rely on generalisations on governance forms for different user sectors 
mentioned in the topical literature and basing thereupon limit the number of clauses for each 
sector in order to simplify the selection process, the range of options would become too small. 
Contracts developed with such a limited instrument would not be adapted sufficiently. The 
efficiency requirements for governance forms indicated in economic theory would not be 
fulfilled. 
The general idea of a differentiated instrument that reflects the variation of the utilisation of 
genetic resources is strongly supported by the results of this study. As discussed, the variation 
of cases regarding relevant transaction variables manifesting utilisation forms is not reflect by 
a sectoral categorisation. Therefore, it should not be called a sectoral approach. 
8.3 Reflection on the methodological approach in the governance analysis 
In many respects this research goes beyond the existing literature. An iterative process with a 
triangulation of methods and a strong focus on empirical results has been applied for the 
governance analysis. Focus groups and the standardised, cross-sectional online survey are 
methods that have not been applied in this research field before. Focus groups allowed for the 
discovery of new aspects, particularly regarding the heterogeneity of practical applications 
and viewpoints on bioprospecting praxis within sectors. Even within companies projects are 
heterogeneous. The standardised survey generated data that describes ABS agreements on a 
very detailed level, more detailed than can be found in literature. The questions are 
operationalised such that statistical analyses could be carried out in this dissertation. Though 
very basic, this goes beyond the methods applied in empirical studies found in the literature. 
On the whole, the methodological approach can be assessed as valid to answer the research 
questions. However, reliability and objectivity of the survey results (the exploratory and 
standardised company surveys) are rather difficult to assess. Due to the novelty of the 
research subject, a cross-checking result with similar studies is possible only to a very limited 
extent. Possible inadequacies of the theory were elaborated in chapter 8.1. Specific 
methodological limitations in each empirical research step are discussed in the following 
sections. 
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Model agreements and guidelines were analysed with the method of qualitative content 
analysis. A methodological shortcoming in this research step, not induced by the method, 
though, is the low level of information that could be acquired regarding key groups‟ 
experiences with the instruments. It was not possible to assess whether the instruments 
successfully implement the stated objectives in practice. However, the review gave a good 
overview and introduction to contractual elements and design options and contributed to the 
research process in the intended way. 
The exploratory interviews and focus groups were conducted to receive information on the 
praxis of acquisition and utilisation of genetic resources and reveal governance options and 
heterogeneity among and within sectors. First-hand information should feed into the 
operationalisation of theoretical concepts for the subsequent standardised online survey. The 
level of experience with ABS varied among interview partners, as well as the external settings 
of the interviews. Therefore, exploitable data varied among interviews, as well as among the 
group discussions. This is a clear limitation of the survey though not profound enough to 
disqualify its application. The exploratory character was chosen deliberately in this research 
step, and particularly the dynamic character of group discussions created a chance to reveal 
new aspects and to discuss heterogeneity within user sectors. 
In the subsequent standardised, cross-sectional online survey, the aim was to generate 
detailed and comparable data about transactions with genetic resources that would allow this 
research to take a step beyond a qualitative descriptive governance analysis. However, 
practical constraints such as the limitation of resources, information about the population, 
accessibility, willingness, or ability of companies to participate made it impossible to reach 
equal sub-sample sizes (cases representing user sectors or governance solutions). The subject 
matter is politically critical and governance of transactions with genetic resources includes 
sensitive questions (e.g., benefit-sharing), which users are partly reluctant to answer. Hence, 
the recruitment of survey participants was very challenging and the overall sample size 
smaller than intended. 
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The sample size and composition, as well as the operationalisation of variables (many 
dichotomous, multi-response variables) did constrain the evaluation options for the survey 
data. In future studies this may partly be enhanced, but several limitations are given by the 
research subject: compensation - though theoretically possible to code as one ordinal variable 
with increasing flexibility or as standard market price versus result-based compensation - 
have a much more complex nature in bioprospecting projects. The same applies to conflict 
resolution. 
As noted before, several options for one governance element are often combined, such as 
standard market prices in the form of hourly wages and the stipulation of royalties, or the 
appointment of a judicial authority and internal conflict resolution measures. This makes an 
aggregation of all response categories on one scale impossible. 
A particular challenge was the affiliation of respondents and their companies and reference 
cases with sectors or fields of utilisation
43
. This is a consequence of companies being active in 
many fields. Many participants indicated that genetic resources are used for several purposes, 
sometimes the same resources or at least resources acquired in the same transaction. 
Therefore, sectors had to be aggregated in the survey. This supposedly limits the scientific 
reliability of conclusions drawn from association tests of sector affiliation with transaction 
and governance variables regarding the sectoral approach. On the other hand, 
multidisciplinary application within one company and even within one project as such implies 
the unfeasibility of a sectoral approach to distinguishing cases. 
The provider perspective was not explicitly surveyed in the empirical part of this research. 
This of course limits the perspective and disregards certain information. However, it is 
common practice in empirical studies on governance decisions to survey data only from the 
entity acquiring a good, service or right. Moreover, most of the variables in this governance 
analysis correspond to the characteristics of demand and the utilisation of genetic resources, 
which can be described most appropriately by the user. Also the “user friendliness” of the 
transaction environment in the provider country can be assessed by the user. In addition, 
collecting data from both the user and provider on the same bioprospecting case would not be 
possible in an anonymous survey, which was chosen as survey method to reach a high level of 
willingness to answer. 
                                                 
43 For more in depth explanation see chapter 4, Part A. 
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9 Outlook 
This work provides background information that can be used as starting point for developing 
a contract-standardisation instrument in the form of menus for model contract clauses for 
ABS agreements. It was not possible and not the goal of this dissertation, however, to develop 
a full-fledged instrument. 
The 10.th Conference of the parties (COP10) took place in Nagoya, Japan, in October 2010. 
The negotiations on an international ABS regime led to the adoption of the “Nagoya Protocol 
on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity” 44 (hereafter the protocol). The 
protocol refers to “sectoral and cross-sectoral model contractual clauses” at some points, but it 
does not assign any entity or committee to develop a comprehensive instrument. It is left to 
the member countries of the protocol to “encourage, as appropriate, the development, update 
and use of sectoral and cross-sectoral model contractual clauses for mutually agreed terms” 
(Art. 19 (1)). The CBD institutions shall merely serve to “collect and make available on the 
clearinghouse mechanism sectoral and cross-sectoral contractual clauses for mutually agreed 
terms” (Section II, No. 18), and the Conference of the Parties shall “periodically take stock of 
the use of sectoral and cross-sectoral model contractual clauses,” (Art. 19 (2). The decisions 
fall far short of the suggestions for the design and development procedures of a model-clause 
instrument suggested in this work. This might reflect the ambiguity regarding the cost-benefit 
ratio of developing and implementing a comprehensive measure. However, the ideas 
developed in this dissertation will possibly be taken up and advanced by a group of 
stakeholders or a team of researchers in the future.  
The formulation “sectoral and cross-sectoral model contractual clauses” indicates that the 
sectoral approach is maintained among decision takers on the CBD level, however, to a much 
lesser degree than when the idea of contract-standardisation was first brought to the agenda.  
                                                 
44
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, 29 October 2010, available at 
http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=12267 
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Several problems that cannot be resolved with a model-clause instrument are related to 
imprecise provisions and definitions in the convention text. The protocol makes 
advancements in this area. It reaffirms the national sovereignty of member countries over 
their natural resources (introductory statements), but it specifies provisions for the 
implementation of domestic ABS institutions (laws and procedures) with several decisions in 
Art. 6. 
Moreover, the protocol defines in Art.2(c) the term utilisation of genetic resources falling 
under the scope of ABS regulations more concretely than the convention does. The inclusion 
of “biochemical composition” of natural resources in the scope of ABS provisions is a major 
change to how many user-countries and user-representatives interpreted “utilisation of genetic 
resources” during the course of the negotiations. 
Biotechnological utilisation of genetic resources and the term “derivatives” are also specified 
in the Protocol (Art.2 (c) and (d)). The definition of derivatives of genetic resources and 
whether they should fall under the scope of ABS provisions has been a major issue in the 
previous negotiations. 
Amount of monetary benefit-sharing 
The political debate has not led to a common understanding on how to determine fairness of 
the amount of (monetary) benefit-sharing. So far, in bilateral cases benefit-sharing is most 
likely a product of the following factors: the actual value of the resource for the user, 
negotiating power, and the market situation and substitutability of the resource. Within this 
study it was indicated that diverging ideas about benefit-sharing and mistrust on this issue can 
be a major impediment in bilateral negotiations. Concepts for more objective ways of defining 
benefit-sharing should therefore be subject to future research. Possible leads are the 
investigation of value chains in different application fields, providers‟ opportunity costs of 
conserving genetic resources, and granting access.  
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Stressing non-monetary benefit-sharing 
The real value of non-monetary benefit sharing measures for users and providers should be 
investigated more in-depth and communicated among stakeholders. It was shown in this 
research that capacity building in provider countries can create synergy effects for users. It 
can be assumed that if synergy effects are high, expenses for non-monetary benefit-sharing 
measures might have a higher return for the user than monetary benefit-sharing. Also, non-
monetary benefit sharing measures presumably create higher values for providers in the 
longer run, if they establish a foundation for development
45
. Capacity building is likely to 
have an efficient overall cost-benefit ratio for both parties to an agreement. 
It has to be noted though, that especially small companies and research institutes have limited 
resources to conduct capacity building. It should be investigated how such user entities could 
engage in non-monetary benefit-sharing, for example, in the framework of joint projects. 
Supportive measures 
Search costs and initiation costs in the chain of creating ABS agreements were indicated by 
several users within our empirical studies. To reduce these transaction costs, information 
measures and training of users or the implementation and training of central consultant 
entities could be more suitable. Also information systems in provider countries should be 
revised and possibly harmonised to a certain extent. 
Users from public research institutes suggested the implementation of a superordinate entity 
(e.g. at the CBD level, with representatives of providers and users) to check best practice 
initiatives such as codes of conduct and guidelines for ABS regarding their consistency with 
general ABS provisions in the CBD. Such an entity could also provide guidelines for 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs). MOUs seem to be a useful tool to communicate 
complex research projects. 
                                                 
45
 This has been stressed in many case studies in academic literature. See, for example: CBD 2008: 53). 
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Advancements of research on governance choice 
The theories developed in this work could be advanced. The operationalisation of variables 
and the relevance of variables could be discussed. For a more comprehensive causal analysis 
of overall governance hypotheses, e.g. with the help of structural equation models, a refined 
concept of operationalisation for governance variables could be developed. Aggregating all or 
at least the most relevant options as discreet response categories in one variable would be 
required. Whether this is possible should be investigated in future research. 
References 
 
 
227 
 
  
References 
ABDI, H. (2007): “Kendall Rank Coefficient”. In Salkind, N.J.. Encyclopedia of Measurement 
and Statistics. Thousand Oaks (CA): Sage; online: http://www.utdallas.edu/~herve/Abdi-
KendallCorrelation2007-pretty.pdf (accessed 28/02/2011). 
ALLEN, D. W. (2000): “Transaction Costs,” in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest, 
eds., The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol. 1. Chelthenham, Edward Elgar, 
2000, pp. 893-926. 
ALTMAN, I. J., KLEIN, P. G. & JOHNSON, T.G. (2007): "Scale and Transaction Costs in the U.S. 
Biopower Industry", Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, Vol. 5 (1). 
ARAUJO L., DUBOIS, A. & GADDE, L.-E. (2003): “The Multiple Boundaries of the Firm”. 
Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 40 (5):  1255-1277. 
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE (2004): 
“Genetic Resources Management in Commonwealth Areas Sustainable Access Shared 
Benefits”; online http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity 
/publications/access/regs/pubs/regs.pdf (accessed 28/02/2011). 
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE (2005a): 
“Model Access and Benefit-sharing Agreement - Access Provider and Access Party”; 
online: http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/science/access/model-
agreements/index.html (accessed 28/02/2011). 
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE (2005b): 
“Model Access and Benefit-sharing Agreement - Australian Government and Access 
Party”; online: http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/science/access/model-
agreements/index.html (accessed 28/02/2011). 
BELGIAN CO-ORDINATED COLLECTIONS OF MICRO-ORGANISMS (BCCM) (2000): “MOSAICC: 
Micro-organism sustainable use and access regulation - International Code of Conduct”; 
online: http://bccm.belspo.be/projects/mosaicc/#code (accessed 28/02/2011).  
BELLO, D.C.; SHIRISH, D.P. & LOHTIA, R. (1997): “Hybrid governance: the role of transaction 
costs, production costs and strategic considerations”. In: Journal of Business & Industrial 
Marketing, Vol. 12(2): 118-133. 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION (BIO) (2008): “Suggested Model Material 
Transfer Agreement”; online: http://www.bio.org/ip/international/BIO_Model_MTA.pdf 
(accessed 28/02/2011). 
BORTZ, J., DÖRING, N. (2002): Forschungsmethoden und Evaluation: für Human- und 
Sozialwissenschaftler, 3. Edition, Springer-Verlag, Berlin und Heidelberg. 
BOSLAUGH, S., WATTERS, P.A. (2008): “STATISTICS IN A NUTSHELL”. O‟ REILLY MEDIA: PP. 480. 
BROSIUS, F. (1998): SPSS 8:“Professionelle Statistik unter Windows”. 1 Edition: pp. 1000. 
References 
 
 
228 
 
  
BÜHL, A., ZÖFEL P. (2005): SPSS 12. Einführung in die moderne Datenanalyse unter Windows. 
9. Auflage. München u.a., Pearson Studium. 
BRUNSSON, N., JACOBSSON, B. (2002): "A world of standards", Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
CARRIZOSA, S., BRUSH, S.B., WRIGHT, B.D., MCGUIRE, P.E. (eds.) (2004): “Accessing 
Biodiversity and Sharing the Benefits: Lessons from Implementation of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity”. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK. xiv+316 p. 
CARRIZOSA, S. (2004): "Diversity in Policies in Place and in Progress", in IUCN, eds., 
Accessing Biodiversity and Sharing the Benefits: Lessons from Implementing the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, ed. by IUCN) Gland, Switzerland and Camebridge, 
UK: 9-42. 
CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity) (1992): “Convention on Biological Diversity”, 
Rio de Janeiro; online: http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/ (accessed 28/02/2011). 
- (2001): "Report of the panel of experts on access and benefit-sharing on the work of its 
second meeting", Bonn; online: http://www.cbd.int/doc/?meeting=ABSEP-02 (accessed 
28/02/2011). 
- (2002): “Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization”, Montreal; online: 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-bonn-gdls-en.pdf (accessed 28/02/2011). 
- (2006): "Matrix of the Analysis of Gaps", Granada; online: http://www.cbd.int 
/doc/meetings/abs/abswg-04/official/abswg-04-03-en.pdf (accessed 28/02/2011). 
- (2007a): “Compilation of Submissions Provided by Parties and Other Relevant 
Organizations on Issues of Relevance to the International Regime on Access and Benefit-
sharing“, Montreal; online: https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/abswg-
05/information/abswg-05-inf-01-en.pdf (accessed 28/02/2011). 
- (2007b): “Analysis of Gaps in Existing National, Regional and International Legal and 
Other Instruments Relating to Access and Benefit-Sharing“, Montreal; online: 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/abswg-05/official/abswg-05-03-en.pdf (accessed 
28/02/2011). 
- (2008): “Access and Benefit-Sharing in Practice: Trends in Partnerships Across Sectors.” 
Montreal, Technical Series No. 38: pp. 140. 
-  (2008): “Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity on the work of its ninth meeting”, Bonn; online: 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-09/full/cop-09-dec-en.pdf (accessed 28/02/2011). 
- (2010): “Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity”, Nagoya; online: http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=12267 (accessed: 
28/02/2011). 
References 
 
 
229 
 
  
CLEFF, T. (2008): “Deskriptive Statistik und modern Datenanalyse – Eine computergestützte 
Einführung mit Excel, SPSS und STATA”. 1. Edition: pp. 202. 
DEDEURWAERDERE, T. (2005): "From bioprospecting to reflexive governance", Ecological 
Economics, Vol. 53 (4):  473-491. 
DEUTSCHE INDUSTRIEVEREINIGUNG BIOTECHNOLOGIE (2008): “Contribution of the Biotech-
Industry to the Implementation of Article 15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 
Access and Benefit-sharing”. 
Donald Mc, J.H. (2009): “Handbook of Biological statistics”. 2. Edition. Sparky House 
Publishing: pp. 313.  
DYER, J.H. (1997): “Effective interfirme collaboration: How firms minimize transaction 
costs and maximize transaction value”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol.18 (7):  535-
556. 
DROSS, M. (2005): “New elements of the international regime on access and benefit-sharing 
of genetic resources: the role of certificates of origin”, BfN, Bonn. 
ERLEI, M., LESCHKE, M. & SAUERLAND, D. (1999): “Neue Institutionenökonomik”, Schäffer-
Poeschel Verlag: pp. 555. 
FAO (UNITED NATIONS FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION) (1983): “International 
TReaty on PLant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture”; online: 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0510e/i0510e.pdf (accessed 28/02/2011). 
- (2006), "Standard Material Transfer Agreement", Rome; online: 
http://www.planttreaty.org/smta_en.htm (accessed 28/02/2011). 
- (2007): “Second Session of the Governing Body of the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture” (FAO, IT/GB-2/07/Report), Rome. 
FRISCH, M., WEIN, T. & EWERS, H.-J. (2003): “Marktversagen und Wirtschaftspolitik“, 
5.Edition, Verlag Vahlen: pp. 420. 
FRISON, C., DEDEURWAERDERE, T. (2006): "Infrastructures publique et regulations sur aux 
ressources genetique et le Partage des Avantages qui decoulent de leur utilisation pour 
l'innovation dans la recherche des sciences de la vie", Louvain. 
GEHL SAMPATH, P. (2005): “Regulating bioprospecting: institutions for drug research, access, 
and benefit-sharing. Tokyo” a.o.: United Nations University Press: pp. 274.  
GRANT, R.M. (2006): “Strategisches Management. Analyse, Entwicklung und 
Implementierung von Unternehmensstrategien”, 5. Edition, Pearson Studium: pp. 688.  
GULATI, R. (1999): “Network location and learning: The influence of network resources and 
firm capabilities on alliance formation”. In: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 20 (5): 
397–420. 
References 
 
 
230 
 
  
HERRLINGER, C., JORASCH, P. & WOLTER, F.P. (2003): "Biopatentierung - eine Beurteilung 
aus sicht der Pflanzenzüchtung," in g. C. Bau und D. Mieth, Hg., Patente am Leben?: 
ethische, rechtliche und politische Aspekte der Biopatentierung, Paderborn: 245-258. 
HOLM-MÜLLER, K.; RICHERZHAGEN, C. & TAEUBER, S. (2005): "Users of genetic resources in 
Germany: awareness, participation and positions regarding the convention on biological 
diversity", BfN, Bonn: pp. 118. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT and STATE SECRETARIAT FOR 
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (2007): “ABS-Management Tool: Best Practice Standard and 
Handbook for Implementing Genetic Resource Access and Benefit-sharing Activities”, 
Bern; online: http://www.iisd.org/abs/ (accessed 28/02/2011). 
INTERNATIONAL SEED FEDERATION (ISF) (2007): “Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture”; online: http://www.worldseed.org/isf/on_sustainable_agriculture.html, 
(accessed 28/02/2011). 
INTERNATIONAL SEED FEDERATION (ISF) (2008): “ISF Position on Access to Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture”; online: 
http://www.worldseed.org/isf/on_sustainable_agriculture.html, (accessed 28/02/2011). 
KALE, P.; DYER, J.H. & SINGH, H. (2002): “Alliance capability, stock market response, and 
long term alliance success: The role of alliance function”. In: Strategic Management 
Journal Vol. 23: 747–767. 
KATE, K.T., LAIRD, S.A. (1999): "The commercial use of biodiversity", Earthscan Publ., 
London: pp. 398. 
KATE, K.T., LAIRD, S.A. (2000): "Biodiversity and business: coming to terms with the grand 
bargain.” In: International Affairs, Vol. 76 (1): 241-264. 
KATILA, R., MANG, P. (2003): “Exploiting technological opportunities: the timing of 
collaboration”. In: Research Policy, Vol. 32 (2): 317. 
KERSTEN, M. (2004): “Transaktionskosten Aanalytische Untersuchung und Konzeption 
optimaler Managementstrategien für längerfristige Naturschutzprojekte”, Kiel: pp. 282. 
KESTING, P., SMOLINSKI, R. (2007): “When Negotiations Become Routine". In: Negotiation 
Journal: on the progress of dispute settlement, Vol. 23: 419-438. 
KLEINALTENKAMP, M. (1993): "Standardisierung und Marktprozess", Gabler, Wiesbaden: 
276p. 
LAIRD, S.A. (2000): Benefit-sharing „best practice‟ in the pharmaceutical and botanical 
medicine industries. In: Responding to Bioprospecting. Eds. Svarstad, H. and Dhillion, 
S.S., Spartacus Forlag AS, Oslo: p. 89-99. 
References 
 
 
231 
 
  
LAIRD, S. A., WYNBERG, R. (2005): "The Commercial Use of Biodiversity: An update on 
current trends in demand for access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing, and industry 
perspectives on ABS policy and implementation". Prepared for the Convention on 
Biological Diversity‟s ad hoc open-ended working group on access and benefit-sharing, 
Fourth meeting, Granada, Spain, 30 January - 3 February, 2006: 55 p.. 
(UNEP/CBD/WGABS/4/INF/5) 
LAIRD, S., JOHNSTON, S. & WYNBERG, R. (2006): Recent Trends in the Biological Prospecting. 
Contributed to the XXIX Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.  
LAMNEK, S. (2005): Qualitative Sozialforschung, 4. Edition, Beltz Verlag, Weinheim und 
Basel: 808 p. 
LATORRE, F. (2005): "Review of the experiences of implementation by UK stakeholders of 
access and benefit-sharing arrangements under the Convention on Biological Diversity", 
London: 84 p. 
LEWIS-LETTINGTON, R.J., WANYIKI, S. (editors) (2006): “Case Studies on Access and 
Benefit-sharing. International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, Rome, Italy: 178 p. 
LOASBY, B.J. (1998): “The organisation of capabilities”. In: Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization, Vol. 35: 139–160. 
MARTIENSEN, J. (2000): Institutionenökonomik – Die Analyse der Bedeutung von regeln und 
Organisation für die Effizienz ökonomischer Tauschbeziehungen. Verlag Vahlen, 
München: pp. 525. 
MASTEN, S.E. (1993): "Transaction Costs, Mistakes, and Performance". In: Managerial and 
Decision Economics, Special Issue: Transactions Costs Economics: 119-129. 
MASTEN, S.E. (1999): “Contractual Choice”. In: Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1999. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=142934. 
MASTEN S.E., SAUSSIER, S. (2000): “Econometrics of Contracts: An Assessment of 
Development in the Empirical Literature on Contracting”. In: Revue d‟ economie 
industrielle, Vol. 92(92): pp. 215-236.  
MAYRING, P. (2002): “Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung”, 5. Auflage, Beltz 
Verlag, Weinheim und Basel: 180 pp. 
MCDONALD, J.H. (2009): “Handbook of Biological Statistics (2nd ed.)”, Sparky House 
Publishing, Baltimore, Maryland. 
MEULEMAN, M., MANIGART, S., LOCKETT, A. & WRIGHT, M. (2006): “Transaction costs, 
behavioral uncertainty and the formation of interfirm cooperations Syndication in the UK 
private equity market” (Working Paper). 
MILGROM, P., ROBERTS, J. (1995): “Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of 
economic activity”. In: Williamson, O.E., Masten, S. E. (Eds.): Transaction Cost 
Economics. Edward Elgar Publishing: 57-89. 
References 
 
 
232 
 
  
MOORE, G., TIMOWSKY, W. (2005): “Explanatory Guide to the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture”, IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, 
UK: 212 pp. 
MÜHLENKAMP, H. (1999): "Soziale Dienstleistungen aus informationsökonomischer Sicht", 
Inst. für Haushalts- und Konsumökonomik, Stuttgart-Hohenheim. 
NAG, R., HAMBRICK, D. C. AND CHEN, M.-J. (2007): “What is strategic management, really? 
Inductive derivation of a consensus definition of the field.” Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol.28 (9): 935–955. 
NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE (NCI) (1988a): “Letter of Collection”; online:  
http://ttc.nci.nih.gov/forms/ (accessed:  28/02/2011). 
NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE (NCI) (1988b): “Memorandum Of Understanding”; online:  
http://ttc.nci.nih.gov/forms/ (accessed:  28/02/2011). 
NELSEN, R.B. (2001): “Kendall‟s Tau Metric”, in Hazewinkel, Michiel, Encyclopaedia of 
Mathematics, Springer, ISBN 978-1556080104; online: 
http://eom.springer.de/k/k130020.htm (accessed:  28/02/2011). 
NORTH, D. C. (1992): "Institutionen, institutioneller Wandel und Wirtschaftsleistung", Mohr 
Siebeck, Tübingen: 180 pp. 
OECD, WORKING PARTY ON GLOBAL AND STRUCTURAL POLICIES, WORKING GROUP ON 
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF BIODIVERSITY (2003): “Economic Issues in Access and Benefit-
sharing of Genetic Resources - A framework Analysis”, Paris: 58 pp 
PICOT, A., DIETL, H. & FRANCK, E. (2002): “Organisation: eine ökonomische Perspektive”, 
Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag: 471 pp. 
RICHERZHAGEN, C. (2007): “Effectiveness and Perspectives of Access and Benefit-sharing 
Regimes in the Convention on Biological Diversity” (University of Bonn, Institute for 
Food and Resource Economics – Dissertation), Bonn: 272 pp. 
RICHMAN, B., MACHER, J. (2006): “Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical 
Research in the Social Sciences”, Duke Law School Working Paper Series: 83 pp. 
RICHTER, R. & FURUBOTN, E.G. (2003): “Neue Institutionenökonomik: Eine Einführung und 
kritische Würdigung”, 3. Edition, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen: 660 pp. 
RITSON, N. (2008): “Strategic Management”. Neil Ritson & Ventus Publishing ApS: 65pp. 
ROSENTHAL, J. P. (1996): “Equitable sharing of biodiversity benefits: Agreements on genetic 
resources”. International Conference on Incentive Measures for the Conservation and the 
Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity in Cairns”, Australia, 25-28 March 1996. 
SCHIRM, S. A. (2004): Internationale politische Ökonomie: Eine Einführung, 1. Auflage, 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden. 
References 
 
 
233 
 
  
SCHÖNHAGEN, P., WAGNER, H. (2007): “Die Gruppendiskussion: Erschliessung kollektiver 
Erfahrungsräume. Fribourg. 
SHAN, W. (1990):  “An Empirical Analysis of Organizational Strategies by Entrepreneurial 
High-Technology Firms”. In: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 11(2):  129-139. 
SHELANSKI, H. A., KLEIN, P.G. (1995): "Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics". 
In: Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization: 335-361. 
SILVA DA, C. L., SAES, M. S. (2007): „Governance structure and transaction cost: relationship 
between strategy and asset specificity“. In: Nova Economica, Vol. 17(3): 443-468. 
SIMONIN, B.L. (1997): “The importance of collaborative Know-how: An empirical test of the 
learning organization”. In:  Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 40 (5): 1150–1174. 
SUTCLIFFE, M. K.; ZAHEER, A (1998): “Uncertainty in the Transaction Environment: An 
Empirical Test”. In: Strategic Management Journal. 
SONDERFORSCHUNGSGRUPPE INSTITUTIONENANALYSE FH DARMSTADT (2003), 
"Abschlussbericht Implementation von Naturschutz: Naturschutzstandards", Darmstadt. 
SWANSON, T.; GÖSCHL, T. (2000): “Property rights issues involving plant genetic resources: 
implications of ownership for economic efficieny“. In: Ecological Economics, Vol. 32: 
75-92.  
UGALDE, J. C. F. (2007): "The implementation of access and benefit-sharing (ABS) regimes 
for genetic resources". In: European Regional Meeting on an Internationally Recognized 
Certificate of Origin / Source / Legal Provenance Report of an International Workshop 
hosted by the German Federal Agency for Nature Conservation Isle of Vilm, Germany, 
24 - 29 October 2006: 34-38. 
UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY (2003): "User Measures", Tokyo, Japan: 42 pp. online under: 
http://www.ias.unu.edu/sub_page.aspx?catID=111&ddlID=364, retrieved 19.05.2010. 
VISSER, B., EATON, D., LOUWAARS, N. & ENGELS J. (2000): “Transaction cost of germplasm 
exchange under bilateral agreements”, GFAR, online under 
http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/206946/gfar0077.PDF, retrieved 15.06.2011. 
WANG, N. (2002): “Measuring Transaction Costs”, Ronald Coase Institute Working Paper 
Series, online under http://www.coase.org/workingpapers/wp-2.pdf, retrieved 19.05.2010. 
WILBANKS, J.,  BOYLE, J. (2006): “Introduction to Science Commons”; online 
http://sciencecommons.org/about/ (accessed 28/02/2011).  
References 
 
 
234 
 
  
WILLIAMSON, O.E. (1975): “Markets and Hierarchies”. Analysis and Antitrust Implications, 
Free Press, New York: pp. 286. 
- (1979): "Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relations," Journal of 
Law and Economics, Vol. 22 (2): 233-231. 
- (1985): The Economic Institution of Capitalism. The Free Press, New York: 468 pp. 
- (1990): Die ökonomischen Institutionen des Kapitalismus. Unternehmen, Märkte, 
Kooperation. Tübingen. 
- (1991): Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural 
alternatives. In: Administrative Science Quarterly 36 (2), 269–296 
- (1995): “Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations”. In: 
Masten, S., Williamson, O. E. (Eds.): Transaction Cost Economics. Edward Elgar 
Publishing: 233-261. 
- (1996a): The mechanisms of governance, Oxford University Press, New York: 448 pp. 
- (1996b), "Transaction cost economics and the Carnegie connection". In: Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organization, Vol. XX (31): 149-155. 
- (1998): "Transaction Costs Economics: How it Works. Where it is Headed". In: De 
Economist, Vol. 146 (1): 23-58. 
- (2000): "The New Institutional Economics: Tacking Stock, Looking Ahead”. In: Journal 
of Economic Literature, Vol. 38 (3): 595-613. 
- (2002): "Empirical Microeconomics: another perspective". In: Augier, M, March, J. G. 
(Eds.): The Economics of Choice, Change and Organization: Essays in Honour of 
Richard M. Cyert, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK: 419-441. 
- (2003): Examining economic organization through the lens of contract. In: Industrial and 
Corporate Change, Vol. 12(4): 917-942. 
YOUNG, T.R. (2004): "Legal issues Regarding the International Regime: Objectives, Options, 
and Outlook". In: IUCN (Eds.), Environmental Policiy and Law Paper No. 54, Gland, 
Switzerland and Camebridge, UK: 271-293. 
 
 
 
Appendix I - List of Interview Partners 
 
 
235 
 
  
Appendix I - List of Interview Partners 
 
Interview partner Institution 
Belinda Brown Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, 
Government of Australia 
Jane Bulmer IUCN Environmental Law Center, Bonn 
Philip Desmeth Belgian Co-Ordinated Collections of Micro-Organisms 
Juanita Chaves; Selim 
Louafi; Kent Nnadozie 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, Rome 
Dr. Ricardo von Gent German Association of Biotechnology Industries (DIB) 
Dr. Christoph Herrlinger German Plant Breeders‟ Association (BDP) 
Thinh Nguyen Counsel for Science Commons 
Prof. Wilhelm Barthlott University of Bonn, Nees-Institut for Biodiversity of plants 
Prof. Andreas Bechthold University of Freiburg, Professorship of Pharmaceutical Biology 
und Biotechnology, Institute for Pharmaceutical Sciences 
Dr. Reinhard von Broock  KWS Lochow GmbH 
Prof. Dr. Wolf Dieter 
Bluethner 
Firma Chrestensen (Erfurter Samen- und Pflanzenzucht GmbH) 
Dr. Helge Bode Saarland University, Institute for Pharmaceutical Biotechnology 
Dr. Claudio Cerboncini Research Centre Caesar (Centre for Advanced European studies 
and research) 
Dr. Ulf Feuerstein Euro Grass 
Dr. Peter Goertz Suedwestsaat 
Dr. Cristoph Haeuser Natural Museum of Nature Science Stuttgart 
Prof. Juergen Heinze University of Regensburg, Institut for Biology I (Evolution, 
Behaviour and Genetics) 
Dr. Thomas Hurek University of Bremen, Department General Microbiology 
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Dr. Walter an den 
Kerckhoff 
Consultant for Intermed Discovery 
Prof. Gabriele Maria 
Koenig 
University of Bonn, Institute for Pharmaceutical Biology 
Dr. Thomas Koths Bayer 
Dr. Wolfram Lobin University of Bonn, Botanical Gardens 
Lohwasser, Ulrike Leibniz-Institut für Pflanzengenetik und 
Kulturpflanzenforschung (IPK), Abteilung Genbank, 
Forschungsgruppe Ressourcengenetik und Reproduktion, 
Gatersleben 
Dr.Frank Petersen Novartis 
Dr. Manfred Reiffen Boehringer Ingelheim 
Professor Ernst Rühl Forschungsanstalt Geisenheim, Section of Grapevine Breeding 
and Grafting 
Dr. Walter Schmidt KWS Saat AG 
Dr. Nadja Seibel-Thomsen DSM Nutritionals 
Annika Wiekhorst University of Mainz, Biota Project 
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Appendix II: Questions from an online survey with user companies  
(Only questions evaluated in the framework of this dissertation) 
 
(Qa2) In which fields does or did your company use genetic resources? 
Note: Multiple entries possible. 
Pharmacy 
Botanical Medicine 
Personal Care and Cosmetics 
Plant Breeding - Seed 
Plant Breeding - Horticulture 
Biotechnology, other fields than Pharmacy and Plant Breeding 
Others: 
 
(Q3) Factors for the Selection of Supply Sources for Genetic Resources (If possible consider 
the activities of your company over the past 10 years.) 
Answering categories: 1 // 2 // 3 // 4 // 5 // 6 // 7 // I do not know 
1= not important at al ...... 7= very important   
How important are the following aspects? 
1: Short lead and start times 
2: Standardized processes for material aquisition 
3: No negotiations about the terms of trade with the provider 
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(Q4) Please complete the following sentences and assess how important each aspect is for the 
selection of a supply source for genetic resources. 
Answering categories: 1 // 2 // 3 // 4 // 5 // 6 // 7 // I do not know 
1= not important at al ...... 7= very important   
For some projects in our company was or is... 
... access to undiscovered genetic resources as a potential source of innovative products very 
important. 
... access to properties of wild species of certain plants or animals very important. 
... it very important to be able to study genetic resources in the context of their natural habitat. 
... traditional knowledge about effectiveness of natural resources very important 
... exclusive access or exclusive usage rights for genetic resources very important. 
... it very important that the provider could deliver the genetic resource(s) as raw material on a 
intermediate or long-term basis in larger quantities. 
 
(Q5) Which methods of acquiring genetic resources has your company utilized in the past 10 
years? 
Note: Please mark in each line the response that applies. 
Answering categories: never  //  rarely  //  sometimes  //  frequently  //  always  //  maybe 
 Collection of genetic resources in nature 
 Research partners have collected genetic resources in nature 
 Acquisition from official and authorised supplier institutes from the country in which the genetic 
resources appear in their natural habitat 
 Acquisition from international Ex-Situ collections (such as gene banks or microorganism 
collections) 
 Acquisition from commercial brokerage firms 
 Other sources of acquisition: 
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(Q6) How relevant are the following characteristics of institutional frameworks of provider 
countries for your company in determining the selection of a provider country for genetic 
resources?  
(Provider country: simplified term for the country in which the genetic resource can be found in its 
natural habitat.) 
Answering categories: 1 // 2 // 3 // 4 // 5 // 6 // 7 // I do not know 
1= not important at al ...... 7= very important   
 
(a) National regulations for the access and use of genetic resources are in place 
(b) Competent contact partners in the administration are designated and reachable 
(c) Information about the national system for access and use of genetic resources are available 
online 
(d) Information (as defined above) is available in English 
(e) Centrally managed access procedure for genetic resources 
(f) Clear competencies of actors for access negotiations 
(g) A reliable legal system 
(h) When necessary, an official representative facilitates communication with local / indigenous 
groups 
(i) Legal competency of participants in access negotiations 
(j) The provider country can provide information about its biodiversity 
(k) Provider has a concept for resource evaluation  
(l) Scientific competency of participants in access negotiations 
(m) Existence of potential research partners in the provider country 
(n) Self-interest of the government of the provider country to attract foreign companies for 
bioprospecting  
(o) Which other factors do you assess relevant: 
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(Q9) Which strategies does your company use to minimize the transation costs involved in the 
acquisition of genetic resources from provider countries? 
(Transaction costs include the time invested by employees, costs for external expertise, and travel 
costs for initiation, communication, and monitoring measures and renegotiations.) 
Note: Multiple entries possible. 
 We select provider countries with solid institutional frameworks. 
 We rely on previously established relationships. 
 We involve intermediaries. 
 We work with local research partners. 
 Others: 
 
(Q11) Please clarify in detail the field(s) of usage for the project you selected. 
Note: Multiple entries possible. 
 Pharmacy 
 Botanical Medicine 
 Personal Care and Cosmetic 
 Plant breeding- seeds 
 Plant breeding - horticulture 
 Biotechnology, others than Pharmacy and Plant breeding 
 Others: 
 
(Q14) How large is the estimated timeframe from accessing the genetic resources to 
possessing a commercial product or intermediary product or it being evident, that such a 
product cannot be achieved? 
Less than 1 year 
1 year up to 3 years 
More than 3 up to 5 years 
More than 5 up to 7 years 
More than 7 up to 9 years 
More than 9 up to 11 years 
More than 11 years 
I do not know 
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(Q15) With which provider type did your company negotiate access and use for genetic 
resources and related services in order to reach an agreement for this project? 
Note: Multiple entry possible. 
 National or regional authority in the provider country, such as environmental agency or ministry 
 Local authority in the provider country 
 A local group / indigenous community in the provider country 
 National biodiversity institute or equivalent institution that is authorized by the government to 
manage resources and grant access 
 Research institutes in the provider country (such as universities) 
 Others: 
 
(Q18) Approximately how long did the initiation of the agreement take? (in months / years) 
(Initiation includes the timeframe from the initial contact to the first activity of the provider.) 
 
.................................... 
 
(Q19) Please characterize the service / effort of the provider respectively institutions in the 
provider country in this project. 
Note: Multiple entries possible. 
 Collection permission 
 Access to previously inventoried resources in a national collection 
 Information (for example, traditional knowledge) about usage possibilities 
 Exclusive access to genetic resources 
 Provider executes collection activities 
 Preparation of the material 
 Evaluation of samples 
 Participation in advanced research 
 Provider grants exclusive usage rights for certain information 
 Provider grants exclusive research rights for resources in certain application areas 
 Others: 
 
(Q20) Did or will the services of the provider occur once or repeatedly over a longer period of 
time? 
Answering categories: Once // Repeatedly 
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(Q22) This block of questions addresses investments that your company made for the project 
in your company„s home countries. 
(Home countries means business locations that were selected independently of the project or 
previously existed.) 
Answering categories: Yes // No // I do not know 
Has your company invested or is your company investing for the use of genetic resources 
from this project in its home country/ies in ... 
... Buildings (Laboratories, Plants) ? 
... Laboratory equipment or other physical assets ?  
... education / hiring of skilled employees ? 
 
(Q23) Specificity of investments for the utilization of genetic resources (and related inputs) 
made in your companies home countries. 
Can your company„s investments in the home country be otherwise utilized if the project is called off 
before completion? 
Answering categories: 1 // 2 // 3 // 4 // 5 // 6 // 7 // I do not know 
1= only with high financial disadvantages ....... 7= without financial disadvantages 
 
(Q24) This block of questions addresses investments that your company has made for the 
project in the provider country. 
(Provider country: simplified term for the country in which the genetic resource can be found in its 
natural habitat.) 
Answering categories: Yes // No // I do not know 
Has your company invested or is your company investing for the use of genetic resources 
from this project in its home country/ies in ... 
... Buildings (Laboratories, Production Plants) 
... Laboratory equipment or other physical assets 
... Education / hiring of skilled employees 
 
(Q25) Specificity of investments for the utilization of genetic resources (and related inputs) 
made in the provider country? 
Can your company„s investments in the home country be otherwise utilized if the project is called off 
before completion? 
Answering categories: 1 // 2 // 3 // 4 // 5 // 6 // 7 // I do not know 
1= only with high financial disadvantages ....... 7= without financial disadvantages 
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(Q30) Please characterize the level of uncertainty involving the use of genetic resources from 
the project, based on the following statements.  
Answering categories: 1 // 2 // 3 // 4 // 5 // 6 // 7 
1= not correct at all ...... 7 = completely correct 
(a) The utilization process for genetic resources is completely unpredictable at the beginning of the 
project. 
(b) The technology in our field of use changes quickly. 
(c) At the beginning of the utilization process, we are not able to anticipate commercial output at all. 
(d) The genetic resources from the project will be used for research and development of products 
for new /uncertain markets. 
 
(Q31) For what timeframe were mutual requirements made contractually binding with the 
provider? 
Less than 1 year 
1 up to 3 years 
More than 3 up to 5 years 
More than 5 up to 7 years 
More than 7 up to 9 years 
More than 9 up to 11years 
More than 11 up to 13 years 
More than 13 years 
 
 
(Q32) Which of the following two contract types is more applicable to the project? 
The contract is largely negotiated and close to a final version before the start of the project 
A tiered contract that is further developed and modified or replaced by additional contracts during the 
course of the project 
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(Q33) Which conflict resolution mechanism was established for the project? 
Note: Multiple entries possible. 
 Exact description of the mutual activities (for example, schedule, delivery quantities, prices, 
height of compensation payments) in the contract 
 Judicial authority 
 Arbitration with the assistance of an independent third party 
 Internal conflict resolution mechanism, harmonization of interests 
 Others: 
 
(Q35) Which form of monetary compensation does the provider receive from your company 
within the framework of the project? 
Note: Multiple entries possible. 
 No, the provider does not receive any monetary benefits. 
 Weight-related or hourly-wage compensation 
 Negotiated advance payments (lump sum) 
 Negotiated payments that are made after reaching certain steps in the usage process (milestone 
payments) 
 Payments tied to commercial output (e.g. royalties) 
 Output-related payments that are negotiated over the course of the project, for example, when 
certain operational steps are reached 
 The contract contains clauses for ex post negotiation of compensation in the case that the 
framework changes 
 
(Q36) Does your company also provide non-monetary benefit-transfer to the provider within the 
framework of the project? 
Note: Multiple entries possible. 
 No 
 Yes, joint intellectual property rights to usage results 
 Yes, joint publication in scientific journals 
 Yes, support of inventory / taxonomy of Biodiversity 
 Yes, technology transfer 
 Yes, transfer of know-how in the scientific field 
 Yes, support of infrastructure measures 
 Yes, transfer of know-how in the field of sustainable use / cultivation of genetic resources 
 Yes, support of other measures to preserve biodiversity 
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(Q37) What synergy effects (can) result for your company from non-monetary benefit transfers 
within the framework of the project? 
Answering categories: 1 // 2 // 3 // 4 // 5 // 6 // 7 
1= not correct at all ...... 7 = completely correct 
(a) Providers will be better positioned to provide the desired activity (for example, quality / continuity 
of material supply). 
(b) Local scientists will be able to conduct initial on-site evaluations of genetic resources, which will 
reduce costs for us in the long run. 
(c) Capacity building increases trust and facilitates communication with the providers. 
(d) Capacity building is the prerequisite so that scientific cooperation is possible. 
(e) Capacity building ensures the conservation and the long-term availability of genetic resources. 
(f) Capacity building is a fundamental requirement of the provider. 
(g) Others: 
 
(Q38) How would you most closely describe the type of agreement between your company and 
the provider? 
We purchase genetic resources and possibly additional goods and services from the provider. 
We carry out a scientific cooperation project with institutions in the provider country and receive 
access to genetic resources within this framework. 
Our company participates in the provision process through considerable capacity building activities in 
the provider country. 
 
(Q40) How would you assess your company‟s (anticipated) effort for the initiation of the 
agreement, ongoing communication with the provider, renegotiations, as well as monitoring 
measures in this project? 
Note: effort includes working hours, travel costs, and costs for external expertise. 
Answering categories: 1 // 2 // 3 // 4 // 5 // 6 // 7 
1= not correct at all ...... 7 = completely correct 
(a) The effort level is low in comparison to other cost components of the project. 
(b) The effort level is acceptable in comparison to the value of the resources and related services 
acquired in the framework of the project. 
(c) Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult. 
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(Q41) How much experience does your company have in executing complex projects? 
Answering categories: 1 // 2 // 3 // 4 // 5 // 6 // 7 
1= not correct at all ...... 7 = completely correct 
(a) Our company has a high capacity to execute long-term, complex projects. 
(b) Our company already has experience in the past of executing complex long-term projects. 
(c) Our company is experienced in projects with partners from developing or newly industrializing 
countries. 
 
(Q45) The number of employees in your company in 2008 
Under 10 
10 up to 50 
Above 50 up to 250 
Above 250 up to 500 
Above 500 up to 1.000 
Above 1.000 up to 10.000 
Above 10.000 
No statement possible 
 
 
(Q46) Company turnover in the year 2008 
Note: in Million Euro (in Million US Dollar) 
Euro under 2 (US Dollar: under 3) 
Euro: 2 up to 10 (US Dollar: 3 up to 15) 
Euro: above 10 up to 50 (US Dollar: above 15 up to 74) 
Euro: above 50 up to 250 (US Dollar: above 74 up to 370) 
Euro: above 250 up to 1.000 (US Dollar: above 370 up to 1,500) 
Euro: above 1.000 up to 5.000 (US Dollar: above 1,500 up to 7,400) 
Euro: above 5.000 (US Dollar: above 7,400) 
No statement possible 
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(Q48) R&D Budget of your company 
Note: in Mio Euro (in Mio US Dollar); approximate average between 2004 and 2008 
Euro: Under 1 (US Dollar: under 1.5) 
Euro: 1 up to 10 (US Dollar: 1.5 up to 15) 
Euro: above 10 up to 50 (US Dollar: above 15 up to 74) 
Euro: above 50 up to 100 (US Dollar: above 74 up to 150) 
Euro: above 100 up to 250 (US Dollar: above 150 up to 370) 
Euro: above 250 up to 500 (US Dollar: above 370 up to 740) 
Euro: Above 500 (US Dollar: above 740) 
No statement possible 
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Appendix IV: Additional evaluations of the online survey with user companies 
Table A 1: Elements for inclusion in an ABS-agreement suggested by Bonn Guidelines and the Swiss ABS 
management tool 
ABS management tool Bonn Guidelines 
• Recitals 
• Definitions 
• Source and Amounts 
• Uses 
• Licences 
• Price/Benefits 
• Right to Patent/Protection 
of IPRs 
• Exclusivity 
• Copyrights 
• Trademarks 
• Trade Secrets 
• Contractual Protection 
• Dispute Resolution 
• No Liability 
• No Warranty 
• Authorization 
• Confidential Information 
• Publications 
• Indemnification 
• Standards of Conduct 
• Accounting and Records 
 
Introductory provisions … 
Access and benefit-sharing provisions 
• Description of genetic resources covered by the material transfer agreements, 
including accompanying information 
• Permitted uses, bearing in mind the potential uses, of the genetic resources, their 
products or derivatives under the material transfer agreement (e.g. research, 
breeding, commercialization) 
• Statement that any change of use would require new prior informed consent and 
material transfer agreement 
• Whether intellectual property rights may be sought and if so under what conditions 
• Terms of benefit-sharing arrangements, including commitment to share monetary 
and non-monetary benefits 
• No warranties guaranteed by provider on identity and/or quality of the provided 
material 
• Whether the genetic resources and/or accompanying information may be 
transferred to third parties and if so conditions that should apply 
• Definitions 
• Duty to minimize environmental impacts of collecting activities 
Legal provisions 
• Obligation to comply with the material transfer agreement 
• Duration of agreement 
• Notice to terminate the agreement 
• Fact that the obligations in certain clauses survive the termination of the 
agreement 
• Independent enforceability of individual clauses in the agreement 
• Events limiting the liability of either party (such as act of God, fire, flood, etc.) 
• Dispute settlement arrangements 
• Assignment or transfer of rights 
• Assignment, transfer or exclusion of the right to claim any property rights, including 
intellectual property rights, over the genetic resources received through the 
material transfer agreement 
• Choice of law 
• Confidentiality clause 
• Guarantee 
Source: Author based on IISD and State Secretariat for Economic Affairs 2007: 24-29, and CBD 2002:  17-20.  
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Table A 2: Crosstabulation: Number of employees in differentiated by companies’ fields of utilisation 
N: 35 Number of employees in the year 2008 
Fields of utilisation selected by the 
respondents 
< 10 10 - 50 
> 50 - 
250 
> 250 - 
500 
> 500 - 
1,000 
> 1,000 - 
10,000 
Above 
10,000 
Pharmacy and more than one application 
field including Pharmacy 
2 0 0 2 2 1 0 
Botanical Medicine; Cosmetics and Personal 
Care 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Plant Breeding (Seed & Horticulture) 4 4 8 1 2 0 0 
Biotechnology, other fields than Pharmacy 
and Plant Breeding 
2 1 0 0 0 2 1 
Biocontrole Agents 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
All 8 6 8 3 6 3 1 
Source: Author.  
Table A 3: Crosstabulation: Companies’ turnover in fields of utilisation 
N: 30 
Turnover in Million Euro (€) and US Dollar ($) 
(numbers refer to the year 2008) 
Fields of utilisation 
€ < 2  2-10 
> 10-
50 
> 50-
250 
> 250-
1,000       
> 1.000-
5,000 
> 5,000 
$ < 3 3-15 
> 15-
74 
 >74-
370 
< 370-
1,500 
> 1,500-
7,400 
> 7,400 
Pharmacy and more than one application field 
including Pharmacy 
2 0 1 2 0 0 0 
Botanical Medicine; Cosmetics and Personal 
Care 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Plant Breeding (Seed & Horticulture) 5 5 7 1 0 0 0 
Biotechnology, other fields than Pharmacy 
and Plant Breeding 
2 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Biocontrole Agents 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
All 9 6 8 5 0 1 1 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 4: Crosstabulation: R&D budget differentiated by companies’ fields of utilisation 
N: 29 R&D budget in Million Euro (€) or US Dollar ($) (average 2004 to 2008) 
Fields of utilisation 
€ <1 1-10 >10-50 >50-100 >100-250 >250-500 >500 
$ <1.5 1.5-15 >15-74 >74-150 >150-370 >370-740 >740 
Pharmacy and more than one application field 
including Pharmacy 
2 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Botanical Medicine; Cosmetics & Personal Care 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Plant Breeding (Seed & Horticulture) 9 6 1 1 0 0 0 
Biotechnology, other fields than Pharmacy and 
Plant Breeding 
3 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Biocontrole Agents 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
All 14 9 2 1 2 0 1 
Source: Author. 
Table A 5: Frequency table: The transactional environment in the sample cases 
How would you assess the institutional 
framework in the provider country from which 
you receive resources for this case? 
1= very bad ...  7= very good 
all 
Cum. 
freq. 
cat. 1-3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Availability of information about the national system 
for access and use of genetic resources 
1 7 7 6 3 5 1 30 50% 
Competent contact partner in the administration is 
designated and reachable 
2 5 6 4 5 5 3 30 43% 
Centrally managed access procedure for GRs 2 12 2 3 3 6 1 29 55% 
Clear competencies of actors for access 
negotiations 
1 9 4 4 3 4 1 26 54% 
Legal competency of actors involved in negotiations 2 10 1 4 2 2 2 23 57% 
Provider has a concept for resource evaluation 1 2 6 6 8 3 5 31 29% 
Scientific competency of participants in access 
negotiations 
0 2 4 2 9 9 3 29 21% 
Existence of potential research partners in the 
provider country 
0 1 5 3 9 6 5 29 21% 
A reliable legal system 0 3 4 9 3 5 2 26 27% 
Self-interest of the government of the provider 
country in the execution of the project 
4 4 3 4 0 3 4 22 50% 
Source: Author. 
 
Appendix IV: Additional evaluations of the online survey with user companies       
 
 
251 
 
  
 
Source: Author. 
Figure A 1: Scree plot Factor analysis for transaction environment 
Table A 6: Factor Analysis Transaction Environment (case specific part): Total variance explained 
  
Component 
  
Initial Eigenvalues
a
 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cum. % Total % of Var. Cum. % Total % of Var. Cum. % 
Raw 1 14,466 52,605 52,605 14,466 52,605 52,605 7,879 28,652 28,652 
2 5,168 18,792 71,397 5,168 18,792 71,397 6,574 23,907 52,559 
3 2,814 10,231 81,628 2,814 10,231 81,628 5,358 19,484 72,042 
4 2,007 7,299 88,927 2,007 7,299 88,927 3,016 10,967 83,010 
5 1,102 4,008 92,935 1,102 4,008 92,935 2,729 9,925 92,935 
6 ,731 2,659 95,594             
7 ,680 2,474 98,068             
8 ,401 1,457 99,525             
9 ,077 ,280 99,805             
10 ,054 ,195 100,000             
Rescaled 1 14,466 52,605 52,605 5,017 50,174 50,174 3,346 33,459 33,459 
2 5,168 18,792 71,397 2,146 21,465 71,638 1,903 19,027 52,486 
3 2,814 10,231 81,628 ,968 9,678 81,316 1,588 15,877 68,364 
4 2,007 7,299 88,927 ,647 6,470 87,786 1,385 13,846 82,210 
5 1,102 4,008 92,935 ,359 3,592 91,378 ,917 9,169 91,378 
6 ,731 2,659 95,594             
7 ,680 2,474 98,068             
8 ,401 1,457 99,525             
9 ,077 ,280 99,805             
10 ,054 ,195 100,000             
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
a. When analyzing a covariance matrix, the initial eigenvalues are the same across the raw and rescaled solution. 
Source: Author. 
Eigenvalue 1 
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Table A 7: Frequency table: Differentiation of demand in ABS agreements 
Please complete the following sentences and assess how important each aspect is for the selection of 
a supply source for genetic resources. 
For some projects in our company was or is... 
1= not important at all ... 7= very important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 all 
1: ... access to undiscovered genetic resources (GRs) as 
a potential source of innovative products very important. 
2 9 3 5 6 12 20 57 
2: ... access to properties of wild species of certain 
plants or animals very important.    
6 4 4 5 5 13 19 56 
3: ... it very important to be able to study GRs in the 
context of their natural habitat. 
12 10 9 6 8 6 7 58 
4: ... traditional knowledge about effectiveness of natural 
resources very important    
17 7 5 6 3 10 10 58 
5: ... exclusive access or exclusive usage rights for 
genetic resources very important. 
13 11 3 4 4 11 10 56 
6: ... it very important that the provider could deliver the 
GR(s) as raw material on an intermediate or long term 
basis in larger quantities. 
21 4 2 4 9 6 8 54 
Source: Author. 
Table A 8: Frequency table: Provider contribution in reference projects 
Frequency multiple response provider contribution  Frequency Valid percentage 
one service item 13 31 
2 service items 10 23,8 
3 service items 10 23,8 
4 service items 3 7,1 
5 service items 5 11,9 
7 service items 1 2,4 
Total 42 100 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 9: Crosstabulation: for certain provider-contribution items (Mann-Whitney U differentiating 
cases with and without the respective provider contribution item) 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Provider executes collection activities  
Exact Significance (2 sided): .034 no yes Total 
The provider grants some kind of exclusivity rights in 
connection with genetic resources 
no 28 6 34 
yes 4 5 9 
Fisher‟s Exact Test  Participation in advanced research   
Exact Significance (2 sided): .073  no yes Total 
The provider grants some kind of exclusivity rights in 
connection with genetic resources 
no 29 5 34 
yes 5 4 9 
Fisher‟s Exact Test 
 
Preparation of the material  
Exact Significance (2 sided): .005 
 
no yes Total 
Provider executes collection activities  
no 27 5 32 
yes 4 7 11 
Fisher‟s Exact Test 
 
Participation in advanced research   
Exact Significance (2 sided):  .034 
 
no yes Total 
Provider executes collection activities  
no 28 4 32 
yes 6 5 11 
Fisher‟s Exact Test  Participation in advanced research   
Exact Significance (2 sided): .014  no yes Total 
Evaluation of samples    
no 
27 3 30 
yes 
7 6 13 
Source: Author. 
Table A 10: Frequency table on synergy effects of non-monetary benefit-sharing  
What synergy effects (can) result for your company from 
non-monetary benefit transfers in the project? 
1= Not correct at all ... 7= Completely correct 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 all 
1: Providers will be better positioned to provide the desired 
activity, for example, quality / continuity of material supply. 
0 2 3 4 0 7 3 19 
2: Local scientists will be able to conduct initial on-site 
evaluations of genetic resources, which will reduce costs 
for us in the long run. 
0 1 3 5 3 4 3 19 
3: Capacity building ensures the conservation and the 
long-term availability of genetic resources.  
1 1 3 3 1 5 4 18 
4: …is a prerequisite so that scientific cooperation is 
possible.    
2 3 5 2 3 1 3 19 
5: … increases trust and facilitates communication with the 
providers.  
1 0 0 3 3 4 7 18 
6: … is a fundamental requirement of the provider.  3 6 2 4 1 0 2 18 
Source: Author. 
Appendix IV: Additional evaluations of the online survey with user companies       
 
 
254 
 
  
Table A 11: Frequency table: companies specific investments for projects with genetic resources  
Has your company invested or is your company 
investing for the use of genetic resources from this 
project in ... 
Yes No 
I do not 
know 
Number of 
valid 
entries 
yes in 
valid % 
-  its home country/ies a 
... for buildings (Laboratories, Plants) 9 25 3 37 24% 
... for laboratory equipment or other physical assets    19 20 2 41 46% 
... for education / hiring of skilled employees  21 17 2 40 53% 
Number of cases with “yes” entry for at least one item: 26 
- the provider country b 
... for laboratory equipment or other physical assets    11 29 1 41 27% 
... for education / hiring of skilled employees 16 23 2 41 39% 
Number of cases with “yes” entry for at least one item: 18 
a Home countries means business locations that were selected independently of the project or existed previously. 
b Provider country: simplified term for the country in which the genetic resource can be found in its natural 
habitat. 
Source: Author. 
Table A 12: Degree of asset specificity for R&D-projects with genetic resources 
1= only with high financial disadvantages  ...   
7= without financial disadvantages 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 All 
Can your companies‟ investments in the home country be 
otherwise utilised if the project is called off before completion? 
4 2 4 6 1 2 6 25 
Can your companies‟ investments in the provider country be 
otherwise utilised if the project is called off before completion? 
5 3 1 0 2 0 5 16 
Aggregated: Can your companies‟ investments in the home 
country and/or the provider country be otherwise utilised if the 
project is called off before completion? 
7 4 4 3 1 1 7 27 
These questions were filtered, and only answered by participants that beforehand indicated their 
company invested/ invests in the framework of the project. 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 13: Frequency table: Asset specificity, aggregated in one variable, reverse scale 
In the framework of the reference project the 
company‟s investments can be reutilised in case the 
project is called off before completion… 
1= without financial disadvantages (we made no 
investments)    …                                                                    
7= only with high financial disadvantages   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 All 
21 1 1 3 4 4 7 41 
Source: Author. 
Table A 14: Frequency table: Type of contract chosen to govern the project 
 Frequency 
The contract is largely negotiated and close to a final version before the start of the project 17 
Tiered contract that is further developed, modified, or replaced  during the course of the project 17 
Source: Author. 
Table A 15: Frequency table: Timeframe of contracts for bioprospecting projects 
For what timeframe were mutual requirements made contractually 
binding with the provider? 
frequency 
Percentage of valid 
entries 
Less than 1 year 9 23% 
1 up to 3 years 13 33% 
More than 3 up to 5 years 6 15% 
More than 5 up to 7 years 4 10% 
More than 7 up to 9 years 1 3% 
More than 9 up to 11years 1 3% 
More than 11 up to 13 years 1 3% 
More than 13 years 4 10% 
All 39  
Source: Author. 
Table A 16: Frequency Table: Stipulation of conflict resolution measures 
 
Yes No All 
Affirmation in % of 
valid entries  
Exact description of the mutual activities (for example, schedule, 
delivery quantities, prices, height of compensation) in contract 18 20 38 47% 
Judicial authority   7 31 38 18% 
Arbitration with assistance of independent third party    12 26 38 32% 
Internal conflict resolution mechanism, harmonization of interests   17 21 38 45% 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 17: Correlation initiation time and company size 
Proxy for company size Kendall- Tau-c   Approximate significance N 
Number of employees in the year 2008 .185 .244 24 
Turnover in the year 2008 .054 .742 21 
R&D budget (average between 2004 and 2008) .208 .0108 24 
Source: Author‟s. 
Table A 18: Correlation transaction costs and company size 
Proxy for company 
size (aggregated in 5 
categories) Transaction costs variables (aggregated in 5 categories) 
Kendall‟s 
Tau-b   
Approx. 
Sig. 
Number of employees 
in the year 2008 (N: 
30) 
The effort level is low in comparison to other cost components 
of the project.   
-.211 .0102 
The effort level is acceptable in comparison to the value of the 
resources and related services acquired in the framework 
-.176 .233 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult. -.396 .004 
Turnover in the year 
2008 (N: 30) 
The effort level is low in comparison to other cost components 
of the project.   
-.007 .961 
The effort level is acceptable in comparison to the value of the 
resources and related services acquired in the framework 
-.030 .845 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult. -.014 .926 
R&D budget (average 
between 2004 and 
2008) (N: 27) 
The effort level is low in comparison to other cost components 
of the project.   
.192 .178 
The effort level is acceptable in comparison to the value of the 
resources and related services acquired in the framework 
.307 .035 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult. .369 .015 
Source: Author‟s. 
Table A 19: Mann-Whitney U test for company size with sample differentiation according to provider 
contribution (only significant results) 
R&D budget * provider executes collection activities 
Mean Rank group (a): 16.13 
(provider contribution not 
indicated) 
Mean Rank group (b): 22.09 
(provider contribution 
indicated): Mann-Whitney U: 49.5 Asymp. Sig: .069 
R&D budget * Preparation of material 
Mean Rank group a: 13.23 Mean Rank group b: 18.94 Mann-Whitney U: 54.5 Asymp. Sig: .071 
R&D budget * Participation in advanced research 
Mean Rank group a: 13.17 Mean Rank group b: 19.81 Mann-Whitney U: 45.5 Asymp. Sig: .043 
Number of employees * Participation in advanced research 
Mean Rank group a: 15.73 Mean Rank group b: 24.56 Mann-Whitney U: 58 Asymp. Sig: .023 
Source: Author‟s. 
Appendix IV: Additional evaluations of the online survey with user companies       
 
 
257 
 
  
Table A 20: Correlation between transaction cost and users’ indirect capacities 
Transaction cost * users‟ indirect capacities (both variables aggregated 
in 5 categories) Kendall‟s-Tau-b Approx. Sig. N 
The effort level is acceptable in comparison to the value of the resources & related services * 
Our company has high capacity to execute long-term, complex projects. .1 .426 29 
Our company has experience of executing complex long-term projects. .1 .574 29 
Our company is experienced in projects with partners from developing or 
newly industrializing countries 
-.1 .547 28 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult. * 
Our company has high capacity to execute long-term, complex projects. -.09 .535 26 
Our company has experience of executing complex long-term projects. -.03 .819 27 
Our company is experienced in projects with partners from developing or 
newly industrializing countries 
.1 .327 27 
Source: Author. 
Table A 21: Correlation between initiation time and users’ indirect capacities 
Proxy for company size Kendall- Tau-c   Approx. Sig. N 
Our company has a high capacity to execute long-term, 
complex projects 
-.156 .402 23 
Our company already has experience in the past of executing 
complex long-term projects 
-.190 .247 24 
Our company is experienced in projects with partners from 
developing or newly industrializing countries 
-.190 .274 24 
Source: Author‟s. 
Table A 22: Mann-Whitney U test for transaction costs with sample differentiation by provider type 
National, regional and, or local governmental administration entity versus other provider types * 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult. Mann-Whitney U: 54 Asymp. Sig: .057 
Local research institute is involved as provider * 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult. Mann-Whitney U: 76 Asymp. Sig: .341 
Source: Author. 
Table A 23: Mann-Whitney U test for initiation time with sample differentiation by provider type 
National, regional and/ or local governmental administration entity versus other provider types * 
initiation time 
Mean Rank group a:18.14 Mean Rank group b: 11.16 Mann-Whitney U: 42.5 Asymp. Sig: .018 
Local research institute is involved as provider * initiation time 
Mean Rank group a: 14.19 Mean Rank group b: 13.73 Mann-Whitney U: 85 Asymp. Sig: .876 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 24: Correlation between transaction costs and transactional environment 
Transaction cost-variable aggregated in 5 factors Kendall‟s Tau-c Approx. Sig. N 
* Factor 1 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult .-147 .276 17 
* Factor 2 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult .061 .767 17 
* Factor 3 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult -.216 .339 17 
* Factor 4 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult .009 .962 17 
* Factor 5 (individual item!) 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult -.493 .012 17 
Source: Author. 
Table A 25: Correlation between transaction environment and initiation time 
Initiation time  * transactional environment 
(Initiation time aggregated in 5 categories) Kendall‟s Tau-c Approx. Sig. N 
Initiation time * Factor 1 -.083 .674 15 
Initiation time * Factor 2    
Initiation time * Factor 3 .201 .41 15 
Initiation time * Factor 4 -.273 .167 15 
Initiation time * Factor 5 (individual item!) -.154 .572 15 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 26: Correlation between transaction costs and transactional environment (individual items) 
Transaction costs * transaction environment Kendall‟s Tau-b Approx. Sig. N 
Availability of information about the national system for access and use of genetic resources * 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult -.365 .001 26 
Competent contact partner in the administration is designated and reachable * 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult -.126 .301 26 
Centrally managed access procedure for GRs * 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult -.308 .024 26 
Clear competencies of actors for access negotiations * 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult -.258 .077 23 
Legal competency of actors involved in negotiations * 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult -.099 .522 21 
Provider has a concept for resource evaluation * 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult -.038 .771 27 
Scientific competency of participants in access negotiations * 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult -.129 .297 26 
Existence of potential research partners in the provider country * 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult -.097 .449 26 
A reliable legal system *  
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult -.191 .153 24 
Self-interest of the government of the provider country in the execution of the project * 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult -.098 .567 21 
Source: Author. 
Table A 27: Correlation between initiation time and transaction environment (individual items) 
Initiation time *  Kendall‟s Tau-c Approx. Sig. N 
Availability of information about the national system for access and 
use of genetic resources -.231 .220 22 
Competent contact partner in the administration is designated and 
reachable -.253 .228 22 
Centrally managed access procedure for GRs -.294 .119 22 
Clear competencies of actors for access negotiations -.242 .140 21 
Legal competency of actors involved in negotiations .104 .602 18 
Provider has a concept for resource evaluation -.167 .280 23 
Scientific competency of participants in access negotiations -.249 .098 23 
Existence of potential research partners in the provider country -.309 .043 22 
A reliable legal system -.226 .133 20 
Self-interest of the government of the provider country in the 
execution of the project -.028 .834 17 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 28: Correlation between transaction costs and primary uncertainty 
 
Without correction 
for asset specificity 
With correction for 
asset specificity 
Transaction costs * primary uncertainty 
Kendall‟
s Tau-b 
Approx. 
Sig. N 
Kendall‟
s Tau-b 
Approx. 
Sig. N 
Negotiations are / were tedious and difficult * 
The utilisation process for genetic resources is completely 
unpredictable at the beginning of the project.   
.098 .517 28 -.291 .236 12 
At the beginning of the utilisation process, we are not able to 
anticipate commercial output at all.    
.167 .282 28 -.071 .766 12 
The technology in our field of use changes quickly. .086 .633 27 -.386 .111 12 
The genetic resources from the project will be used for 
research and development of products for new / uncertain 
markets 
.147 .387 28 -.017 .948 12 
Source: Author. 
Table A 29: Correlation between primary uncertainty and initiation time 
 
Without correction for 
asset specificity 
With correction for 
asset specificity 
Proxies for primary uncertainty * initiation time of 
bioprospecting projects 
Kendall- 
Tau-c   
Approx. 
Sig. 
N 
Kendall- 
Tau-c   
Approx
. Sig. 
N 
The utilisation process for genetic resources is completely 
unpredictable at the beginning of the project.   
-.051 .734 26 .204 .412 12 
At the beginning of the utilisation process, we are not able to 
anticipate commercial output at all.    
.071 .694 26 -.185 .531 12 
The technology in our field of use changes quickly. .119 .511 25 -.074 .780 12 
The genetic resources from the project will be used for 
research and development of products for new / uncertain 
markets 
.016 .922 26 .-039 .865 12 
Source: Author‟s. 
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Table A 30: Crosstabulation and Mann-Whitney U test differentiating for contract type and combined 
with primary uncertainty 
 1= not correct at all ...... 7 = completely correct 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 All 
Cum. 
frequency cat. 
5 to 7 
Contract type 
At the beginning of the utilisation process, we are not able to 
anticipate commercial output at all. 
Comprehensive contracts right from 
the start of the project 
0 3 2 0 0 7 5 17 71% 
A tiered contract that is further 
developed, modified, or replaced 
during the course of the project 
2 2 0 5 5 2 1 17 47% 
Mann-Whitney U: 84.5 Asymp. Sig.: .036 N: 34 
Contract type The technology in our field of use changes quickly. 
Comprehensive contract  2 2 0 1 4 5 3 17 71% 
Tiered contract  2 6 0 3 1 2 1 15 27% 
Mann-Whitney U: 79 Asymp. Sig.: .062 N: 32 
Contracting approach 
* The genetic resources from the project will be used for research and 
development of products for new / uncertain markets 
Mann-Whitney U:  
125.5 
Approx. 
Sig:  .699 
* The utilisation process for genetic resources is completely unpredictable 
at the beginning of the project.   
Mann-Whitney U:  
119.5 
Approx. 
Sig:  .381 
Source: Author 
Table A 31: Mann-Whitney U test differentiating for contract type and combined with asset specificity 
Contracting approach * Asset specificity (seven-point scale) Mann-Whitney U:  119.5 Approx. Sig:  .530 
Source: Author. 
Table A 32: Contract type combined with users’ indirect capacities 
Contracting approach 
* Our company has a high capacity 
to execute long-term, complex 
projects  
Mann-Whitney U:  113.5 Asymp. Sig.:  .791 
* Our company already has 
experience in the past of executing 
complex long-term projects. 
Mann-Whitney U:  119 Asymp. Sig.:  .968 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 33: Mann-Whitney U test differentiating between two contract types combined with company size 
Contracting approach 
Number of employees Mann-Whitney U: 89.5 Asymp. Sig:  .257  
Companies turnover Mann-Whitney U: 67 Asymp. Sig:  .231 
R&D Budget in  Mann-Whitney U:  56 Asymp. Sig:  .118 
Source: Author. 
Table A 34: Crosstabulation and correlations: Synergy effects in combination with contract duration 
 
1= not all important  …  5= important 
1 2 3 4 5 all 
Cum. frequency 
category  4 & 5 
Contract duration 
Providers will be better positioned to provide the desired activity 
(e.g. quality / continuity of material supply) 
less than 1 year 0 0 1 0 0 1 0% 
one year up to 5 years 0 5 1 3 0 9 33% 
over 5 years up to 9 years 0 0 1 2 2 5 80% 
over 9 years up 13 years 0 0 1 2 0 3 67% 
over 13 years 0 0 0 0 1 1 100% 
Kendall‟s Tau C: 0.4 Approx. significance level: 0.000 N: 19 
 Capacity building increases trust and facilitates communication with 
the providers 
less than 1 year 0 0 1 0 0 1 0% 
one year up to 5 years 1 0 2 4 1 8 63% 
over 5 years up to 9 years 0 0 0 2 3 5 100% 
over 9 years up 13 years 0 0 0 1 2 3 100% 
over 13 years 0 0 0 0 1 1 100% 
Kendall‟s Tau C: 0.5 Approx. significance level: 0.000 N: 18 
Source: Author. 
Table A 35: Correlation test: Contract duration and asset specificity  
Contract duration (eight categories) 
* Asset Specificity (seven-point scale) Kendall‟s Tau C:  .133 Approx. Sig.:  .285 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 36: Correlation test: Contract duration and demand uncertainty  
Contract Duration 
* The genetic resources from the project will be used for research 
and development of products for new / uncertain markets 
Kendall‟s Tau C:  .112 
Approx. Sig.: 
.339 
Source: Author. 
Table A 37: Benefit-sharing measures  
N: 38 Frequency Valid percentage 
Either monetary or non-monetary 
11(9 only monetary ; 2 
only non-monetary) 29% 
Monetary and non-monetary 17 45% 
No benefit-sharing at all 10 26% 
Number of Monetary benefit-sharing measures   
One  15 39,5 
Two  6 15,8 
Three  3 7,9 
Four  2 5,3 
None 12 31,6% 
Number of non-monetary benefit-sharing items   
One  19 25% 
Two  6 8% 
Three  3 4% 
Four and more than four 9 60% 
None 1 3% 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 38: Crosstabulation and Fisher’s Exact test for monetary benefit-sharing in combination with 
provider contribution  
Information (for example, traditional knowledge) about usage possibilities * No Yes 
Weight-related, or hourly-wage compensation No 20 10 
Yes 8 0 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2-sided): .082 
Preparation of the material * No Yes 
Weight-related, or hourly-wage compensation No 25 5 
Yes 2 6 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2-sided): .004 
The provider grants some kind of exclusivity rights in connection with genetic 
resources* 
No Yes 
Negotiated advance payments (lump sum) No 25 5 
Yes 4 4 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2-sided): .071 
 Evaluation of samples   * No Yes 
Negotiated advance payments (lump sum) No 23 7 
Yes 3 5 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2-sided): .081 
Collection permission  * No Yes 
Negotiated advance payments (lump sum) No 22 8 
Yes 2 6 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2-sided): .034 
Preparation of the material * No Yes 
Some kind of ex-ante determined fix payments No 20 4 
Yes 7 7 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2-sided): .061 
The provider grants some kind of exclusivity rights in connection with genetic 
resources * 
No Yes 
Negotiated payments that are made after reaching certain 
steps in the usage process (milestone payments) 
No 25 5 
Yes 4 4 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2-sided):  .071 
Participation in advanced research * No Yes 
Milestone payments No 25 5 
Yes 4 4 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2-sided): .071 
The provider grants some kind of exclusivity rights in connection with genetic 
resources* 
No Yes 
Payments tied to commercial output (e.g. royalties) No 24 4 
Yes 5 5 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2-sided): .036 
The provider grants some kind of exclusivity rights in connection with genetic 
resources * 
No Yes 
Milestone payments, and / or royalties No 22 1 
Yes 7 8 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2-sided):  .001 
Source: Author. 
Table A 39: Mann-Whitney U test differentiating for the application of monetary benefit-sharing 
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measures in combination with duration of utilisation process  
Utilisation Duration 
* Weight-related, or hourly-wage 
compensation 
Mann-Whitney U:  77.5 Asymp. Sig.:  .331 
* Negotiated advance payments 
(lump sum) 
Mann-Whitney U: 57.5  Asymp. Sig.:  .259 
* Milestone payments Mann-Whitney U:  89 Asymp. Sig.:  .634 
* Payments tied to commercial 
output (e.g. royalties) 
Mann-Whitney U: 71.5  Asymp. Sig.:  .218 
* Milestone payments, and / or 
royalties 
Mann-Whitney U:  98 Asymp. Sig.:  .225 
* Output-related payments that are 
negotiated over the course of the 
project 
Mann-Whitney U:  17 Asymp. Sig.:  .071 
* The contract contains clauses for 
ex post negotiations in case that the 
framework changes  
Mann-Whitney U:  57.5 Asymp. Sig.:  .518 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 40: Fisher’s Exact test: non-monetary benefit-sharing in combination with provider contribution 
Participation in advanced research * No Yes 
Joint publication in scientific journals 
 
No 22 3 
Yes 7 6 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2 sided): .040 
Some kind of exclusivity rights related to genetic resources * No Yes 
Technology transfer 
 
No 24 2 
Yes 5 7 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2 sided): .002 
Participation in advanced research * No Yes 
Technology transfer 
 
No 23 3 
Yes 6 6 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2 sided): .016 
Participation in advanced research No Yes 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific field   
 
No 23 1 
Yes 10 4 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2 sided): .052 
Provider carries out collection activities * No Yes 
Support of inventory / taxonomy of Biodiversity   
 
No 25 5 
Yes 2 6 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2 sided): .004 
Preparation of material * No Yes 
Support of inventory / taxonomy of Biodiversity 
 
No 24 6 
Yes 3 5 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2 sided): .031 
Some kind of exclusivity rights related to genetic resources * No Yes 
Joint intellectual property rights to usage results   
 
No 29 5 
Yes 0 4 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2 sided): .002 
Some kind of exclusivity rights related to genetic resources * No Yes 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific field   
 
No 22 2 
Yes 7 7 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2 sided): .006 
Access to previously inventoried resources in a national collection* No Yes 
Transfer of know-how in the field of sustainable use and 
cultivation of genetic resources  
 
No 13 16 
Yes 8 1 
Fisher‟s Exact Test Exact Significance (2 sided): .026 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 41: Crosstabulation: Capacity building in combination with synergy effects  
 1= not correct at all ...... 7 = completely correct  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 All 
Capacity building ensures the conservation and the long-term availability of genetic resources 
Transfer of know-how in the field of 
sustainable use / cultivation of GRs * 
No 1 1 2 3 1 2 0 10 
Yes 0 0 1 0 0 3 4 8 
Providers will be better positioned to provide the desired activity, e.g. quality / continuity of material supply. 
Technology transfer * 
No 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 8 
Yes 0 0 1 2 0 5 3 11 
Capacity building increases trust & facilitates communication with providers. 
Technology transfer * 
No 0 0 0 3 2 2 0 7 
Yes 1 0 0 0 1 2 7 11 
Providers will be better positioned to provide the desired activity, e.g. quality / continuity of material supply. 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific field * 
No 0 1 2 2 0 1 0 6 
Yes 0 1 1 2 0 6 3 13 
Capacity building is the prerequisite so that scientific cooperation is possible. 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific field * 
No 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 6 
Yes 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 13 
Capacity building ensures the conservation and the long-term availability of genetic resources. 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific field * 
No 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 6 
Yes 0 0 1 2 0 5 4 12 
Capacity building increases trust and facilitates communication with the providers. 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific field * 
No 1 0 0 3 1 1 0 6 
Yes 0 0 0 0 2 3 7 12 
Source: Author. 
Table A 42: Crosstabulation: Non-monetary benefit-sharing in combination with the transaction 
environment (aggregated through Factor Analysis) 
Yes, joint intellectual property rights to usage results REGR factor scorefactor 2 
 
-1,57 -1,35 -1,22 -0,68 -0,66 -0,46 -0,39 -0,35 -0,27 -0,04 0,51 0,59 0,65 0,88 1,06 1,17 2,12 
no 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Yes, joint intellectual property rights to usage results REGR factor score factor 3 
 
-1,59 -1,50 -0,94 -0,93 -0,50 -0,46 -0,36 -0,36 -0,34 0,22 0,24 0,28 0,92 0,96 1,04 1,44 1,88 
no 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Yes, support of other measures to preserve biodiversity REGR factor score   factor 3 
 
-1,59 -1,50 -0,94 -0,93 -0,50 -0,46 -0,36 -0,36 -0,34 0,22 0,24 0,28 0,92 0,96 1,04 1,44 1,88 
no 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 43: Crosstabulation: Stipulation of internal conflict resolution and interest harmonisation in 
combination with synergy effects of capacity building 
 1= Not correct at all   ......   7= Completely correct 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Providers will be better positioned to provide the desired activity (e.g. 
quality/continuity of supply) 
Internal conflict resolution 
No 0 2 2 3 0 4 0 
Yes 0 0 1 1 0 3 3 
 … increases trust and facilitates communication 
Internal conflict resolution  
No 1 0 0 3 2 3 1 
Yes 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 
 … prerequisite so that scientific cooperation is possible 
Internal conflict resolution  
No 2 2 4 2 0 1 0 
Yes 0 1 1 0 3 0 3 
 … ensures the conservation and the long-term availability of genetic 
resources. 
Internal conflict resolution 
No 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 
Yes 0 0 1 1 0 3 3 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 44: Mann-Whitney U test differentiating for the dispute resolution measures in combination with 
indirect capacities 
Exact description of the mutual activities (for example, schedule, delivery quantities, prices, height of 
compensation payments) in the contract * 
Our company has a high capacity to execute long-term, complex 
projects. Mann-Whitney U: 122.5 Asymp. Sig: .448 
Exact description of the mutual activities in the contract * 
Our company already has experience in the past of executing 
complex long-term projects. Mann-Whitney U: 122 Asymp. Sig: .437 
Exact description of the mutual activities in the contract * 
Our company is experienced in projects with partners from 
developing or newly industrializing countries. Mann-Whitney U: 126.5 Asymp. Sig: .756 
Judicial authority * 
Our company has a high capacity to execute long-term, complex 
projects. Mann-Whitney U: 72.5 Asymp. Sig: .338 
Judicial authority * 
Our company already has experience in the past of executing 
complex long-term projects. Mann-Whitney U: 76 Asymp. Sig: .420 
Judicial authority * 
Our company is experienced in projects with partners from 
developing or newly industrializing countries. Mann-Whitney U: 71.5 Asymp. Sig: .385 
Arbitration with the assistance of an independent third party * 
Our company has a high capacity to execute long-term, complex 
projects. Mann-Whitney U: 97 Asymp. Sig: .267 
Arbitration with the assistance of an independent third party * 
Our company already has experience in the past of executing 
complex long-term projects. Mann-Whitney U: 76.5 Asymp. Sig: .092 
Arbitration with the assistance of an independent third party * 
Our company is experienced in projects with partners from 
developing or newly industrializing countries. Mann-Whitney U: 65 Asymp. Sig: .079 
Internal conflict resolution mechanism, interest harmonisation * 
Our company has a high capacity to execute long-term, complex 
projects. Mann-Whitney U: 131 Asymp. Sig: .747 
Internal conflict resolution mechanism, interest harmonisation * 
Our company already has experience in the past of executing 
complex long-term projects. Mann-Whitney U: 139 Asymp. Sig: .901 
Internal conflict resolution mechanism, interest harmonisation * 
Our company is experienced in projects with partners from 
developing or newly industrializing countries. Mann-Whitney U: 96.5 Asymp. Sig: .159 
Source: Author. 
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 Table A 45: Mann-Whitney U test differentiating for the dispute resolution measures in combination with 
the transaction environment (aggregated through factor analysis) 
Exact description of the mutual activities (for example, schedule, delivery quantities, prices, height of 
compensation payments) in the contract * 
Factor 1 (includes: (1) A reliable legal system, (2) Scientific 
competency of participants in access negotiations, (3) Clear 
competencies of actors for access negotiations, (4) Provider has a 
concept for resource evaluation) Mann-Whitney U: 20 Asymp. Sig:  .124 
Exact description of the mutual activities in the contract * 
Factor 2 (includes: (1) Self-interest of the government of the 
provider country in the execution of the project; (2) Availability of 
information about the national system for access and use of 
genetic resources) Mann-Whitney U: 25 Asymp. Sig:  .290 
Exact description of the mutual activities in the contract * 
Factor 3 (includes: (1) Legal competency of actors involved in 
negotiations; (2) Centrally managed access procedure for genetic 
resources) Mann-Whitney U: 30 Asymp. Sig:  .564 
Exact description of the mutual activities in the contract * 
Competent contact partner is designated and reachable Mann-Whitney U: 24 Asymp. Sig:  .248 
Exact description of the mutual activities in the contract * 
Existence of potential research partners in the provider country Mann-Whitney U: 33 Asymp. Sig:  .773 
Judicial authority * 
Factor 1  Mann-Whitney U: 14 Asymp. Sig:  .378 
Judicial authority * 
Factor 2  Mann-Whitney U: 15 Asymp. Sig:  .450 
Judicial authority * 
Factor 3  Mann-Whitney U: 3 Asymp. Sig:  .023 
Judicial authority * 
Competent contact partner is designated and reachable Mann-Whitney U: 20 Asymp. Sig:  .900 
Judicial authority * 
Existence of potential research partners in the provider country Mann-Whitney U: 12 Asymp. Sig:  .257 
Arbitration with the assistance of an independent third party * 
Factor 1 Mann-Whitney U: 22 Asymp. Sig:  .399 
Arbitration with the assistance of an independent third party * 
Factor 2 Mann-Whitney U: 28 Asymp. Sig:  .833 
Arbitration with the assistance of an independent third party * 
Factor 3 Mann-Whitney U: 21 Asymp. Sig:  .343 
 
Appendix IV: Additional evaluations of the online survey with user companies       
 
 
271 
 
  
 Continued Table A 45 
Arbitration with the assistance of an independent third party * 
Competent contact partner in the administration is designated and 
reachable Mann-Whitney U: 26 Asymp. Sig:  .673 
Arbitration with the assistance of an independent third party * 
Existence of potential research partners in the provider country Mann-Whitney U: 29 Asymp. Sig:  .916 
Internal conflict resolution mechanism, interest harmonisation * 
Factor 1 Mann-Whitney U: 27 Asymp. Sig:  .546 
Internal conflict resolution mechanism, interest harmonisation * 
Factor 2 Mann-Whitney U: 32 Asymp. Sig:  .920 
Internal conflict resolution mechanism, interest harmonisation * 
Factor 3 Mann-Whitney U: 26 Asymp. Sig:  .482 
Internal conflict resolution mechanism, interest harmonisation * 
Competent contact partner is designated and reachable Mann-Whitney U: 22 Asymp. Sig:  .269 
Internal conflict resolution mechanism, interest harmonisation * 
Existence of potential research partners in the provider country Mann-Whitney U: 22 Asymp. Sig:  .269 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 46: Detailed interrelation of explanatory variables with governance elements 
Explanatory variables Correlation Governance Element (Items) 
Governance variable: Contract type 
Primary uncertainty of R&D with genetic resources  
Timeframe of utilisation - Tired contract (against prediction) 
Uncertainty about commercial outcome of utilisation - Tired contract (against prediction) 
Interaction takes place frequently over a longer 
period of time 
+ Tired contract approach 
Indirect capacities: experiences related to projects 
in developing or newly industrializing countries 
+ Tired contract approach 
Governance variable: Contract duration 
Capacity building  
Technology transfer + Contract duration 
Know-how transfer in the scientific field + Contract duration 
Support of other measures to preserve biodiversity + Contract duration 
Know-how transfer in the field of sustainable use / 
cultivation of genetic resources 
+ Contract duration 
Synergy effects of capacity building  
Providers will be better positioned to provide the 
desired activity 
+ Longer timeframes for contract 
duration 
Capacity building increases trust  and facilitates 
communication 
+ Longer timeframes for contract 
duration 
Governance variable: Monetary benefit-sharing 
Provider contribution  
Exclusivity rights 
+ 
Negotiated payments that are made 
after reaching certain steps in the 
usage process 
+ Payments tied to commercial output 
Evaluation of material + Negotiated advance payments 
Preparation of material + 
Weight-related, or hourly-wage 
compensation 
Collection permission + Negotiated advance payments 
Asset specificity + Output-related types of monetary 
benefit-sharing 
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Table A 46 continued Correlation Governance Element (Items of 
Element) 
Primary uncertainty of R&D with genetic resources  
Demand and Market uncertainty - Weight-related, and hourly wage 
compensation 
Uncertainty about the development of the utilization 
process 
+ 
Negotiated advance payments (against 
prediction) 
Indirect capacities + Flexible payment mechanisms 
Governance variable: Non-monetary benefit-sharing 
Provider contribution  
Contribution to advanced research 
+ Joint publications 
+ Technology transfer 
+ 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific 
field 
Collection permission 
+ Support inventory and taxonomy of 
Biodiversity 
+ Transfer of know-how in the scientific 
field 
Exclusivity rights + Joint IPRs 
Preparation of material - Support inventory and taxonomy of 
Biodiversity 
Strategic factors of capacity building  
Providers will be better positioned to provide the 
desired activity 
+ 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific 
field 
+ Technology transfer 
Capacity building increases trust  and facilitates 
communication 
+ 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific 
field 
+ Technology transfer 
Capacity building ensures long-term availability of 
GRs 
+ 
Transfer of know-how in the scientific 
field 
+ 
Know-how transfer in the field of 
sustainable use and/or cultivation of 
GRs 
Interaction takes place frequently over a longer 
period of time 
+ 
Support of inventory and/or taxonomy 
of biodiversity 
+ Technology transfer 
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Table A 46 continued Correlation Governance Element (Items of Element) 
Indirect capacities  
Experiences in projects with partners from 
developing or newly industrializing countries 
+ Joint IPRs to usage results 
+ Joint publication in scientific journals 
+ Support of inventory / taxonomy of Biodiversity 
+ Technology transfer 
+ Transfer of know-how in the scientific field    
+ Transfer of know-how in the field of sustainable 
use / cultivation of GRs 
+ Support other measures to preserve biodiversity 
High capacity to execute long-term, complex 
projects 
+ 
Yes, technology transfer 
Experience in the past of executing complex long-
term projects 
+ 
Transaction environment  
Factor 2 + 
Joint IPRs to usage results 
Factor 3 + 
Factor 3 + Support  other measures to preserve biodiversity 
Governance variable: Conflict resolution 
Provider contribution  
Contribution to advanced research + Third party assisted arbitration 
Collection activities + 
Judicial authorities  
Provider grants some kind of exclusivity in 
connection with genetic resources 
+ 
Only access to previously inventoried GRs + 
Synergy effects of capacity building   
Providers will be better positioned to provide the 
desired activity 
+ 
Internal conflict resolution and measures for 
harmonization of interests. 
Capacity building increases trust & facilitates 
communication 
+ 
…ensures long-term availability of GRs + 
…prerequisite for scientific cooperation + 
Primary uncertainty of R&D with genetic resources   
Demand and Market uncertainty - Internal conflict resolution…  
Uncertainty resulting from technological change 
- Internal conflict resolution…  
+ Judicial Authority 
Unpredictability of commercial output of utilization - Internal conflict resolution … 
Source: Author. 
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Table A 47: Kruskal Wallis test: differentiation of user companies’ sectors affiliation in combination with 
demand aspects for genetic resources  
Sector affiliation aggregated in five categories (sector_aggr5) *  
For some projects in our company was or is access... 
Chi-Square 
value 
Kruskal Wallis 
Test 
Asymp. Sig a 
N 
 ... to undiscovered genetic resources as a potential source of innovative 
products very important. 
1.476 .831 57 
 ... to properties of wild species of certain plants or animals very important.    10.105 .039 56 
 ... it very important to be able to study GRs in the context of their natural 
habitat. 
6.201 .185 58 
 ... traditional knowledge about effectiveness of natural resources very 
important    
14.623 .006 58 
 ... exclusive access or exclusive usage rights for genetic resources very 
important. 
5.016 .286 56 
 ... it very important that the provider could deliver the genetic resource(s) as 
raw material on an intermediate or long-term basis in larger quantities. 
6.481 .166 54 
Source: Author. 
 
